2021-2022

5月25日(火): 16:30-18:40 (@Zoom)

16:30-17:30

発表者1: 河崎亮 (東京工業大学工学院)

タイトル: Myopic and Farsighted Stability of the Core in Assignment Games

概要:

We present some results regarding the core of assignment games and its stability properties. The core of an assignment game consists of outcomes where no buyer-seller pair that is not matched at that outcome can benefit by trading with each other. However, the definition of the core is silent as to how an outcome in the core can be reached. A solution concept that can give some insight towards this aspect is the stable set defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern. We show that the core can be expressed in some form as a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set with respect to domination relations that are based on sequential deviations by either myopic agents or by farsighted agents.

17:40-18:40

発表者2: 坂東桂介(信州大学, 学術研究院社会科学系)

タイトル: Stability and substitutability in dynamic Matching Markets (joint with Ryo Kawasaki)

概要:

We analyze a dynamic matching market where matching between agents is decided for each time period. To analyze this situation, we embed the situation into the framework of many-to-many matching with contracts where the contract includes the time period at which the matching occurs. While a general stability concept is already defined for the matching with contracts framework, in a dynamic matching model, contracts may exhibit complementarities across time periods, which may cause the nonexistence of a stable outcome. Thus, we define a stability concept called temporal stability that is more suitable to the dynamic nature of the model. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a temporally stable outcome, including a corresponding substitutability condition, ordered substitutability, for the dynamic matching model.