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Article by Elsa Lawlor-Gazzea (05.06.2025)
The invention of nuclear weaponry followed by the in-reaction existing concept of nuclear annihilation to the fullest degree is often described as one of the most bittersweet incidents in global scientific history. The year 1945 saw a bipolarity in emotion between the glory of scientific achievement and simultaneously, crippling existential fear; a conflict of mentality and emotion, now so akin to a modern general public by virtue of Christopher Nolan’s three hour biopic “Oppenheimer”.
We have come a long way from 1949, the year the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb “RDS-1”, otherwise known as “JOE-1” at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan. An action which marked the USSR as the second nation ever to develop and test a nuclear device, at which point the concept of nuclear deterrence became central to conceptual peace for and wellbeing of global citizens. But nuclear deterrence as we understand it in a Cold War context is not compatible with modern day geopolitics for a generous array of reasons.
Swingset with a Nuclear Power Plant Station in the background
The Cold War acted as an incubator for technological and ideological development for the two geopolitical hegemons after the second world war, the US and the USSR. It was characterized by the psychological warfare that ensued during this period, which became a replacement for conventional warfare, due to the contemporary reckoning at the time that the usage of nuclear weaponry was synonymous with the literal annihilation of the world. In this period, two major schools of thought emerged. One of these was led by Bernard Brodie, American military strategist, who argued that deterrence at its root was automatic. The central argument of his theory being that even if a nuclear power could not guarantee a full scale counterattack after being hit, the mere risk that it might still retaliate was grounds enough to deter an adversary. However, the second school of thought became far more popular, as a theory in opposition to the first; deterrence is not automatic, but carefully constructed and maintained. Wohlstetter, the American political scientist and father of this line of argumentation, propounded that a nation state must assure that there is second strike capability. If a country can survive a nuclear attack and still retaliate with devastating force, it creates a situation called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD became the concept that infected the collective conscience of all global citizens during the Cold War.
However, both superpowers prioritized strategic stability and non-proliferation, culminating in agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and arms control agreements such as ABM Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).
Photo of Strategic Nuclear Planning extracted from the National Security Archive
A second nuclear age dawned in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This Post-Cold War era took place in an unipolar world, with the US in a position of supreme geopolitical influence and power. The US, sat at a geopolitical helm, using its dominance to significantly reduce nuclear stockpiles, leaving only 14,000 globally. The denuclearization project succeeded in denuclearizing nations such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine.
Nonetheless, deterrence was postponed towards the end of the 1990s as other problems emerged at the close of the millennium. In 1998, both India and Pakistan established nuclear arsenals, while North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and developed nuclear weapons. During this time, concerns grew over missile defense systems undermining deterrence credibility for Russia and China from the point of view of the United States.
Bush and Gorbachev shaking hands in Moscow in July of 1991
While the first nuclear age became an integral aspect of the human understanding of nuclear power, the second aimed to de-escalate under the watchful eye of unofficial American jurisdiction. The Cold War’s bipolar order created a paradoxical peace through the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), where deterrence was stable due to the binary rivalry between the U.S. and USSR, each understanding the other’s capabilities and limits. Following the Soviet collapse, the Second Nuclear Age emerged as a unipolar era dominated by American influence, shifting deterrence from existential fear to managing a fragile international order through arms reductions, denuclearization of former Soviet states, and nonproliferation efforts.
Today’s strategic environment features three principal nuclear powers: the U.S., Russia, and China, each engaged in complex geopolitical competition defined by overlapping rivalries, shifting alliances, and divergent strategic doctrines. The once-clear lines of deterrence now operate across multiple, interdependent dyads, significantly increasing the potential for miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.
Nuclear postures are no longer uniform or predictable. Russia has articulated an “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine, suggesting the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in regional conflicts, while China — historically committed to a no-first-use policy — has recently exhibited doctrinal ambiguity that signals evolving strategic thinking. Smaller nuclear-armed states such as Pakistan and North Korea further complicate the landscape, employing asymmetric deterrence strategies rooted in existential survival rather than strategic parity.
Compounding these challenges, emerging technologies (including artificial intelligence, cyber operations, hypersonic delivery systems, and space-based assets) are fundamentally reshaping the architecture of strategic stability. These innovations blur the boundaries between conventional and nuclear warfare, undermine confidence in early warning systems, and introduce novel vulnerabilities into command, control, and communication (NC3) structures. Traditional models of deterrence, which were predicated on clear escalation ladders and assured second-strike capabilities, are increasingly inadequate in this new strategic reality.
While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty once served as the cornerstone of global nonproliferation efforts, the Third Nuclear Age is characterized by mounting proliferation pressures. Certain developments threaten to crack the global nuclear order into a constellation of unstable, regionally based deterrence regimes.
Once pillars of transparency and predictability, arms control agreements such as the INF Treaty have collapsed and New START remains precariously suspended. In their absence, there exists little institutional mechanism to constrain a new, technologically driven arms race.
Sarmat Missile Test Failure in 2024
This era feels unfamiliar not merely due to its complexity, but because it defies the paradigms and patterns of previous nuclear ages. It resists linear logic, predictable escalation dynamics and universally accepted norms. It demands a re-conceptualization of deterrence, one that incorporates interconnected crises, technological disruption, and ideological fragmentation among both state and non-state actors.
In sum, the Third Nuclear Age is not a mere continuation of earlier nuclear eras; it represents a structural rupture in the logic and practice of strategic deterrence. It is an age in which deterrence is no longer self-evident, in which technological innovation outpaces institutional adaptation, and in which the consequences of strategic misjudgment carry unprecedented gravity.
To navigate this volatile terrain, policymakers and scholars must transcend the intellectual frameworks of the past. We require new paradigms for crisis management, inclusive multilateral arms control mechanisms, and sustained diplomatic engagement among nuclear competitors. Above all, we must recognize that in a world populated by multiple nuclear actors and disruptive technologies, strategic stability cannot be assumed; it must be actively constructed.
Sources:
Robertson, Ryan. "Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal in Question After Sarmat Missile Test Failure." Straight Arrow News, 8 months ago. https://san.com/cc/russias-nuclear-arsenal-in-question-after-sarmat-missile-test-failure/. Accessed 5 June 2025.san.com+1san.com+1
Burr, William. "Overkill, Assured Destruction, and the Search for Nuclear Alternatives: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Posture During the Cold War." National Security Archive, 22 May 2020. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2020-05-22/us-nuclear-weapons-posture-during-cold-war-compilation-core-primary-sources. Accessed 5 June 2025.nsarchive.gwu.edu
The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century
"The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/role-nuclear-weapons-21st-century. Accessed 5 June 2025.
The Third Nuclear Age
"The Third Nuclear Age." OAPEN Library, https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/96956. Accessed 5 June 2025.
Nuclear Stability in the 21st Century
Sood, Rakesh. "Nuclear Stability in the 21st Century." The Diplomat, 3 Oct. 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/nuclear-stability-in-the-21st-century/. Accessed 5 June 2025.
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