Tanks Of Battle World War 2

The Battle of Kursk was a major World War II Eastern Front battle between the forces of Germany and the Soviet Union near Kursk in southwestern Russia during the late summer of 1943; it ultimately became the largest tank battle in history and resulted in a Soviet victory.[35][36] It is considered by some to be the turning point of the European theatre of war instead of the Battle of Stalingrad several months earlier.[35][36][37]

The battle began with the launch of the German offensive Operation Citadel (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle), on 5 July, which had the objective of pinching off the Kursk salient with attacks on the base of the salient from north and south simultaneously. After the German offensive stalled on the northern side of the salient, on 12 July the Soviets commenced their Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of Operation Kutuzov (Russian: ) against the rear of the German forces on the same side. On the southern side, the Soviets also launched powerful counterattacks the same day, one of which led to a large armoured clash, the Battle of Prokhorovka. On 3 August, the Soviets began the second phase of the Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev ( ) against the German forces on the southern side of the salient.

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The battle was the final strategic offensive that the Germans were able to launch on the Eastern Front. Because the Allied invasion of Sicily began during the battle, Adolf Hitler was forced to divert troops training in France to meet the Allied threat in the Mediterranean, rather than using them as a strategic reserve for the Eastern Front.[47] Hitler cancelled the offensive at Kursk after only a week, in part to divert forces to Italy.[48] Germany's extensive losses of men and tanks ensured that the victorious Soviet Red Army enjoyed the strategic initiative for the remainder of the war. The Battle of Kursk was the first time in the Second World War that a German strategic offensive was halted before it could break through enemy defences and penetrate to its strategic depths.[49][50] Though the Red Army had succeeded in winter offensives previously, their counter-offensives after the German attack at Kursk were their first successful summer offensives of the war.[51]

On 15 April, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6, which called for the Kursk offensive operation, codenamed Zitadelle ("Citadel"), to begin on 3 May or shortly thereafter. The directive was drafted by Kurt Zeitzler, the OKH Chief of Staff.[77] For the offensive to succeed it was deemed essential to attack before the Soviets had a chance to prepare extensive defences or to launch an offensive of their own.[78][79] Some military historians have described the operation using the term blitzkrieg (lightning war);[k] other military historians do not use the term in their works on the battle.[l]

Hitler called his senior officers and advisors to Munich for a meeting on 4 May. Hitler spoke for about 45 minutes on the reasons to postpone the attack, essentially reiterating Model's arguments.[89] A number of options were put forth for comment: going on the offensive immediately with the forces at hand; delaying the offensive further to await the arrival of new and better tanks; radically revising the operation, or cancelling it altogether. Manstein advocated an early attack, but requested two additional infantry divisions, to which Hitler responded that none were available.[89] Kluge spoke out strongly against postponement and discounted Model's intelligence.[90] Albert Speer, the minister of Armaments and War Production, spoke about the difficulties of rebuilding the armoured formations and the limitations of German industry to replace losses. General Heinz Guderian argued strongly against the operation, stating "the attack was pointless".[91] The conference ended without Hitler coming to a decision, but Citadel was not aborted.[91] Three days later, OKW, Hitler's conduit for controlling the military, postponed the launch date for Citadel to 12 June.[92][93]

Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front?

A three-month quiet period had descended upon the Eastern Front as the Soviets prepared their defences and the Germans attempted to build up their forces. The Germans used this period for specialised training of their assault troops.[102] All units underwent training and combat rehearsals. The Waffen-SS had built a full-scale duplicate Soviet strong point that was used to practice the techniques for neutralizing such positions. The panzer divisions received replacement men and equipment and attempted to get back up to strength. The German forces to be used in the offensive included 12 panzer divisions and 5 panzergrenadier divisions, four of which had tank strengths greater than their neighbouring panzer divisions. However, the force was markedly deficient in infantry divisions, which were essential to hold ground and to secure the flanks.[103] By the time the Germans initiated the offensive, their force amounted to around 777,000 men, 2,451 tanks and assault guns (70 percent of the German armour on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 guns and mortars.[85][104][p]

Nearly all artillery, including howitzers, guns, anti-aircraft and rockets, were tasked with anti-tank defence.[134] Dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns further strengthened the anti-tank defences.[126][134] Anti-tank forces were incorporated into every level of command, mostly as anti-tank strong points with the majority concentrated on likely attack routes and the remainder amply spread out elsewhere.[134] Each anti-tank strong-point typically consisted of four to six anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank rifles, and five to seven heavy and light machine guns. They were supported by mobile obstacle detachments as well as by infantry with automatic firearms.[135] Independent tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regiments were tasked with cooperating with the infantry during counterattacks.[135]

According to a Soviet General Staff report, 29 of the 35 major Luftwaffe raids on Soviet airfields in the Kursk sector in June 1943 were against dummy airfields.[146] According to historian Antony Beevor, in contrast, Soviet aviation apparently succeeded in destroying more than 500 Luftwaffe aircraft on the ground.[149] The Soviet deception efforts were so successful that German estimates issued in mid-June placed the total Soviet armoured strength at 1,500 tanks.[150] The result was not only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but a misperception of Soviet strategic intentions.[147]

The main tank of the Soviet tank arm was the T-34 medium tank, on which the Red Army attempted to concentrate production. The tank arm also contained large numbers of the T-70 light tank. For example, the 5th Guards Tank Army roughly contained 270 T-70s and 500 T-34s.[when?] In the salient itself the Soviets assembled a large number of lend-lease tanks. These included U.S.-manufactured M3 Lees and British-built Churchills, Matildas and Valentines. However, the T-34 made up the bulk of the Soviet armour.[151] Without including the deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front, the Soviets massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft to defend the salient.[112][152] This amounted to 26 percent of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26 percent of its mortars and artillery, 35 percent of its aircraft and 46 percent of its tanks.[112]

By 1943 the Luftwaffe's strength on the Eastern Front had started to weaken after Stalingrad, and the siphoning of resources to North Africa.[153] The Luftwaffe forces in the east were further depleted with fighter units being shifted back to Germany to defend against the escalating Allied bombing campaign.[154] By the end of June, only 38.7 percent of the Luftwaffe's total aircraft remained in the east.[155] In 1943 the Luftwaffe could still achieve local aerial superiority by concentrating its forces. The majority of German aircraft left available on the Eastern Front were slated for Citadel.[149] The goal of the Luftwaffe remained unchanged. The priority was to gain aerial supremacy, then to isolate the battlefield from enemy reinforcements, and finally, once the critical point had been reached in the land battle, to render close air support.[156]

The changing strengths between the two opponents prompted the Luftwaffe to make operational changes for the battle. Previous offensive campaigns had been initiated with Luftwaffe raids against opposing airfields to achieve aerial superiority. By this point in the war Red Army equipment reserves were extensive and the Luftwaffe commanders realised that aircraft could be easily replaced, making such raids futile. Therefore, this mission was abandoned. In addition, previous campaigns had made use of medium bombers flying well behind the frontline to block the arrival of reinforcements. This mission, however, was rarely attempted during Citadel.[157]

In the months preceding the battle, Luftflotte 6 supporting Army Group Center noted a marked increase in the strength of the opposing VVS formations. The VVS formations encountered displayed better training, and were flying improved equipment with greater aggressiveness and skill than the Luftwaffe had seen earlier.[164] The introduction of the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5 fighters gave the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luftwaffe in terms of equipment. Furthermore, large numbers of ground-attack aircraft, such as the Ilyushin Il-2 "Shturmovik" and the Pe-2, had become available as well. The VVS also fielded large numbers of aircraft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of supplies and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant the Red Army and VVS formations would be able to conduct an extended campaign without slackening in the intensity of their effort.[157] 2351a5e196