Takashi KURIHARA

*Under line: the first author(s)

Journal publications (peer-reviewed)       

[6] Kurihara, T., 2023. Sufficient conditions making lexicographic rules over the power set satisfy extensibility. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 115. [Link]
This study aims to clarify sufficient conditions for weak orders on the existing and null alternatives to make leximax and leximin rules over the power set satisfy extensibility. Each null alternative indicates ‘choosing not to choose the corresponding existing alternative’. Extensibility requires that a preference order of any two alternatives is equivalent to that of their singleton sets. Then, the leximax (alternatively, leximin) rule ranks any two subsets by comparing the same-ranked (null) alternatives in the two transformed subsets (which include the existing alternatives in each subset and the null alternatives of other existing alternatives) from top to bottom (alternatively, bottom to top). We then introduce the following two new properties: Semi-inversion desirability requires that a preference of any two null alternatives is not identical to that of their existing alternatives. Consistent desirability requires that a preference order of ‘a null alternative and a non-paired existing alternative’ is not identical to that of their paired (null) alternatives. We show that semi-inversion desirability implies extensibility, and the combination of semi-inversion desirability and consistent desirability is weaker than a traditional property, namely self-reflecting. Furthermore, we clarify the sufficient condition to make the leximax and leximin rules equivalent.

[5] Adachi, T., Chung, H., Kurihara, T., 2023. (The Impossibility of) Deliberation-Consistent Social Choice. American Journal of Political Science. [Link]
There is now a growing consensus among democratic theorists that we should incorporate both “democratic deliberation” and “aggregative voting” into our democratic processes. But how should the two democratic mechanisms of deliberation and voting interact? In this article, we introduce a new axiom, which we call “Nonnegative Response toward Successful Deliberation” (NNRD). The basic idea is that if some individuals change their preferences toward other individuals’ preferences through democratic deliberation, then the social choice rule should not make everybody who has successfully persuaded others through reasoned deliberation worse off than what they would have achieved without deliberation. We prove an impossibility theorem that shows that there exists no aggregation rule that can simultaneously satisfy NNRD along with other mild axioms that reflect deliberative democracy's core commitment to unanimous consensus and political equality. We offer potential escape routes; however, each escape route can succeed only by compromising some core value of deliberative democracy.

[4] Imahori, M., Kurihara, T., Noguchi, H., 2019. Does income affect medical care and long-term care expenditures for the elderly?: Evidence from claims data of a municipality in Japan. Japanese Journal of Health Economics and Policy (医療経済学研究, in Japanese), 31, 27-46. [ Link ]

[3] Kurihara, T., 2018. Axiomatic characterizations of the basic best-worst rule. Economics Letters, 172, 19-22. [ Link ]
We show that reinforcement and top–bottom cancellation imply anonymity, and that the basic best–worst rule can be characterised by neutrality, continuity, reinforcement, and top–bottom cancellation. Additionally, we directly characterise the basic best–worst rule by neutrality, reinforcement, top–bottom non-negativity, and top–bottom cancellation. Top–bottom non-negativity requires that if the difference in number between the individuals preferring a certain alternative as their best and worst alternatives, respectively, is strictly negative, then that alternative is not included in the social choice.

[2] Kurihara, T., 2018. A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule.  Economics Letters, 168, 110-111. [ Link ]
We axiomatize the anti-plurality rule by anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, and new axioms, that is, averseness and bottoms-only. Averseness is a weaker axiom than faithfulness, and bottoms-only is the opposite of tops-only. Thus, we do not apply the characterization of a scoring social choice rule by anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, and continuity to characterize the anti-plurality rule.

[1] Kurihara, T., Kobayashi, S., 2016. Relevance between Eye-Movements and Choice Behaviors: an Experiment on Strategic Form Games with the Eye-Tracking System. The Waseda Journal of Political Science and Economics, 389-390, 2-17. (in Japanese) [ Link ]

Working papers

[9] Kurihara, T. Lexicographic similarity ordering for abbreviation matching in unsegmented languages. [SSRN]

[8] Kurihara, T., Suga, K. An axiomatic analysis of the difference between variance-to-mean ratio and alpha-Gini coefficient.

[7] Adach, T., Chung, H., Kurihara, T. Borda Rule Meets Approval Voting: Social Choice Scoring Functions Aggregating Weak Orders.

[6] Kurihara, T., Imahori, M. The gender gap in the first marriage for the 20−34-year-old age group having the desire to marry in Japan.

[5] Kurihara, T., Suga, K. Collective decision–making with rational preference update systems based on an expert suggestion. 

[4] Kurihara, T. An axiomatic characterisation of Combined Borda rule. 

[3] Kurihara, T. Leximax and leximin rank-ordered rules on the power set with discrete categories. [SSRN]

[2] Kurihara, T. Leximedian rank-ordered rules on the power set with a rearrangement method. [ SSRN ]

[1] Kurihara, T., Funaki, Y. Relevance between Eye-Movements, Choice Behaviors on the Prisoner's Dilemma Games and Willingness to Pay for a Quasi-Public Good. [ SSRN ]

Invited talks

[5] Kurihara, T., Suga, K. The 2nd Conference on Normative Economics and Philosophy, Tokyo, June 2026.

[4] Adachi, T., Kurihara, T. The 2nd monthly workshop, Institution of Social Science, Kyoto (Online), December 2024.

[3] Adachi, T., Kurihara, T. The 1st Social Choice Theory Workshop, Tokyo, September 2024.

[2] Kurihara, T.  WINPEC Microeconomics Workshop Autumn 2019, Tokyo, November 2019.

[1] Kurihara, T. The 7th workshop of Normative Economics, Tokyo, January 2017 (Debater: Professor Kotaro Suzumura).

Conferences (peer-reviewed)

[22] Kurihara, T., Suga, K. The 18th meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Tokyo, June 2026.

[21] Adachi, T., Chung, H., Kurihara, T. The 17th meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Paris, July 2024.

[20] Kurihara, T., Imahori, M. XXV Applied Economics Meeting, Toledo, June 2023.

[19] Kurihara, T., Imahori, M. Autumn Meeting of JEA, Tokyo,  October 2022  (Debater: Professor Masaaki Mizuochi)

[18] Adachi, T., Chung, H., Kurihara, T. SAET 2021, virtual, June 2021. (Online)

[17] Kurihara, T., Suga, K. World Congress of the IEA 2021, Bali, July 2021. (Online)

[16] Kurihara, T., Suga, K. PSA 2021, Belfast, March 2021. (Online)

[15] Kurihara, T., Suga, K. PSA 2020, Edinburgh, April 2020 (accepted, but cancelled).

[14] Kurihara, T.  2019 Autumn Meeting of JEA, Kobe, October 2019 (Debater: Professor Ryoichi Nagahisa).

[13] Kurihara, T. Tokyo Conference on Economics of Institutions and Organizations Summer 2019, Tokyo, August 2019.

[12] Kurihara, T., Elkind, E. 3rd ILLC Workshop on Collective Decision Making, Amsterdam, June 2019.

[11] Imahori, M., Kurihara, T., Noguchi, H. EuHEA  2018, Maastricht, July 2018.

[10] Kurihara, T.  ESAM 2018, Auckland, July 2018.

[9] Kurihara, T. COMSOC 2018, Troy, June 2018.

[8] Kurihara, T. SIAM DM18, Denver, June 2018.

[7] Kurihara, T. The XVIII World Congress of the IEA, Mexico City, June 2017.

[6] Kurihara, T. 2017 NASMES, St.Louis, June 2017.

[5] Kurihara, T. 2016 AMES, Kyoto, August 2016.

[4] Kurihara, T. The 13th Meeting of SSCW, Lund, June 2016.

[3] Kurihara, T., Funaki, Y. Consciousness and Intention in Economics and Philosophy 2015, Kyoto, December 2015.

[2] Kurihara, T., Funaki, Y. The 19th Conference of Experimental Social Sciences, Tokyo, November 2015.

[1] Kurihara, T., Kobayashi, S.  Japan Association of Political Economy the 5th conference, Tokyo, March 2014.