I am trying to setup synology external access with my ORBI. I was able to quickly setup port forwards using UPnP and all the port seems to be connecting... except port 80. And I think i'm unable to get a DDNS certificate because of this. Does anyone have the same problem?
This certaily looks correct to me. In all this, I forgot to ask what the Orbi is connected to. Obviously, the Orbi is in "router" mode. If it is connected to another router rather than directly to the internet modem, port forwarding is not going to work. One quick test is to do a "trace route" to some external IP adddress, such as Google DNS (8.8.8.8) from any machine on your LAN.
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My tentative conclusion is that the on-line tool will only report a port open when it receives a response from a TCP connection attempt.Th e Orbi forwarding packets may not be enough to confirm the port "open".
It is possibe to verify this, but it is a chore. You can open a "debug session" on the Orbi to record all of the WAN/LAN traffic. Perform the connection attempt. Then close the debug session, save the debug file, and open the WAN and LAN recordings in a program like Wireshark. It should show the packet coming in and going to the Synology, but the Synology not responding. I do this all the time, so I have gotten used to it. The first time, this is a serious time comittment.
I actually love Synology, I have 5 synologys as HTTP DP at 5 separate locations, but only upload packages with jamf admin to 1 (the master) then have they Synology folder rsync replicate that jamf dp folder to all the others automagically - saves me so much time.
Nothing even that fancy, just used WebStation in Synology , virtual host, i used 8080, and pointed document root to i just checked top level sharepoint of my AFP DP folder which containts the root folers Casper Data, Packages, Scripts. and in jamf for the DP HTTP just added port 8080, no other info and , no defaults or timeouts issues and http(s) is so great as it resumes downloads
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I'm using joplin 2.9.17 running on mac os 13.0.1
I have also a brand new NAS synology DS418. I use Synology drive to synchronise my files on my both mac (Air and Pro) and i'd like to synchronize also my joplin notes on both Macs with the NAS and with my Iphone running on IOS 16.2.
Synology is a top-tier network-attached storage vendor, and one that has embraced providing users with remote access to their stored data via its Synology QuickConnect cloud-based infrastructure. In preparation for Pwn2Own Toronto, the annual hacking competition focused on small office IoT devices, we zeroed in to Synology and Western Digital NAS given their position in the market and reach across users worldwide.
Today, most developers are aware of the risks associated with these types of vulnerabilities and attacks, and take advantage of a wide variety of authentication frameworks and libraries in order to deploy a strong user authentication and authorization model.
Using the stolen credentials, an attacker could authenticate to the cloud as the user, access data stored on their NAS device, and also leverage other legitimate features in order to carry out remote code execution attacks on the real device. An attacker would then be able to backdoor the device and maintain persistence, and also launch other attacks, including ransomware.
In this blog, we will explain the inner workings of QuickConnect, how devices authenticate, and the means by which we were able to leverage device identifiers and secrets in order to pull off our attack.
The web pages are served by CGI service. All CGI endpoints are C++ compiled binaries and the root directory for all CGIs is: /usr/syno/synoman and the main configuration file is located at /etc/synoinfo.conf. The user web session information is stored in /usr/syno/etc/private/session.
Similarly to our attack on Western Digital, we wanted to examine the cloud services of Synology DS920+, with the goal of identifying vulnerabilities that could allow us to take over devices. To accomplish this goal, the first step was to gain a better understanding of Synology's cloud services: QuickConnect which is mainly managed by the /usr/syno/sbin/synorelayd binary.
One of the main features of Synology SD920+ is its native integration with the QuickConnect service. Synology QuickConnect is a cloud platform for connecting users remotely from anywhere around the world to their device at home, providing them remote access to their stored data, files, and information.
The device connection and relay mechanism intrigued us as a fascinating area of research, particularly due to its lack of client account requirements. Thus, we embarked on a journey to comprehend the entire mechanism from the perspective of the device (authentication, tunnel, user-connection, user-access).
By identifying vulnerabilities in the device-cloud authentication process, we could potentially mimic the device and spoof its IP address. Consequently, when the user attempts to access their device, the QuickConnect platform would unknowingly redirect them to the attacker. Since the authentication is verified against the device itself, the attacker would then obtain the authentic device credentials.
When the device boots up it will authenticate itself to the QuickConnect cloud. Once authenticated, it will maintain a pull worker that will wait for further instructions. The main instruction is to start the OpenVPN process and connect to the QuickConnect VPN network. This happens when remote clients are trying to access their Synology device remotely.
At the end, the device will wait for further instructions to download an OpenVPN configuration and enter the Synology VPN network. This is done so that clients could reach their devices remotely and bypass NAT/firewall restrictions.
If we could collect all these device identifications, we would be able to impersonate the device and force QuickConnect to relay users to our machine instead of their device and we could steal their credentials to the real device.
provided by the QuickConnect infrastructure. Saved within the device and remains static until removed from the device (for example: performing factory reset). Multiple keys can be generated for single device
After many hours of researching the Synology-QuickConnect infrastructure and the API routes, we discovered that if we are trying to register the device again we will get a new API-KEY without revoking the previous ones. To register a device all we needed was MAC, serial number, model number, and DS-Token.
Therefore, by using the apiauth.quickconnect.to/api.php route and supplying a device serial number, model and MAC, we got a new valid device API-KEY associated with the device. Even though we issued a new API-KEY, the old one stored on the device still worked, meaning the device could still connect to QuickConnect. This vulnerability is tracked as ZDI-23-658.
When the user sets up their device to use QuickConnect cloud feature, they login to their device, go to QuickConnect settings and finally connect to their Synology account from the wizard on the device. This is a pairing process that connects the Synology user and their device. Throughout this process a AUTH-KEY token is saved on the device which uses it as part of its authentication process with QuickConnect.
Most of the API is implemented in account.synology.com/dnsauth.php. We started to investigate how this process works, and noticed an interesting action that can be used with this API called get_auth_key. This can be called without needing the device to have a DDNS name so it was a good candidate for us to check.
We continued our reverse engineering process on the DDNS mechanism (account.synology.com/dnsauth.php) and found another action we could use to get more data without having a DDNS name set to our device. This action is called: check. We found that this action could return the device alias name if we just ask the API via ds_info parameter.
The last thing we need to get before we could authenticate on behalf of the device and steal its tunnel connection is the Device ID (Server ID). To get this identifier, we found an API on global.synology.com/Serv.php that would gladly return information about the device including the Device Identifier if we will send the register command. This vulnerability is tracked as ZDI-23-659.
With the tokens in hand, we can use legitimate functionality on the NAS to enable its management SSH service. Then, we can add another backdoor user to the system, and connect to the device using our new user. We now have an SSH shell on the device, with the ability to execute arbitrary OS commands.
CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') may allow Unauthenticated RCE
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to execute unauthorized code on the platform.
CWE-305 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Missing Authentication for Critical Function may allow Authentication Bypass
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to execute unauthorized code on the platform 152ee80cbc
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