Tuesday, July 8
09:25 – 09:30 Welcome and Opening: Bernard Cornet
09:30-10:50 - Chair: Cuong Le Van
Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University
Pricing people and objects via core assignments
Alessandro Citanna, New York University
Pseudo-markets for indivisible goods
with Mich Tvede
10:50 – 11:10 Coffee Break
11:10-12:30 - Chair: Elena Del Mercato
Vincenzo Platino, University of Naples Federico II
Decentralization for the Core of Non‑Convex Economies with Externalities
with Maria Gabriella Graziano and Marialaura Pesce
Antoine Zerbini, Universitat autonoma de Barcelona
Segment and Rule: Modern Censorship in Authoritarian Regimes
with Kun Heo
12:30-14:00 - Lunch
14:00-15:20 - Chair: Ali Khan
Marcus Pivato, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Global subjective expected utility representations
Stephane Zuber , CNRS and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
A New Characterization of Expected Total Utilitarianism
with Dean Spears and Johan Gustafsson
15:20 – 15:40 Coffee Break
15:40-17:40 - Chair: Bernard Cornet
Michel Grabisch, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Bel Coalitional Games
with Silvia Lorenzini
Alain Chateauneuf, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
On the viability of Choquet pricing
Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Trade and gifts: a general equilibrium approach to social interactions
with Marc Fleubaey
20:00 - Conference Dinner (By invitation only)
Restaurant du Parc Montsouris
Pavillon Montsouris, 20 rue Gazan, 75014 Paris
Wednesday, July 9
09:30-10:50 - Chair: Rabah Amir
Ali Khan, John Hopkins University
On Separately Convex and Separately Continuous Preferences
with Ani Ghosh and Metin Uyanik
Paul Belleflamme, Université catholique de Louvain
with Leonardo Madio and Fabrizio Ciotti
Competition for prominence
10:50 – 11:10 Coffee Break
11:10-12:30 - Chair: Bertrand Wigniolle
Łukasz Woźny
Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
Loss aversion or preference imprecision? On WTA-WTP disparity without endowment effect
with Michal Jakubczyk and Michal Lewandowski
Jean-Pierre Drugeon
CNRS and Paris School of Economics
On Ordinal Recursive Preferences via Nested Binary Aggregators
12:30-14:00 - Lunch
14:00-15:20 - Chair: Jean-Marc Bonnisseau
Fabio Michelucci, Università Ca’ Foscari, Venice
Markets for (concealable) information
Rabah Amir, University of Iowa
Discrete Comparative Statics
with David Rietzke
15:20 – 15:40 Coffee Break
15:40-17:40 - Chair: Antoine Mandel
Philippe Bich, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
A New Non Cooperative Foundation of Pairwise Stability with Some Applications
with Cherif Yaker
Guillaume Vigeral, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Structure of the sets of Nash equilibria of finite games; applications to the complexity of some decision problems in game theory
Agnieszka Rusinowska, CNRS and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Dynamic network formation with farsighted players and limited capacities
with Michel Grabisch, Elena Parilina and Georges Zaccour
Thursday, July 10
09:30-10:30 - Chair: Łukasz Woźny
Adrián Yerovi, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Computation of Weighted Pairwise Stable Networks
In a network formation problem, pairwise stability is a cornerstone concept like Nash Equilibria in game theory. In fact, previous literature has demonstrated that under certain conditions pairwise stable networks are guaranteed to exist and that they have an intrinsic connection to Nash Equilibria when links are unweighted. This relationship allows for the implementation of algorithmic procedures to find pairwise stable networks. Recently, the existence result was generalized to unweighted networks (i.e., links take values in the real numbers), but computational approaches applicable to this setting remain unexamined in the literature. This thesis bridges this gap by developing a stochastic and a tracing algorithm where pairwise stability is achieve through the identification of a Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game involving nodes and links. The algorithms are then applied to a couple pertinent applications from the literature.
Yiqiao Zhou, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Multi-Winner Election Rules and Social Welfare Maximization:
A Review of the Comparison and Optimization of ABC Rules
This presentation explores the design and evaluation of Approval-Based Committee (ABC) rules from a social welfare perspective. As multi-winner elections gain importance in both theoretical research and practical applications, balancing collective satisfaction with equitable representation becomes crucial. I analyze key ABC rules—including Approval Voting, Proportional Approval Voting, Chamberlin–Courant, and Monroe rules—highlighting their differing welfare outcomes and computational trade-offs. In addition to welfare maximization, I also examine fairness-oriented criteria such as Proportional Justified Representation (PJR) and Extended Justified Representation (EJR), and the tensions that arise when these fairness goals conflict with utilitarian objectives. The talk also reviews optimization techniques such as exact algorithms, approximation methods, and heuristics aimed at improving welfare performance. Finally, I outline several possible directions for future improvement, focusing on how voting rules might better integrate welfare objectives with fairness considerations in real-world settings.
10:30 – 11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-12:00 - Chair: Fabio Michelucci
Urmat Dzhunkeev, Université catholique de Louvain
Structural Analysis and Nowcasting with Bayesian Vector Autoregressions and Sentiment
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, we estimate macroeconomic effects of monetary policy by Proxy Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVAR). Second, we forecast the US gross domestic product (GDP) by mixed-frequency Bayesian Vector Autoregressions (BVAR) and their combination constructed by Bayesian Predictive Synthesis (BPS). We contribute to macroeconometric literature in two respects. First, we orthogonalize the monetary policy surprises (MPS) with a broader set of sentiments: Beige Books, Federal Reserve System (Fed) speeches, Fed testimonies. Second, we include sentiment scores from the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) internal meetings as instrumental variables in the Proxy SVAR. In comparison to quarterly BVAR we find a higher forecast performance of mixed- frequency BVARs and their combination from the current-quarter to 4-quarter-ahead horizon: (i) 14.98-38.62% by blocking BVAR, (ii) 26.68-40.31% by Cube root BVAR, (iii) 11.01-38.33% by Latent BVAR, (iv) 25.68-47.08% by BPS. With orthogonalized MPS we observe a lower response of consumer price index and industrial production compared to a Proxy SVAR without orthogonalization of MPS. Impulse response functions (IRFs) are robust to sentiment scores from FOMC internal meetings that are included as additional instrumental variables in the Proxy SVAR.
Sena Akbayir, Université catholique de Louvain
Does Financial Market Participation Increase Households’ Well-being?
Insight on households’ saving habits and financial investment choices
Financial market participation helps households to secure and control their future financial situation. This study empirically tested whether financial market participation improves household well-being, using Dutch DNB micro-household survey panel data from five survey waves (2020-2024). Fixed-effects and between-effects panel regression models are adopted to distinguish within-individual and across-individual variations over time. Results indicate a modest, statistically significant negative relationship between financial market participation and happiness, which serves as a proxy for subjective well-being. This relationship was found robust to alternative measures, such as assets from investments and their share in the asset portfolio. Findings suggest financial market participation does not enhance subjective well-being and, in the context of the Dutch population, may be associated with a slight decline in reported overall happiness. Employment status, owning real estate, higher health conditions, marriage status and perceived financial household status show significant and high positive effects on happiness.
12:00 End of conference