Program

Monday, June 27

8:30 – 9:00 Welcome, Coffee & Registration – Room 116

9:00 – 11:00 Room 117 – Chair: Alessandro Citanna, Yeshiva University

Hervé Crès, New York University in Abu Dhabi

Why so much consensus? Reciprocal aggregation and duality between persons and groups (with M. Tvede)

Sebastián Cea-Echenique, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne – CES & PSE

Generalized trust does not necessarily improve efficiency (with A. Marinovic)

John K.-H. Quah, Johns Hopkins University

A revealed preference theory of monotone choice and strategic complementarity (with N. Lazzati and K. Shirai)

11:00 – 11:25 Coffee Break – Room 116

11:25 – 12:45 Room 117 – Chair: Zied Lachiri, National Engineering School of Tunis – ENIT

Jacqueline Morgan, University of Naples Federico II & CSEF

Inner regularizations and viscosity solutions for pessimistic bilevel optimization problems (with M.B. Lignola)

Hedy Attouch, University Montpellier

Modeling resource dynamics from a conservation of resources perspective. An application to psychological health at work (with J.-P. Neveu)

12:45 – 14:00 Lunch Break – Room 116

14:00 – 16:00 Room 117 – Chair: Nizar Allouch, Queen Mary University of London

Itzhak Gilboa, HEC Paris & Tel-Aviv University

Weighted utilitarianism, Edgeworth, and the market (with R. Argenziano)

Franz Dietrich, CNRS – CES & PSE

Savage’s theorem under changing awareness

Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University

The subgame-perfect core (with P. Chander)

16:00 – 16:20 Coffee Break – Room 116

16:20 – 17:40 Room 117 – Chair: Erik J. Balder, University of Utrecht

Prajit K. Dutta, Columbia University

Asyncronous games with transfers: Uniqueness and optimality; Part I - finite horizon (with P. Siconolfi)

Olivier Guéant, ENSAE ParisTech - CREST/LFA, and Jean-Michel Lasry, Ceremade & Institut Louis Bachelier

Mean field games in economics and finance

19:30 Social Dinner of the Workshop

Restaurant Bouillon Racine

3 rue Racine, 75006 Paris

Phone: 00 33 1 85 15 21 33

Website: http://www.bouillon-racine.com/

Métro: Cluny - La Sorbonne

Parking Ecole de Médicine: 21 rue de l’Ecole de Médecine

Tuesday, June 28

9:00 – 9:30 Welcome & Coffee – Room 116

9:30 – 10:50 Room 117 – Chair: Yiannis Vailakis, University of Glasgow

Paolo Siconolfi, Graduate Business School of Columbia University

Designing constrained efficient markets under moral hazard or hidden information (with A. Citanna)

Lukasz Wozny, Warsaw School of Economics

Repeated moral hazard with costly self control

10:50 – 11:20 Coffee Break – Room 116

11:20 – 12:40 Room 117 – Chair: Pascal Gourdel, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne – CES & PSE

Annamaria Barbagallo, University of Naples Federico II

Advances in oligopolistic market equilibrium with variational inequality arguments (with P. Mauro)

Herakles Polemarchakis, University of Warwick

Rational dialogs

12:40 – 14:00 Lunch Break – Room 116

14:00 – 16:00 Room 117 – Chair: Pawel Dziewulski, University of Oxford

Mich Tvede, Newcastle University

Regulation of trades based on differences in beliefs (with H. Crès)

Philippe Bich, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne – CES & PSE

Ambiguity aversion and pure-strategy equilibrium refinement in discontinuous games

Frank Page, Indiana University

Systemic risk and the dynamics of financial networks (with R. Gong)

16:00 – 16:30 Coffee Break – Room 116

16:30 – 17:50 Room 117 – Chair: Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne – CES & PSE

Jan Werner, University of Minnesota

The envelope theorem, Euler and Bellman equations, without differentiability (with R. Marimon)

Nicholas Yannelis, University of Iowa, and Maria Gabriella Graziano, University of Naples Federico II & CSEF

Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences (with C. Meo)