I am a Lecturer in Economics at the Ulster University Business School. My research sits at the intersection of economic history and applied industrial organisation, with a specific focus on patent institutions, intellectual property rights, innovation policy, and firm financing. I hold a PhD in Economics from Queen's University Belfast, where my thesis explored invention and innovation during the British Industrial Revolution. I am particularly interested in the adoption of natural language processing and large-language modelling techniques to study patent data.
I am a Research Affiliate at Queen's University Centre for Economic History and the Centre for Economics, Policy, and History.
My work has been published in leading journals such as The Economic History Review, European Review of Economic History, Explorations in Economic History, and Industrial and Corporate Change
Our understanding of the relationship between the English patent system and technical change during the industrial revolution is based entirely on the study of successful patents. We address this feature by providing the first study of unsuccessful patent applications in England during the first industrial revolution. The paper presents a new hand-collected dataset of 722 unsuccessful patent applications filed in England between 1783 and 1834, drawn from archival records of the Home Office. Combined with existing records of granted patents, we employ econometric analysis to empirically investigate the determinants of patent failure. Using natural language processing techniques to measure patent novelty, we find that more novel patents and patents originating from technological outsiders were more likely to fail. We also find early failure discouraged applicants from subsequent patenting attempts, although we find no evidence that failed applications were of a lower economic value than successful ones. Our findings are linked to a system of ex ante private opposition of patents, known as caveat opposition, specific to the English patent system at the time. We argue the caveat system served to block threatening competitors rather than filter out low-quality patents. Private opposition, therefore, likely impeded knowledge diffusion during Britain's industrial revolution.
In 1794, the British State intervened in the patent system by introducing the Navy proviso, a legal proviso targeted at select patents compelling the patentee to supply their invention to the State on terms set by state-appointed adjudicators. This study employs new patent and archival data to examine the proviso’s origins, administration, and which technologies it was targeted at. Our findings reveal the state targeted technologies to enhance logistical and operational capacities during wartime, addressing potential undersupply in private markets. Functioning similarly to patent buyouts and compulsory licensing, the proviso may have encouraged technical change and knowledge dissemination.
Email: s.billington@ulster.ac.uk
University Profile: https://pure.ulster.ac.uk/en/persons/stephen-billington/
Location: Ulster University Business School, York Street, Belfast, BT15 1AP