UNSEEN ACTORS:

The Cuban Revolution is often thought of as a watershed moment in history when in 1959, Fidel Castro led many bearded men and a rural peasant base to overthrow Fulgencio Batista and his regime, ending his oppressive reign while bringing the victorious revolutionaries to power. While Castro and his men successfully overthrew Batista and remained a significant part of the success of the Cuban Revolution, there are a considerable number of other factors that led to Batista’s demise. Antoni Kapcia, Latin American historian and author of Leadership in the Cuban Revolution, coined the term Fidel-Centrism, which is the overwhelming tendency of scholarship on the Cuban Revolution to focus on the efforts and person of Fidel Castro.1 Similarly, Julia Sweig’s book Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground also highlights the issue that much of the scholarship surrounding the revolution is either centered on Castro and his guerrilla forces in the Sierra Maestra mountain ranges or distorted in the sense that it fails to recognize the role of the urban underground in the Cuban Revolution.2 This is not by coincidence, rather the revolutionary myth crafted by Che Guevara, which gives prominence to Castro and his guerrilla forces, is what leads many to having a distorted view of the Cuban Revolution.3 Despite the prevailing myth that has largely been embraced by Cubans ever since, recent scholarship on the Cuban Revolution overturns both Fidel-Centrism and the “founding fathers” myth crafted by Che Guevara, and instead highlights the urban underground (also known as the Llano) as essential to the overall success of the 26th of July Movement (M267). Despite the urban underground’s short-lived hegemony within the 26th of July Movement, the urban underground was vital in ensuring the successes of Castro and his guerrilla forces and to the efforts of overthrowing Batista.

Contrary to what many scholars believe about the urban underground, the llano were not a threat to Castro and his men in the Sierra Maestra, rather the urban underground were vital to the survival of the guerrilla army in the years leading up to 1959. The 26th of July Movement, Castro’s vanguard revolutionary organization which included both the llano and the sierra (Castro and his guerrilla forces), was one of several opposition forces in 1955, alongside parties such as Organización Auténtica and the Ortodoxo Party. The llano exercised control over much of the strategic organizing and extensive planning in the M267 (The 26th of July Movement that took place between the years of 1956-1958, while simultaneously supplying the guerrillas with supplies and arms in the Sierra Maestra mountain ranges. By 1956, Frank Pais, who had been active in the anti-Batista clandestine resistance since 1953, had taken over the responsibility of expanding resistance in the cities. The primary goal of Pais and other core members of the 26th of July Movement such as Armando Hart, Faustino Perez, Haydee Santamaria and other underground activists was to build up Castro’s guerrilla force, create new fronts, and form urban militias and to organize the Cuban working class.4 It was Pais who was further committed to the enormous task of outlining the M267’s strategic plans of overthrowing Batista by advocating for a nationwide general strike supported by armed struggle.5 Pais also held the responsibility of supplying Castro and his men in the Sierra Maestra, as they were entirely dependent on the llano for things like arms, supplies, and ammunition.6 The contributions of core members of the urban underground including Frank Pais and many others highlight the ways in which both the sierra and the llano worked together. These contributions also underlined the ways in which the urban underground laid the groundwork for future events such as the general strike of 1958. While these contributions were significant, they weren’t nearly as important as the Sierra Manifesto, a document that was an essential in politicizing Cuban society.

In addition to the urban underground’s efforts in organizing in the cities and supplying the guerrillas, Frank Pais along with other core members of the 26th of July Movement also made important contributions to the Sierra Manifesto, a document that attempted to undermine electoral methods of attaining power while simultaneously calling for Batista’s resignation. Pais, core members of the M267 and leaders such as Raul Chibas, Enrique Barroso, and others made the trip to Cuba to meet with Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra mountain ranges to discuss the possibilities of forming a revolutionary government and other important issues.7 Frank Pais was successful in gathering Cuba’s societal leaders and convincing them to side with the 26th of July’s insurrectionist strategy, and what emerged from these meetings was the Sierra Manifesto. The Sierra Manifesto was significant in that it responded to the main concerns and questions that were asked throughout Cuba.8 The document (published in July of 1957) attempted to politicize Cuba while simultaneously calling for unity among civic institutions, opposition parties and revolutionary sectors.9 It desired unity in that it called for civic institutions and opposition parties to demand Batista’s resignation, which would ultimately signify their rejection of electoral paths to peaceful transition. The manifesto solidified the 26th of July Movement’s organizational strategies originally proposed and advocated for by Pais, while also corresponding with Pais’s plans of coordinating a general strike to overthrow Batista.10 More importantly, the Sierra Manifesto was symbolic in that it showcased the efforts of both the sierra and the llano. Both factions of the 26th of July Movement worked together in order to undermine electoral paths to power while actively working towards Batista’s demise.

While it is clear that the urban underground and Frank Pais’s organizational and strategic efforts were vital to the success of the 26th of July Movement as well as Castro and his guerrilla forces, both Fidel Castro and Che Guevara have expressed ambivalence towards the urban underground. Despite the urban underground’s vital contributions, Guevara’s founding fathers myth has largely contributed to much of the scholarship that undermines the urban underground’s significance. Furthermore, many Cubans and others alike see Castro and his men as the driving force behind Batista’s demise, when in actuality, the act of overthrowing Batista was the climax of the prolonged insurgency and a product of both the sierra and the llano’s efforts. In his critique of Che Guevara’s foco theory, historian Matt D. Childs mentions Guevara’s writings as being generally well received throughout the world, which has greatly contributed to people’s understanding of the revolution.11 Che Guevara’s Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War is one of many published writings that has contributed to people’s distorted view of the revolution. In this particular essay, Guevara gives prominence to the inhabitants of the Sierra Maestra, stating that they are unique in their struggles.12 Guevara emphasizes their role as true revolutionaries, attempting to undermine the efforts of the urban underground while simultaneously reinforcing the myth that remains popular throughout the world. Historian Antoni Kapcia attributes Castro’s fame as one of the reasons as to why many scholars and others alike have a distorted view of the Cuban revolution.13 It may have also been the fact that Castro didn’t have his hands in most of the organizing and decision making that occurred within the urban underground. Regardless, both Castro and Guevara have spoken well of the urban underground and formally recognized it’s contributions, although one particular event possibly changed their views on the significance of the urban underground, an event that led to Castro and his men becoming the hegemonic force in the 26th of July Movement. This event was the general strike of 1958, a significant failure for the urban underground that dramatically changed the direction and strategy of the entire 26th of July Movement.

Che Guevara referred to the general strike of 1958 as a “painful failure” that did not succeed in threatening the regime's hold on power.14 Despite Guevara’s usual attempts to minimize the significance of the urban underground, he was correct. The general strike in 1958 was a failure, and despite the years of tedious organizing and planning, the urban underground wasn’t able to recover from a failure as big as this. Since Pais’s death in July of 1957, the llano had expanded much of its outreach and influence, which led to lots of organizational issues within the core of the urban underground. While Rene Ramous Latour and Celia Sanchez, two central figures in the Cuban Revolution who played an essential role in the development of the urban underground, overtook Pais and his duties, both worked tirelessly to meet the needs of the llano and the sierra, and even then, the urban underground still lacked organization.15 Considering Fidel Castro had his hands full in the Sierra Maestra, he realized his need for Pais when his successors failed to allocate the necessary resources to the sierra.16 Latour did visit the Sierra Maestra to reassure Castro of his efforts, although it became evident that Pais’s death was already starting to weaken the llano. This was only the beginning of the decline of the urban underground.

Under the leadership of Rene Ramos Latour, the urban underground’s primary strategy following the death of Frank Pais was to continue following the organizational plans he originally implemented before his death, which was to carry out a general strike followed by an armed insurrection. Despite some internal conflicts that occurred within the 26th of July Movement between the months of November 1957 and January 1958, the llano were able to remain autonomous from Castro in the Sierra Maestra. Latour’s new strategy for the llano centered around an urban militia that would eventually overthrow Batista in the general strike.17 While Castro’s primary concern was his need for supplies, arms, ammunition and other resources from the llano, the urban underground’s focus also remained to garner support from students and the Cuban working class.18 The urban underground were successful in garnering support for the general strike, and even had Fidel Castro’s approval of the plans to carry out the strike.19 Although just as things started to fall into place for the general strike, even more problems began to arise. Due to an extremely limited supply of weapons and ammunition, some of the urban militia’s captains being killed, intensified repression from Batista and his regime, and an overall sense of disunity between opposition groups and the 26th of July Movement, the strike that was supposed to showcase the immense efforts of both the sierra and the llano had failed.20

On April 9, 1958, the general strike that was once described as “the final stage of Cuba’s struggle against Batista” had failed. With this failure came the end of the urban underground’s hegemony in the 26th of July Movement, allowing for Castro and his guerrilla forces to take center stage. The failure of the strike contributed to much of the scholarship and historiography that continues to undermine the efforts of the llano, although the strike highlights some of the ways in which the urban underground was vital to Batista’s demise. While it is obvious that Castro and his guerrilla forces had effectively taken control of the M267 and were successful in doing so, the urban underground and it’s incredibly skillful group of core members had arguably laid the groundwork that was needed in order for Castro and his men to succeed. The failure of the strike also highlights the massive amount of coordination, resources, and talent needed to accomplish something as monumental as overthrowing a dictatorial regime. Due to the extensive efforts of Frank Pais, Armando Hart, Haydee Santamaria, Celia Sanchez, and many others, Castro and his guerrilla forces were able to survive in the Sierra Maestra Mountain Ranges while the urban underground effectively prepared the cities for what was to come in 1959.

While many people’s understanding of the Cuban Revolution highlights the importance of Fidel Castro and his guerrilla forces as the vanguard of the 26th of July Movement, the urban underground’s efforts from the years of 1956-1958 overturn the myth (crafted by Che Guevara) that has remained prevalent in scholarship and historiography since 1959. While the efforts of Frank Pais and the urban underground have been largely seen as an attempt to undermine the efforts of Castro in the Sierra Maestra, scholars such as Julia Sweig and Antoni Kapcia have argued against this in their respective works, instead emphasizing the many ways in which both the sierra and the llano worked together to undermine Batista’s authority and electoral paths to power. The efforts of Frank Pais and many others who extensively organized while simultaneously providing the sierra with arms and supplies have been largely overlooked by scholars and others alike, when in actuality the sierra depended upon the llano in order to survive in its early stages. Furthermore, the sierra worked closely with the llano, and while Castro viewed the sierra as the main focus and driving force behind the revolution, he still recognized the llano as essential to the 26th of July Movement and the revolution at large. It is extremely important for historians and others alike to recognize the joint efforts of both the sierra and the llano in the Cuban Revolution, and in doing so, a complete story of the Cuban Revolution emerges.

Antoni Kapcia, Leadership in the Cuban Revolution, 1.
Julia Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution, 1.
Ibid
Ibid, 13.
Ibid, 14.
Ibid
Ibid, 31.
Ibid, 34.
Ibid, 35.
Ibid, 37.
Matt D. Childs, Journal of Latin American Studies, 598.
Che Guevara, Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, (pdf).
Antoni Kapcia, Leadership in the Cuban Revolution, 2.
Matt D. Childs, Journal of Latin American Studies, 601.
Julia Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution, 49.
Ibid, 54.
Ibid, 96.
Ibid, 96.
Ibid, 110.
Ibid, 131.