SIHS SEMINAR Series
SIHS SEMINAR Series
2025年11月14日(金) November 14 (Fri.), 2025 5:20PM-6:50PM
報告者/Presenter: 中田 里志/Satoshi Nakada (東京理科大学/Tokyo University of Science)
Title: The Coarse Nash Bargaining Solutions (joint with Kensei Nakamura)
場所：2号館11階経済学部会議室B
Venue: 11th Floor, Bldg. No.2 Meeting Room B
幹事/Organizer：釜賀浩平/Kohei Kamaga
言語/Language：英語/English
要旨/Abstract:
This paper studies the axiomatic bargaining problem and proposes a new class of bargaining solutions, called coarse Nash solutions. These solutions assign to each problem a set of outcomes coarser than that chosen by the classical Nash solution (Nash,1950). Our main result shows that these solutions can be characterized by new rationality axioms for choice correspondences, which are modifications of Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives (or more precisely, Arrow's (1959) choice axiom), when combined with standard axioms.
Co-hosted by Sophia Institute for Human Security and JSPS KAKENHI Grant No. 24H00143 "Institutional Design for Social Common Capitals."
SIHSセミナーは、上智大学・人間の安全保障研究所 (SIHS) が主催するオープンな学術セミナーです。学内・学外を問わず、興味のある研究者・院生・学生の方はお気軽にご参加ください。The SIHS Seminar series is hosted by Sophia Institute for Human Security (SIHS). Our academic seminar series is open to anyone who is interested; all researchers, graduate students, and undergrad students are welcome. Feel free to participate if you are interested.