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Visite o canal para mais vídeos
Visite também os vídeos do VI Congresso da SBFA (2020): https://www.youtube.com/channel/UClKz143oA3VNB3L3038CtgQ/featured
Palestra do Prof. Otávio Bueno na UFAL - Alagoas, em Julho de 2018.
Sobre o Nominalismo em Filosofia da Matemática
Daniel Hutto - Handling the hard problem of content with kinky cognition - III ICCN Ways of Enaction
Em Setembro de 2017.
Manuel Heras-Escribano -
III ICCN - Ways of Enaction
Em Setembro de 2017
II Congresso SBFA:
04 a 06 de Junho de 2012
Apenas alguns vídeos do II Congresso SBFA estão disponíveis. Agradecimentos a Carlos Augusto.
Susan Haack
Epistemology: Who Needs It?
University of Miami shaack@law.miami.eduThis reflection on the real-world relevance of epistemological ideas begins with the thought that all of us—when we wonder what to make of newspaper reports of supposed medical breakthroughs, of failures of military intelligence, etc., etc.—call, implicitly or explicitly, on epistemology; and shows how an understanding of, e.g., the differences between genuine inquiry and advocacy research, the nature of wishful and fearful thinking, and the material character of the relevance and its bearing on what relevant evidence we may be missing, can illuminate the ways in which inquiry can go wrong and evidence can mislead us.
Shaun Nichols
Rational Learners and Non-Utilitarian Rules
University of Arizona snichols@philosophy.utah.eduHundreds of studies on moral dilemmas show that people’s judgments do not conform to utilitarian principles. However, the exact nature of this nonconformity remains unclear. Some maintain that people rely on deontological “side constraints” that are insensitive to cost-benefit analysis. However, the scenarios that are used to support this intuition, e.g., the magistrate and the mob, contain an important confound. In these cases, we consider whether it is appropriate for one person to violate a moral rule in order to prevent others from committing similar violations. In that case, people tend to say that it would be wrong to violate the rule. In a series of experiments, we showed that people give very different responses when the question is whether an agent should violate a moral rule so that she herself doesn’t have to commit more such violations in the future. This suggests that a critical feature of our moral rules is that they function in an intra-agent, rather than inter-agent manner. But this raises a further question – why do our rules have this non-utilitarian character? One prominent view (e.g. Mikhail 2007) holds that the structure of moral rules plausibly depends on an innate moral grammar. We propose instead that given the evidence that the young child has, a rational Bayesian learner would in fact arrive at non-utilitarian rules.
Mesa Redonda:
ISSUES ON MODERATE RELATIVISM
Nicolás Lo Guercio
Universidad de Buenos Aires – Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas – Grupo de Acción FilosóficaJustina Díaz Legaspe
Universidad Nacional de La Plata ∕ Universidad de Buenos Aires ∕ Grupo de Acción FilosóficaRamiro Caso
Universidad de Buenos Aires ∕ Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas ∕ Grupo de Acción FilosóficaMesa Redonda:
MORALIDADE E EMOÇÃO – TEMAS DO TRABALHO DE JESSE PRINZ
Caroline Marim
Universidade Gama FilhoCláudia Passos Ferreira
Universidade Federal do Rio de JaneiroRodrigo de Souza Tavares
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro ∕ Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de JaneiroProf. Dr. Jesse Prinz
City University of New York