This chapter pretty much reminds me why one of my fundamental ethical systems is preference utilitarianism (more on me here).
I think Singer effectively disposes of this notion:
p38-39:
To say that Jack and Jill had equal opportunities to become a doctor, because Jack would have got into medical school if his results had been as good as Jill's, is to take a superficial view of equal opportunity ... Genuine equality of opportunity requires us to ensure that schools give the same advantages to everyone.
Making schools equal would be difficult enough, but it is the easiest of the tasks that await a thoroughgoing proponent of equal opportunity. Even if schools are the same, some children will be favoured by the kind of home they come from. ... But how does one equalise a home? Or parents? Unless we are prepared to abandon the traditional family setting and bring up our children in communal nurseries, we can't.
Even if we did rear our children communally, as on a kibbutz in Israel, they would inherit different abilities and character traits, including different levels of aggression and different IQs. Eliminating differences in the child's environment would not affect differences in genetic endowment.
So equality of opportunity is not an attractive ideal. It rewards the lucky, who inherit those abilities that allow them to pursue interesting and lucrative careers. It penalises the unlucky, whose genes make it very hard for them to achieve similar success.
p40:
Whatever the facts about the social or genetic basis of racial differences in IQ, removing social disadvantages will not suffice to bring about an equal or a just distribution of income - not an equal distribution, because those who inherit the abilities associated with high IQ will continue to earn more than those who do not; and not a just distribution because distribution according to the abilities one inherits is based on an arbitrary form of selection that has nothing to do with what people deserve or need. The same is true of visual-spatial ability and aggression, if these do lead to higher incomes or status.
p??-??:
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p??-??:
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[It is assumed that humans are basically the same and thus preferences are not genetic and have a normal distribution, ie: bell curve.]
Opposing opportunity isnt my goal. In fact, opportunity is prerequisite for preference utilitarianism:
People want to be able to satisfy their preferences which plainly requires the opportunity to do so.
Thus, in the/this "classic" debate: Opportunity becomes another outcome to be equalized.
How? We measure our success at maximizing opportunity by measuring life outcomes:
Gross:
A bit more detailed:
We begin to question whether or not opportunities are equalized when we find large disparities between people and on further analysis find these people can be easily categorized:
Based on our assumption above, any outcome distributed across clear categorizes of people are likely the result of an unethical process using immoral values..
Participatory Economics pretty much answers why remuneration for effort vs other (skill, "value", etc) is the correct moral choice.
Need is a constraint on preference satisfaction. (Reminder: Preference satisfaction is a constraint on personal eudaimonia.)
People whose needs are met must be having their preferences met and are must more likely to be flourishing.
People who need can not act on their preferences to their fullest extent and are unlikely to be flourishing.
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