Abstract: 

 In a laboratory setting, we study the effect of induced partisanship on costly information acquisition, information sharing, and voting decisions in an endogenous social network. We find social media significantly increases the quality of group decision making when information sharing on the platform is constrained to be truthful. However, when it is possible to share misinformation, social media has a deleterious effect and group decisions are worse than when there is no information sharing at all. 

Abstract:

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to investigate the efficacy of different content moderation policies designed to combat misinformation on social media. These policies vary the way posts are monitored and the consequence imposed when misinformation is detected. We consider three monitoring protocols: (1) individuals can fact check information shared by other group members for a cost; (2) the social media platform randomly fact checks each post with a fixed probability; (3) the combination of individual and platform fact checking. We consider two consequences: (1) fact-checked posts are flagged, such that the results of the fact check are available to all who view the post; (2) fact-checked posts are flagged, and subjects found to have posted misinformation are automatically fact checked for two subsequent rounds, which we call persistent scrutiny. We compare our data to that of Pascarella et al. (Social media, (mis)information, and voting decisions. Working paper, 2022), which studies an identical environment without content moderation. We find that allowing individuals to fact check improves group decision making and welfare.  Platform checking alone does not improve group decisions relative to the baseline with no moderation. It can improve welfare, but only in the case of persistent scrutiny. There are marginal improvements when the two protocols are combined. We also find that flagging is sufficient to curb the negative effects of misinformation. Adding persistent scrutiny does not improve the quality of decision-making; it leads to less engagement on the social media platform as fewer group members share posts.

Abstract:

Does the local nature of information in a networked environment impede coordination and cooperation? How does the communication structure affect the actions group's coordinate on?  This paper explores the interplay between two communication structures and decisions in a best-shot public good game across three five-person networks. The network determines which group members share a local public good.  Across the networks, the number of neighbors each person has is varied. In the Line network, an individual can have either one or two neighbors. In the Asymmetric network, an individual can have one, two, or three neighbors. Lastly, the Circle network is symmetric, and everyone has two neighbors. I then introduce two communication structures. The first is global, where all group members can communicate. Second is local, where only neighbors can communicate. Unlike global, the local structure overlays the communication structure on the underlying network of externalities, which reinforces the strategic advantage of individuals with more neighbors in the Line and Asymmetric networks. Compared to no communication, both global and local structures successfully raise efficiency in the Line and Asymmetric networks. However, in the Circle network, only local communication is successful in raising efficiency. Global communication does not improve efficiency or the likelihood of coordinating on an equilibrium. With communication, individuals learn to take turns to invest, which promotes equity and efficiency. 

Abstract:

The existing literature studying the effect of network structure on public good provision report a negative relationship between the number of neighbor an individual has and their likelihood of investing in the public good. The evidence points at the lack of incentive for individuals in central positions to invest which in turn leads to lower total social welfare. This paper uses a laboratory experiment tests the relative efficacy of two cost sharing rules in raising efficiency across three five individual network structures in a best shot public goods game. The two cost sharing rules incentivizes individuals with more neighbors to invest and groups to coordinate on the efficient Nash equilibria. The first rule is a local cost sharing, where individual who invest receive a transfer of a fixed proportion of the cost from each of their neighbors who do not invest. The second is a global cost sharing rule where the total cost of investment is equally divided among individuals who benefit from the public good. I find that the efficiency is the lowest in the treatment without cost sharing, the low efficiency is driven by underprovision. The introduction of the two cost sharing rule lowers underprovision of the public good. The local cost sharing rule increases efficiency across all network structure and it is successful in incentivizing individuals with more neighbors to invest in the public good. I find an inverse relationship between the asymmetry of the network structure and the effectiveness of the global cost sharing in increasing efficiency.  

Abstract:

Can norms predict behavior in Principal-Agent settings? Are there any general rules governing decision-making when an Agent chooses between two risky prospects for a Principal? In this paper, we first elicit ratings from independent Judges of the social appropriateness of decisions made by Agents. We elicit these norms using Krupka and Weber (2013). In addition, we elicit whether the choices made by Agents deserve a reward or punishment from the Principal. We find strong evidence for coordination on norms around the social appropriateness of decisions. Furthermore, we find that Agents are more likely to select more normative options. In contrast, we find that Principals' allocation for bonuses depends on the realization of the risky prospect rather than whether the Agents' choice was consistent with the norm. 

1. Effect of immigration policies on children's health (with Augustine Denteh and Makayla Lavender) - Data analysis

2. Willingness to pay for fact-checking (with Lucas Rentschler)  - Preliminary draft available

3. Norms of Norms (with J Dustin Tracy) - Preliminary draft available

4. Contagion Dilemmas  (with Abdul H. Kidwai and Lawrence R. De Geest)  - IRB submitted.

5. Stochastic best shot public goods game in networks - Experiment design.

1. "Upgrading in the Indian garment industry: a study of three clusters" (with Saon Ray and Mishita Mehra), Asian Development Bank Economics Working Paper Series No. 43, April 2016. Available at SSRN: (link)

2. "Normalizing India-Pakistan Trade" (with Taneja et al.), in India Pakistan Trade: Strengthening Economic Relations (pp. 13-45), Springer, August 2014

3. "India-Pakistan: Trade Perception Survey" (with Taneja et al.), in India-Pakistan Trade: Strengthening Economic Relations (pp. 71-126), Springer, August 2014