Let's Talk about Wittgenstein again - an unfinished talk at Yuan Ze University. 

Professor Kai-Yuan Cheng. 

What is Gavagai? - Indeterminacy of Translation 

Eva & Bernie  

What did I learn from the philosophy course? 

Ke, Ting-Yun (Tina) 

Look at things from multiple angles.

• Answer questions in class

• Speech activity

 Understand the complete research process

• Choose the topic 

• Set the question 

• Find the answer 

• Draw a conclusion

 Cultivate the ability of independent thinking via poster session.

Group Performance of Wittgenstein Ideology 

Do our minds have a language of their own?

Njabulo

The relationship between Advertisement and Customer Behavior

Wawa

Jasmine

Language, Thought, and Reality

Jessica

Discussion about Language and Meaning 

Sherzod Omar Hakimov 

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

Vietnamese Group 3

Mysticism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.

Radek Schuster

There are just a few mentions of “the mystical” at the end of the Tractatus, and Wittgenstein dealt with the subject only shortly after 1916, apparently on the basis of his experiences in World War I. The mystical, as Wittgenstein puts it, is that the world exists (TLP 6.44) and the contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni or the feeling that the world is a limited whole (TLP 6.45). At the same time, the mystical is to be the paragon of what is inexpressible and what shows itself (TLP 6.522).  Thus, if we take the showing/saying distinction as the primary interpretive key to Tractatus, it is clear that the mystical is to be understood as a supremely essential component of Wittgenstein's whole logico-philosophical system. The aim of this contribution will be to explicate the relation of the mystical to the other spheres of the ineffable in Tractatus — logic, ethics and aesthetics.  It is then open for discussion whether Wittgenstein's mysticism is more coherent with the Western mystical tradition or rather with the Eastern tradition, e.g. Zen-Buddhism.

Could a concept be open?  

Kuan-Wei Wu 

Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, suggests that at least some of our concepts is "open", i.e., used without there being a set of necessary and sufficient conditions governing how it is and should be used. He uses "game" as an example, and goes on to elucidate and establish a phenomenon which he calls "family resemblance". The core idea is that what guides our uses of a concept is not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but its various tokens' resemblance to each other. Two tokens of a certain type may have nothing in common, however, due to their likeness to some other tokens of that type; both count as tokens of the same type. I find this description of our use of concepts intuitive and illuminating. However, there are some logical, metaphysical, and rationality-related problems which this view must face. The logical principle at stake here is the law of excluded middle. The metaphysical view at stake here is realism. The rationality of judgment at stake here is our view that when we judge something that it satisfies (or doesn't satisfy) some concept, if our judgment amounts to knowledge, our reason (s) for the judgement must be correct. In this talk, I will illustrate these problems and think with everyone.