Miller, Conrad, Jennifer Peck, and Mehmet Seek. 2022 “Integration Costs and Missing Women in Firms” AEJ:Applied 14(2): 51–77
In Saudi Arabia and some other countries it is costly for a firm to employ both men and women because social norms prohibit interaction between unrelated men and women. (Employing both genders in the same location requires configuring the workspace to segregate the genders.) In this environment, only large firms will employ both genders, and many smaller firms will tend to be male-only. Social norms against between-group interaction like these are examples of (a) “antagonistic inputs” in the production process (Section 12.2) and (b) employee-based taste discrimination (Section 16.2).
Amodio, Francesco and Miguel A. Martinez-Carrasco. 2020 Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning IZA discussion paper no. 13898
While economists usually assume that the shape of the production function is known, in practice, workplace incentives actually affect workers’ knowledge of the production function. This is illustrated by the effects of a sudden change in the pay schedule at a Peruvian egg production plant.
Lyons, Elizabeth, (2017). "Team Production in International Labor Markets: Experimental Evidence from the Field," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9(3):70-104.
Studies the effect of diversity on how workers are organized using data from a field experiment conducted in an environment where diversity is pervasive. Finds that teams function better when workers are from the same country. Thus, at least in this setting, same-country workers are complements and different-country workers are substitutes.
Kokkodis, Marios and Sam Ransbotham 2022 “Learning to Successfully Hire in Online Labor Markets” Management Science, forthcoming.
Analysis of 238,364 hiring decisions from a large online labor market shows that employers often experiment with certain types of workers, then adjust their hiring focus with experience. Specifically, employers often initially explore cheaper contractors with a lower reputation. When these options result in unsuccessful outcomes, employers learn and adjust their hiring behaviors to rely more on reputable contractors who are not as cheap. Such hiring tends to be successful, guiding employers to reinforce their hiring processes.
Van Inwegen, Emma, Zanele T. Munyikwa, and John J. Horton 2023 Algorithmic Writing Assistance on Jobseekers’ Resumes Increases Hires NBER working paper no #30886
In a field experiment nearly half a million jobseekers, the authors show that algorithmic writing assistance increased the probability of getting hired by 8 percent. Contrary to concerns that the assistance takes away a valuable signal, they find no evidence that employers were less satisfied. The authors explain this result by arguing that better writing is not a signal of ability but helps employers ascertain ability.