Dessert 1--What Goes Into a Contract? (Sections 1.1-1.7) [based on: D'Acunto, Francesco, Jin Xie, and Jiaquan Yao. 2020 “Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence” CESifo Working Paper No. 871
Dessert 2-- Buy versus Make and Why Are There Firms? (Section 3.3) [based on: Coase, R. (1937) “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica 4: 386-405, and Simon, H. "A Formal Theory of Employment", Econometrica, July 1951]
Dessert 3-- The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks (Sections 5.2-5.4) [based on: Corgnet, Brice and Roberto Hernán-González. 2017 “Revisiting the Tradeoff between Risk and Incentives: The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks”, Management Science]
Dessert 4-- Symbolic Awards—More Work for Free? (Section 9.2) [based on: Ager, Philipp, Leonardo Bursztyn, and Hans-Joachim Voth, (2017). “Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II,” NBER working paper number 22992.
Dessert 5-- Unequal Raises and Quits (Section 10.7) [based on: Dube, Arindrajit, Laura Giuliano, and Jonathan Leonard. Fairness and Frictions: The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behavior American Economic Review, 2019, 109 (2).]
Dessert 6--Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector (Chapter 17) [based on: Krueger, Alan B, and O. Ashenfelter, (2018). "Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector," NBER Working paper no. 24831. ]
Dessert 7-- Which prize structures encourage the most innovation? (Section 20.7) [based on: Joshua Graff Zivin and Elizabeth Lyons The Effects of Prize Structures on Innovative Performance NBER working paper no. 26737, February 2020
Dessert 8-- Competing on the Holodeck—Peer Effects in Tournaments (Section 22.3) [based on: Graff, Frederik, Christian Grund and Christine Harbring, (2018).” Competing on the Holodeck: The Effect of Virtual Peers and Heterogeneity in Dynamic Tournaments,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 11919
Dessert 9-- The Volunteer’s Dilemma-- Gender and Non-Promotable Tasks (Section 26.4) [based on: Babcock, Linda, Maria P. Recalde, Lise Vesterlund, and Laurie Weingart. “Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with Low Promotability” American Economic Review 2017, 107(3): 714–747.
Dessert 1--What Goes Into a Contract? (Sections 1.1-1.7) [based on: D'Acunto, Francesco, Jin Xie, and Jiaquan Yao. 2020 “Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence” CESifo Working Paper No. 871
Dessert 2-- Buy versus Make and Why Are There Firms? (Section 3.3) [based on: Coase, R. (1937) “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica 4: 386-405, and Simon, H. "A Formal Theory of Employment", Econometrica, July 1951]
Dessert 3-- The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks (Sections 5.2-5.4) [based on: Corgnet, Brice and Roberto Hernán-González. 2017 “Revisiting the Tradeoff between Risk and Incentives: The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks”, Management Science]
Dessert 4-- Symbolic Awards—More Work for Free (Section 9.2) [based on: Ager, Philipp, Leonardo Bursztyn, and Hans-Joachim Voth, (2017). “Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II,” NBER working paper number 22992.
Dessert 5-- Unequal Raises and Quits (Section 10.7) [based on: Dube, Arindrajit, Laura Giuliano, and Jonathan Leonard. Fairness and Frictions: The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behavior American Economic Review, 2019, 109 (2).]
Dessert 6--Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector (Chapter 17) [based on: Krueger, Alan B, and O. Ashenfelter, (2018). "Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector," NBER Working paper no. 24831. ]
Dessert 7-- Which prize structures encourage the most innovation? (Section 20.7) [based on: Joshua Graff Zivin and Elizabeth Lyons The Effects of Prize Structures on Innovative Performance NBER working paper no. 26737, February 2020
Dessert 8-- Competing on the Holodeck—Peer Effects in Tournaments (Section 22.3) [based on: Graff, Frederik, Christian Grund and Christine Harbring, (2018).” Competing on the Holodeck: The Effect of Virtual Peers and Heterogeneity in Dynamic Tournaments,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 11919
Dessert 9-- The Volunteer’s Dilemma-- Gender and Non-Promotable Tasks (Section 26.4) [based on: Babcock, Linda, Maria P. Recalde, Lise Vesterlund, and Laurie Weingart. “Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with Low Promotability” American Economic Review 2017, 107(3): 714–747.