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Resources in Personnel Economics
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Part 1-- The Principal-Agent Model
Chapters 1-4: Basics of Principal-Agent Models
Sections 5.2-5.4: Risk-Sharing in Incentive Contracts
Section 5.5: The Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problem
Section 5.6: Nonlinear Incentives and the Timing Gaming Problem
Section 5.7: Ratchet Effects
Section 5.8--Career Concerns
Chapter 6: Noisy Performance Measures and Optimal Monitoring
Other topics
Overviews of the Agency Literature
Part 2-- Evidence on Employee Motivation
Chapter 7: Empirical Methods in Personnel Economics
Chapter 8: Performance Pay at Safelite Glass: Higher Pay, Productivity an
Section 9.1: Adverse Performance Effects of Small Stakes
Section 9.2: Intrinsic, Symbolic and Image Motivation
Sections 9.3 and 9.4: Choking-- Performance and Selection Effects of Large
Sections 9.5 and 9.6: Reference Points in the Workplace
Section 9.7: Present Bias and Procrastination
Chapter 10: Reciprocity, Implicit Contracts, and Trust in the Workplace
Chapter 11: Pigeons and Pecks-- Incentives and Income Effects
Other topics
Part 3-- Employee Selection
Chapter 12: Choosing Qualifications
Chapter 13: Risky versus Safe Workers
Chapter 14: Recruitment: Formal vs. Informal? Broad vs. Narrow?
Chapter 15: Choosing from the Pool: Testing, Discretion and Self-Selectio
Chapter 16: Avoiding Bias
Chapter 17: Setting Pay Levels-- Monopsony Models
Chapter 18: Setting Pay Levels-- Efficiency Wage Models
Chapter 19: Training
Part 4-- Competition in the Workplace: Tournaments and Promotions
Chapter 20: A Simple Model of Tournaments
Chapter 21: Sabotage, Collusion and Risk-Taking in Tournaments
Chapter 22: Unfair and Uneven Tournaments
Chapter 23: Who Wants to Compete? Selection into Tournaments
Part 5-- Cooperation in the Workplace: Teams
Chapter 24: Incentives in Teams and the Free-Rider Problem
Chapter 25: Team Production in Practice
Section 26.1: Complementarity and Substitutability-- Definitions and Evide
Sections 26.2 and 26.3: Team Effort Choices under Complementarity-- Weakes
Section 26.4: Team Effort Choices under Substitutability-- The Volunteer's
Section 26.5: Effort, Ability and Optimal Team Size
Chapter 27: Choosing Teams-- Self-Selection and Team Assignment
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Dessert
Chapter 0: What is Personnel Economics
Resources in Personnel Economics
Home
Part 1-- The Principal-Agent Model
Chapters 1-4: Basics of Principal-Agent Models
Sections 5.2-5.4: Risk-Sharing in Incentive Contracts
Section 5.5: The Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problem
Section 5.6: Nonlinear Incentives and the Timing Gaming Problem
Section 5.7: Ratchet Effects
Section 5.8--Career Concerns
Chapter 6: Noisy Performance Measures and Optimal Monitoring
Other topics
Overviews of the Agency Literature
Part 2-- Evidence on Employee Motivation
Chapter 7: Empirical Methods in Personnel Economics
Chapter 8: Performance Pay at Safelite Glass: Higher Pay, Productivity an
Section 9.1: Adverse Performance Effects of Small Stakes
Section 9.2: Intrinsic, Symbolic and Image Motivation
Sections 9.3 and 9.4: Choking-- Performance and Selection Effects of Large
Sections 9.5 and 9.6: Reference Points in the Workplace
Section 9.7: Present Bias and Procrastination
Chapter 10: Reciprocity, Implicit Contracts, and Trust in the Workplace
Chapter 11: Pigeons and Pecks-- Incentives and Income Effects
Other topics
Part 3-- Employee Selection
Chapter 12: Choosing Qualifications
Chapter 13: Risky versus Safe Workers
Chapter 14: Recruitment: Formal vs. Informal? Broad vs. Narrow?
Chapter 15: Choosing from the Pool: Testing, Discretion and Self-Selectio
Chapter 16: Avoiding Bias
Chapter 17: Setting Pay Levels-- Monopsony Models
Chapter 18: Setting Pay Levels-- Efficiency Wage Models
Chapter 19: Training
Part 4-- Competition in the Workplace: Tournaments and Promotions
Chapter 20: A Simple Model of Tournaments
Chapter 21: Sabotage, Collusion and Risk-Taking in Tournaments
Chapter 22: Unfair and Uneven Tournaments
Chapter 23: Who Wants to Compete? Selection into Tournaments
Part 5-- Cooperation in the Workplace: Teams
Chapter 24: Incentives in Teams and the Free-Rider Problem
Chapter 25: Team Production in Practice
Section 26.1: Complementarity and Substitutability-- Definitions and Evide
Sections 26.2 and 26.3: Team Effort Choices under Complementarity-- Weakes
Section 26.4: Team Effort Choices under Substitutability-- The Volunteer's
Section 26.5: Effort, Ability and Optimal Team Size
Chapter 27: Choosing Teams-- Self-Selection and Team Assignment
Sign Up for Email List
Dessert
Chapter 0: What is Personnel Economics
More
Home
Part 1-- The Principal-Agent Model
Chapters 1-4: Basics of Principal-Agent Models
Sections 5.2-5.4: Risk-Sharing in Incentive Contracts
Section 5.5: The Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problem
Section 5.6: Nonlinear Incentives and the Timing Gaming Problem
Section 5.7: Ratchet Effects
Section 5.8--Career Concerns
Chapter 6: Noisy Performance Measures and Optimal Monitoring
Other topics
Overviews of the Agency Literature
Part 2-- Evidence on Employee Motivation
Chapter 7: Empirical Methods in Personnel Economics
Chapter 8: Performance Pay at Safelite Glass: Higher Pay, Productivity an
Section 9.1: Adverse Performance Effects of Small Stakes
Section 9.2: Intrinsic, Symbolic and Image Motivation
Sections 9.3 and 9.4: Choking-- Performance and Selection Effects of Large
Sections 9.5 and 9.6: Reference Points in the Workplace
Section 9.7: Present Bias and Procrastination
Chapter 10: Reciprocity, Implicit Contracts, and Trust in the Workplace
Chapter 11: Pigeons and Pecks-- Incentives and Income Effects
Other topics
Part 3-- Employee Selection
Chapter 12: Choosing Qualifications
Chapter 13: Risky versus Safe Workers
Chapter 14: Recruitment: Formal vs. Informal? Broad vs. Narrow?
Chapter 15: Choosing from the Pool: Testing, Discretion and Self-Selectio
Chapter 16: Avoiding Bias
Chapter 17: Setting Pay Levels-- Monopsony Models
Chapter 18: Setting Pay Levels-- Efficiency Wage Models
Chapter 19: Training
Part 4-- Competition in the Workplace: Tournaments and Promotions
Chapter 20: A Simple Model of Tournaments
Chapter 21: Sabotage, Collusion and Risk-Taking in Tournaments
Chapter 22: Unfair and Uneven Tournaments
Chapter 23: Who Wants to Compete? Selection into Tournaments
Part 5-- Cooperation in the Workplace: Teams
Chapter 24: Incentives in Teams and the Free-Rider Problem
Chapter 25: Team Production in Practice
Section 26.1: Complementarity and Substitutability-- Definitions and Evide
Sections 26.2 and 26.3: Team Effort Choices under Complementarity-- Weakes
Section 26.4: Team Effort Choices under Substitutability-- The Volunteer's
Section 26.5: Effort, Ability and Optimal Team Size
Chapter 27: Choosing Teams-- Self-Selection and Team Assignment
Sign Up for Email List
Dessert
Chapter 0: What is Personnel Economics
Part 1-- The Principal-Agent Model
Chapter 0: What is Personnel Economics and Why is it Important?
Chapters 1-4: Basics of Principal-Agent Models
Sections 5.2-5.4: Risk-Sharing in Incentive Contracts-- Theory and Evidence
Section 5.5: The Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problem
Section 5.6: Nonlinear Incentives and the Timing Gaming Problem
Section 5.7 (new): Ratchet Effects
Section 5.8 (new): Career Concerns
Chapter 6: Noisy Performance Measures and Optimal Monitoring
Overviews of the Agency Literature
Other Topics
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