Are there illusions in VR?
In this talk we start by proposing a specific, sensorimotor-enactivist account of action in virtual reality, and contrast it to another ecological-enactivist approach of Rolla, Vasconcelos and Figueiredo (2023). We agree with Rolla et al. on the nature of virtual environment and embodiment, but disagree with their treatment of meaning (affordances), illusion and allusion to be found in VR.
We specifically focus on illusion and allusion. Since virtual reality is seen as a second plane, in which what is presented ignores the “real world” and what is presented is a mere “simulation”, it is “tempting... to consider [virtual reality experiences] illusory” (p. 5). Rolle et al. criticise treating illusions as failures of perception, argue that there are no illusions in VR, but propose that in VR, instead we are dealing with allusions: acting as if what is happening in VR is real.
We reject this analysis, and show that if illusions are “are failed attempts to perceive in evolutionarily atypical conditions” (p. 10), then VR should be illusory, because all of VR is being in an evolutionarily atypical condition. We propose that VR could still involve illusions, re-described through the enactivist lens. We endorse that genuine perceptual process is going on in VR (Baggs et al. 2024), and concur that we could have illusions in VR.
Then, allusion is not necessary as a counter-proposal. The characterisation of this experience as ‘as if’ suggests that there is some pretense going on when one is in the virtual environment. However, we are not convinced one experiences anything “as if” in a virtual reality setting. This commitment seems to stem from a fictionalist starting point, that the enactivist does not embrace.Hence, there is no pretense going on in VR, at least not in the form of allusions.