Pragmatics is the study of “invisible” meaning, which is understanding what is meant even when it’s not explicitly said or written.
Communication relies heavily on shared assumptions and expectations between speakers or writers.
Investigating these assumptions and expectations gives insights into how we understand more than just the linguistic content of utterances.
From a pragmatic perspective, more is always being communicated than is said.
An example of this principle is interpreting a sign at a parking garage. Despite the literal words allowing for absurd interpretations (like parking a “heated attendant”), we understand the sign to mean that there is a heated area where cars can be parked and attended to.
This understanding comes even though the word “car” is not present on the sign. This demonstrates how we use shared assumptions and expectations to infer meaning.
Interpretation of signs or messages is based on the meanings of the words, the context in which they occur, and some pre-existing knowledge of what would be a likely message.
We are actively involved in creating an interpretation of what we read and hear.
Context plays a crucial role in interpretation. There are different kinds of context: physical context (location where we encounter words and phrases) and linguistic context (also known as co-text, which is the set of other words used in the same phrase or sentence).
Some words, known as deictic expressions, can’t be interpreted without context. These include words like here, there, now, then, pronouns, and time expressions like yesterday, today, tomorrow.
Deictic expressions are used to point to people, places, and times, and are interpreted in terms of which person, place, or time the speaker has in mind.
There is a broad distinction between what is close to the speaker (this, here, now) and what is distant or not close to the speaker (that, there, then).
Deictic expressions can also be used to express emotions. For example, if something is physically close but disliked, we can use a “not close” term to describe it, thereby pushing it away from us.
We can indicate whether movement is away from the speaker (go) or toward the speaker (come). The difference between telling someone to “Go to bed” versus “Come to bed” illustrates this.
Deixis can be entertaining. For example, a bar owner might put up a sign that reads “Free Beer Tomorrow” to encourage customers to return, knowing that technically, it will always be “one day too early” for the free drink. This demonstrates how context and shared assumptions are used to infer meaning.
Words themselves don’t refer to anything. People refer. Reference is defined as an act by which a speaker or writer uses language to enable a listener or reader to identify something.
To perform an act of reference, we can use proper nouns, other nouns in phrases, or pronouns. These words don’t always identify someone or something uniquely. For each word or phrase, there is a “range of reference.”
An expression such as “the war” doesn’t directly identify anything by itself because its reference depends on who is using it.
We can also refer to things when we are not sure what to call them. We can use expressions like “the blue thing” and “that icky stuff,” and we can even invent names.
For example, a man who drove his motorcycle fast and loud through a neighborhood was referred to as “Mr. Kawasaki.” In this case, a brand name for a motorcycle is being used to refer to a person. This demonstrates how we use language creatively to refer to things in our environment.
Successful reference depends more on the listener’s ability to recognize what the speaker means than on the listener’s dictionary knowledge of a word.
We can use nouns associated with things to refer to people, and names of people to refer to things. This process is called inference.
Anaphora is a common pattern where we introduce new referents and then refer back to them. The first mention is called the antecedent, and the subsequent referring expressions are anaphoric expressions.
Cataphora is a less common pattern that reverses the antecedent-anaphora relationship by beginning with a pronoun and then later revealing more specific information.
The connection between antecedents and anaphoric expressions is often based on inference.
When we talk about an assumption made by the speaker, we usually talk about a “presupposition.” This is different from “inference,” which describes what the listener does.
When we use referring expressions like “this,” “he,” or “Jennifer,” we usually assume that our listeners can recognize which referent is intended.
We design our linguistic messages based on large-scale assumptions about what our listeners already know. This is described as a presupposition.
Presuppositions are what a speaker or writer assumes is true or known by a listener or reader.
An example of a presupposition is if someone tells you “Hey, your brother is looking for you,” it’s presupposed that you have a brother.
Another example is the question “When did you stop smoking?” which presupposes that you used to smoke and you no longer do so.
There is a test for presuppositions that involves comparing a sentence with its negative version and identifying which presuppositions remain true in both. This is called “constancy under negation.”
For instance, whether you say “My car is a wreck” or “My car is not a wreck,” there is an underlying presupposition (I have a car) that remains true. This demonstrates how presuppositions work in our language.
Speakers use short forms like “you know,” “well,” “I mean,” and “I don’t know” as pragmatic markers to indicate how their utterances are to be interpreted.
These markers are optional and loosely attached to the utterance, and they can be used to mark a speaker’s attitude to the listener or to what is being said.
“You know” is used to indicate that knowledge is being treated as shared, and “I mean” is used to self-correct or to mark an attempt to clarify something.
“I don’t know” has evolved from a way of indicating lack of knowledge to become a marker of hesitation or uncertainty when a speaker is about to say something potentially in disagreement with another speaker.
By appearing hesitant about disagreeing, the speaker can signal a desire not to challenge the other speaker. This seems to be a new way of being polite in interaction.
Politeness in linguistics is related to the concept of “face,” which is your public self-image. Politeness is defined as showing awareness and consideration of another person’s face.
A face-threatening act is something that represents a threat to another person’s self-image, such as using a direct command. A face-saving act lessens the possible threat to another’s face.
We have both a negative face (the need to be independent and free from imposition) and a positive face (the need to be connected, to belong, to be a member of the group).
The appropriate language to mark politeness differs substantially from one culture to the next. Misunderstandings can arise when directness or indirectness is valued differently in different cultures.
The distinction between direct and indirect ways of communicating can be analyzed as different types of linguistic action, or speech acts. This demonstrates how our use of language is influenced by social and cultural factors.
A speech act is an action that involves language such as “requesting,” “commanding,” “questioning,” or “informing.” It is the action performed by a speaker with an utterance.
The structure of an utterance and its function can be visualized in a relationship. For example, “Did you eat the pizza?” is an interrogative structure functioning as a question.
Direct speech acts are when the structure of an utterance is used with its normal function, such as using an interrogative structure to ask a question.
Indirect speech acts occur when a structure is used to perform a function other than its normal one. For example, using an interrogative structure to make a request (“Can you pass the salt?”) is an indirect speech act.
Communication depends not only on recognizing the structure and meaning of words in an utterance, but also on recognizing what speakers mean by their utterances in a particular context. This principle is demonstrated by indirect speech acts.