Subject: Strategic Briefing Note, Swedish Defensive Doctrine
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Date: July, 1984
Prepared by: Office of Scandinavian Analysis (SCAA)
Reference No.: SBNDD-142-SWE
Strategic Overview:
Sweden continues to maintain a posture of armed neutrality, officially outside NATO but deeply invested in territorial defense. While public discourse in Stockholm emphasizes peace policy, Swedish military planning clearly anticipates a Soviet incursion as its primary threat vector. Our assessment is that, should an invasion occur, Sweden will not attempt to meet it with a conventional forward defense. Instead, it will pursue a deliberate, decentralized strategy of national resistance, leveraging geography, civilian readiness, and dispersed military force.
Key Features of Swedish Strategy:
1. Total Defense
Sweden’s entire defense system rests on a dual structure: military forces and civilian resilience. In wartime, both merge. Civilian agencies, local governments, and the general public are expected to contribute to defense through logistics, infrastructure support, and even armed resistance if occupied. The population is psychologically and practically conditioned for war.
2. Strategic Depth via Delay and Disruption
Rather than defend at the borders, Sweden plans to trade space for time. Regular forces will conduct delaying actions, leveraging terrain chokepoints, forests, and urban environments to exhaust and frustrate the enemy. The goal is not to stop an invasion cold, but to make occupation prohibitively difficult and to sustain national resistance over time.
3. Decentralized Command and Redundant Infrastructure
Swedish doctrine assumes that command and control will be degraded in the early phase of any attack. Accordingly, military units are trained to operate autonomously under general intent. Air assets can be dispersed to highway strips and hidden revetments. Command posts, depots, and supply chains are hardened, mobile, and redundant.
4. Territorial Defense and Guerrilla Continuity
If regular forces are overrun, Sweden plans for a protracted resistance campaign. The Home Guard, local defense units, and pre-positioned guerrilla assets will conduct sabotage, ambushes, and intelligence operations. Civilian support for this phase is built into national planning.
5. Maritime and Coastal Defense Focus
The Swedish Navy, while small, is optimized for defensive operations in the Baltic littoral. Coastal artillery, sea mines, and fast attack craft are positioned to deny amphibious access and disrupt Soviet naval movement. Substantial fortifications are maintained in the archipelagos.
Analyst Assessment:
From a U.S. standpoint, Swedish tactics prioritized survivability, endurance, and disruption. The Swedish Armed Forces were not structured to repel a superpower invasion outright but to make occupation slow, costly, and uncertain. Sweden’s preparations bore resemblance to Swiss and Finnish doctrines—marked by a high degree of national mobilization, local initiative, and territorial defense.
In the event of war, Sweden would have served as a strategic complication for the USSR, forcing them to commit resources to a prolonged campaign with no guarantee of pacification.
Analyst Assessment:
Swedish tactics prioritize survivability, endurance, and disruption. The Swedish Armed Forces are not structured to repel a superpower invasion but rather to raise the costs of occupation, deny the enemy a quick victory, and preserve national integrity long enough for diplomatic or international shifts. Sweden's preparations bare resemblance to Swiss and Finnish doctrines - marked by a high degree of national mobilization, local initiative, and territorial defense.
From a U.S. perspective, this doctrine - while independent - is broadly compatible with NATO interests, as it complicates Soviet freedom of movement in Scandinavia without formal alliance obligations.
End of Brief
Prepared by:
Douglas W. Barlow, Analyst
Office of Scandinavian Analysis (SCAA)
Classification Authority: Executive Order 12356
CONFIDENTIAL