An Online Gathering for Moral Psychology -- Fall 2025*
Friday, November 7th: 4:00pm to 7:00pm (EST)
Saturday, November 8th: 11:00am to 3:15pm (EST)
Friday, November 7th
The Zoom link is here.
Intro to Conference (4:00pm)
Joshua Greene (Harvard University, USA) (4:10pm)
Title: Tango: Reducing Political Animosity at Scale with a Cooperative Online Quiz Game
Abstract:
Rising political animosity threatens democracy in the United States and other nations. Previous research indicates that intergroup contact under favourable conditions can reduce animosity. Other research indicates that mutually beneficial cooperation is essential for maintaining complex social structures. Building on these ideas, we asked whether mutually beneficial cooperation can reduce animosity between opposing political party members and whether this is possible in an anonymous online context. We created an online quiz game, Tango (letstango.org), where Republicans and Democrats partner and communicate in real time. Across five experiments (N = 4,493, four preregistered), we find that an hour of gameplay with an outparty partner can reduce negative partisanship, with increased self-reported warmth, more equitable economic allocations and more favourable outparty meta-perceptions persisting for up to four months. Gameplay also improves democracyrelated attitudes, with effects persisting for one week. The game receives high enjoyability ratings, which may increase motivation to engage with this intervention.
Meltem Yucel (Michigan State University, USA) (4:45pm)
Title: Children’s Application of Religious, Moral, and Conventional Norms Across Cultures
Abstract:
Religion is often associated with social cohesion and prosociality (Kelly et al., 2024; Norenzayan et al., 2014). Notably, religion can also be at the root of intractable and deadly conflicts when people from different faiths disagree over beliefs and practices. Religious conflicts can also arise within members of the same faith who disagree on certain religious practices or norms—norms that are introduced by religious authorities (e.g., gods or their human representatives, sacred texts) whose violation does not directly impact others’ welfare or rights (e.g., eating pork) (Atran & Ginges, 2012; Nucci & Turiel, 1993). But who do children expect their religious norms to apply to? And do these expectations vary across age and/or cultures? Recent research finds that older children and adolescents evaluate religious norms as being group-specific (Dahl et al., 2022; Srinivasan et al., 2019). I present our ongoing work on how 4- to 12-year-old children (N = 1253, Mage = 7.89 years) apply different kinds of norms to same-faith (e.g., a Muslim character) and other-faith protagonists (e.g. a non-Muslim character). The study was designed and collected by the members of the Developing Belief Network, spanning 21 cultural groups, 6 religions, and 9 countries (see Weisman et al., 2024).
The Stephen P. Stich Award (see here): Paul Bloom (University of Toronto) (5:30pm)
Title: Bad Morality
Abstract:
Our moral feelings have evolved in large part to facilitate cooperation and solve coordination problems, and few would doubt that they have made the world a much better place. I explore here how they make things worse. Looking particularly at empathy, moral outrage, loyalty, and purity concerns, I explore how our strong moral feelings lead to outcomes that, when we reflect on them, are awful. Building on the work of many moral philosophers and moral psychologists, I argue that we often suffer from too much morality.
Saturday, November 8th
The Zoom link is here.
Intro to Conference + Data Blitz (11:00am) [Speakers 1-8 TBD]
Joanna Demaree-Cotton (Oxford University, UK) (12:30pm)
Title: Moral Duties to the Dead
Abstract:
Do we have moral duties to respect the wishes of the dead? If so, on what grounds? Philosophers have typically characterized duties to the dead in welfarist terms, arguing that it is part of “commonsense morality” that going against the wishes of the dead harms them, and is therefore wrong (e.g. Feinberg, 1980, 1987). However, little is known about the moral psychology of respecting the wishes of the dead. In a series of studies (with Prof. Matthew Lindauer and Dr. Cesar Palacios-Gonzalez), we find that even nonreligious participants tend to judge that there is a strong moral obligation to fulfil others’ wishes, irrespective of whether the other person is alive or dead. Moreover, the obligation to respect the wishes of the dead persists across several types of wish, and even if when doing so is highly costly for the living. Contrary to the welfarist position, our evidence suggests that these judgments are not explained by the perception that the dead are harmed. Instead, judgments about duties to the dead are grounded in non-welfare-based values related to respect and loyalty.
Paulo Sérgio Boggio (Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie, Brazil) (1:05pm)
Title: Who Cares? A Critical Test of Morality’s Leading Theories
Abstract:
This talk will present a comparative study of leading models in moral psychology — including Moral Foundations, Moral Identity, and Moral Politics — to examine which truly predict genuine concern for others. By testing multiple instruments within the same analytic framework and considering the moderating role of personality, it will raise a critical question: what are we really measuring when we study morality?
The Keynote Address: Linda Skitka (University of Illinois, Chicago) (1:45pm)
Title: Attitude Moralization and Demoralization
Abstract:
Scholars often assume that certain issues or dilemmas universally evoke moral reactions, whether presented as classic moral dilemmas (e.g., trolley problems) or contemporary controversies (e.g., abortion rights). However, research reveals considerable individual variation in the degree to which people report that their positions on controversial issues are experienced as moral convictions. For example, some people perceive their attitude about abortion as reflecting a preference; they simply prefer for it to be legal or illegal, without attaching moral weight to the issue. Yet someone else might feel that their attitude on abortion reflects the consensus of the group (e.g., their faith community). If the group changed its position, they would be likely to change their position as well. Finally, others’ position on abortion is experienced as a moral conviction. This variation in the perceived moral significance of an attitude has important consequences: for example, stronger moral convictions are associated with greater political engagement (voting, activism), unwillingness to compromise, perceived obligations to act, and acceptance of deception and violence to achieve their morally preferred outcomes. Understanding the processes involved in predicting attitude moralization and demoralization is therefore crucial. The goal of this talk is to review recent research examining attitude moralization and demoralization, its theoretical and practical implications, and future research directions.
*If you have questions about the event, please contact Thomas Nadelhoffer (tnadelhoffer@gmail.com).
Past Online Gatherings
An Online Gathering for Moral Psychology
Spring 2023
Friday, March 3rd: 4:00pm to 7:45pm (EST)
Here is the link for the recording of the event: https://youtu.be/SFaJr7aOfr0
Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside, Philosophy) at 4:00 pm (30 min. for talk + 15 min. for Q & A)
Title: The Measurement Problem
Abstract: There are four ways we could construct a "moralometer", a device for measuring a person's overall morality: self-report, informant report, behavioral measures, or physiological measures. Each measure faces serious methodological problems. Self-report will be subject to bias, socially desirable responding, and likely a Dunning-Kruger effect for people with poor moral knowledge. Informant report will suffer from similar problems, though possibly to a lesser extent and with the possibility of correction by multiple informants. However, informant reports will necessarily be based on limited and possibly unrepresentative knowledge of the target. Behavioral measures are less subject to bias but will inevitably sample only a tiny and possibly unrepresentative proportion of behavior, and they provide little context for interpreting behaviors that might have very different significance despite being superficially similar. Furthermore, behavioral measures will likely require tradeoffs between feasibility and ecological validity. Physiological measures are at best in their infancy. Beyond the particular shortcomings of these four types of measure, further challenges arise from moral disagreement, moral relativism, and incommensurability. Consequently, the prospects of an accurate moralometer are dim.
Jillian Jordan (Assistant Professor in the Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit at Harvard Business School), winner of the inaugural Gilbert Harman Memorial Prize for Early Career Research in Moral Psychology (see here), at 4:55 pm (30 min. for talk + 10 min. from commentator + 5 min. response + 15 min. Q & A). Commentary will be provided by Laura Niemi (Cornell, Psychology).
Title: “Virtuous Victims and Adjacent Consent." **This is joint work with Roseanna Sommers (University of Michigan Law School).
Abstract: Sexual assault is a pervasive problem, and victims often face a lack of support, especially when the assault follows from an initially consensual encounter. We call this idea “adjacent consent”: the victim has consented to something, but what happens to them (e.g., sexual intercourse) exceeds what they consented to (e.g., kissing, foreplay). Across a series of studies, we show that female victims of forcible rape who have provided adjacent consent are blamed more, and seen as less virtuous and deserving of support. Two distinct mechanisms contribute to these effects. First, some people—particularly political conservatives and older individuals—generally disapprove of the sexual activity the woman consented to, even in the absence of sexual assault. Second, adjacent consent prevents people from morally elevating the woman if she is assaulted. When a woman who has provided no consent whatsoever is forcibly raped, participants reliably see her as more virtuous than they would if she were not victimized (the “Virtuous Victim Effect”). Yet when the forcible rape follows from an initially-consensual encounter, participants do not extend the victim this affirmation. This second mechanism holds across a broad swath of participants, including political liberals and college students who, in the absence of assault, affirmatively applaud the woman’s sexual conduct. Moreover, adjacent consent undermines the Virtuous Victim Effect even when the victim clearly did not provide “implied consent” to sex, and this undermining does not merely reflect that adjacent consent (i) conveys romantic interest towards the perpetrator, (ii) makes the perpetrator seem less immoral, (iii) makes the victim seem like a promiscuous person, or (iv) reveals that the victim has put herself at risk of victimization. Together, our results highlight how our moral psychology of consent—and particular, an apparent tendency to “overextend” adjacent consent—may erode support for certain victims of sexual assault.
Keynote Address by Manuel Vargas (UCSD, Philosophy) at 6:05 pm (1 hr. + 30 min. Q & A)
Title: Adaptive Agency
Abstract: What should we think about the culpability of action that derives in some significant way from attitudes whose content is a product of oppression, domination, or deprivation? There are reasons to be skeptical that there is much that can be usefully said about this topic. However, one reason for aspiring to work out a systematic approach is that there are recognizable syndromes in how contexts of oppression, domination, and deprivation shape agency in ways that matter for culpability. Focusing on something we can call adaptive agency enables us to work our way toward a relatively unified way of characterizing some of the complicated ways contexts shape agency and culpability. On the account on offer, an important aspect of adaptive agency is the way in which environments shape people so that their agency is “fitted to” circumstances of injustice, often making that injustice less apparent and less readily contested. Even so, this fact is compatible with at least some exercises of adaptative agency being instances of culpability.
Saturday, March 4th: Noon to 4:00pm
Here is the link for the recording of the event: https://youtu.be/kZa-siu11eM
Data Blitz: 1 hr. (11 x 5 min. presentations by the following graduate students and postdocs):
Amber Chen (UCSB, Psychology); Alejandro Erut (UT Austin, Center for Applied Cognitive Science); Zoe Finiasz (Duke, Psychology); Ivy Gilbert (Cornell, Psychology); Eliana Hadjiandreou (PSU, Psychology); Markus Kneer (Uni. Of Zurich, Philosophy); Paul C. McKee (Duke, Neuroscience); Xavier Roberts-Gaal (Harvard, Psychology); Andrew Smith (UCLA, Anthropology; Matthew Stanley (Duke, Psychology); Era Wu (Dartmouth, Psychology)
Jessica A.Sommerville (University of Toronto, Psychology) at 1:15 pm (30 min. for talk + 15 min. for Q &A)
Title: Probing the origins of moral sentiments and sensitivity: Fairness as a case study
Abstract: The ability to recognize human actions and actors as good or bad, and to use such information to guide our judgments and behavior is fundamental to navigating our social world. While it is now accepted that moral reasoning and judgment does not await adolescence, as previously argued, contention exists regarding the developmental origins and nature of moral sensitivity and sentiments. In this talk, I present research investigating infants’ burgeoning sensitivity to fairness norms to address these questions, arguing that moral responses capitalize on the coalescence of a variety of processes and mechanisms that ultimately contribute to children’s ability to construe actions and individuals as moral or immoral.
Florian Cova (University of Geneva, Philosophy and Cognitive Science) at 2:00 pm (30 min. for talk + 15 min. for Q & A)
Title: Why Belief in Free Will Is Not an Adaptation
Abstract: In the past 20 years, there has been a growing corpus of empirical research on people's belief about free will. Most of this research has highlighted the personal benefits (greater well-being, efficiency, meaning of life) and social benefits (greater punishment of wrongdoers) of belief in free will. This has led certain researchers to argue that belief in free will might be a biological adaptation. In this talk, I will argue that arguments towards this conclusion mostly work because they take advantage of an ambiguity between compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will. More precisely, I will argue that (i) if we take "free will" in an incompatibilist sense, then the existing empirical evidence does not support (and even contradict) the conclusion, and that (ii) if we take "free will" in a compatibilist sense, then the conclusion is simply trivially true, and does not bring any new knowledge.
Keynote Address by Tania Lombrozo (Princeton, Psychology): (1 hr. + 30 min. Q & A)
Title: Evidence for Two Varieties of Believing
Abstract: In this talk I will propose and present evidence for a form of doxastic pluralism positing more than one belief-like cognitive attitude. I will focus on the distinction between beliefs based on evidential reasons and beliefs based on moral reasoning, and present preliminary evidence suggesting that these beliefs have distinct profiles related to their functional roles in human cognition.