In 2014, “John Doe,” a graduate of Columbia University, contacted the US government after fleeing an ISIS encampment in Syria. Scarred by the vicious brutality he witnessed while in the caliphate, “the man proposed a deal: If they helped him get home safely, he would tell them everything that he had heard and seen” (Feuer). He just wanted to come home, and was willing to accept any criminal liability that might result from his membership in ISIS.

There is a misconception in the West that ISIS is formed entirely by people from the Middle East. In reality, there are innumerable “John Does” from the West, both Muslims who are not well-acclimated to homogenous Western culture and non-Muslims who are psychologically predisposed to criminality. These people can become blinded by the Islamic State’s notions of brotherhood. To better understand ISIS’s intent, it is vital that we understand who is a part of ISIS, and what these people are willing to risk.

What is ISIS?

ISIS, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, is an Islamic extremist group formed in 2014, as an offshoot of al Qaeda (Elbaum). ISIS aligns with the Sunni sect of Islam and believes in fundamentalist values and practices derived from the Quran (the holy book of Islam). The goal of ISIS is to form an Islamic State, called a caliphate. A caliphate is run by a caliph, a designated religious leader believed to be a direct descendant of the prophet Muhammad. This Islamic State would reject secular laws, and strictly follow Shariah Law (the divine law according to the Quran). ISIS has a stated goal of extending its caliphate across Iraq and Syria and creating a nation-state of Sunni Muslims.

This caliphate wants to enforce a lifestyle that was prevalent during the days of Muhammad: according to The Atlantic, “much of what the group does looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse” (Wood). This “seventh-century legal environment” would include slavery, crucifixions, and beheadings, practices that were in fact in place in medieval times, but are widely rejected by most contemporary Muslims today (Wood). The Islamic State’s fundamentalist Sunni values would be recognizable to early Islamic forefathers, including Muhammed: “We can gather that their state rejects peace as a matter of principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change, even if that change might ensure its survival; and that it considers itself a harbinger of—and headline player in—the imminent end of the world” (Wood). ISIS’s goal to bring about the “end of the world” or “the apocalypse,” mentioned above by Wood in The Atlantic, is both a real goal of the group and a useful inspirational tool for propaganda purposes. According to ISIS propaganda, their jihad will lead to an “apocalyptic battle between Muslims and the “Romans.”’ This battle, originally prophesied in the 7th century, will--according to the prophecy--eventually occur in the northern Syrian town of Dabiq, supposedly ushering in the complete victory of ISIS over non-Muslim forces (Noack). The importance to ISIS of this prophesied apocalyptic battle in Dabiq can be seen in the frequency of the term “Dabiq” in ISIS propaganda, as well as in ISIS’s stubborn efforts to maintain control of this small, strategically unimportant town--which ISIS only abandoned in October 2016, after experiencing existential pressure in Mosul (Noack). ISIS relies on medieval, 7th-century punishments that align with Shariah Law, and fight to bring back this system of governing.

On June 29, 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was named this caliph of the Islamic State, after completing a questionable effort to prove his descendance from Muhammad (Elbaum). Al-Baghdadi had previously led al-Qaeda in Iraq and was responsible for establishing it as a military presence in the region (Elbaum). However, ISIS ultimately split from al-Qaeda, as al Qaeda was more focused on foreign targets like the US, and ISIS was more interested in the sectarian conflict with Sunnis whom they believed were collaborating with Shia regimes, the opposing sect in Islam (Byman). Because of their emphasis on sectarianism, as well as building a literal Islamic nation ignoring existing political boundaries, ISIS acted quickly to take control of the land. ISIS began seizing land in Syria, but gained international recognition when it took control of Mosul, Iraq in June 2014 (Vinograd). Quickly following that conquest, ISIS overran Saddam Hussein’s birthplace, Tikrit, a major symbolic victory in the battle to obtain northern Iraq (Vinograd).

How does ISIS attract support?

ISIS gains publicity for its movement by committing violent crimes to increase media attention and legitimize the group as a recognized terrorist organization. Though ISIS primarily focuses on maintaining control of the people in its own territory (a control it accomplishes via fear), ISIS has also attempted to attract new members and to prove itself a legitimate global threat, one perhaps capable of world domination. ISIS has claimed responsibility for over a hundred terrorist attacks--both in Syria and Iraq and abroad--in hopes of instilling fear and a sense of urgency in the West. ISIS utilizes its media attention to distribute graphic videos of the attacks, both murderous and symbolic, such as the destruction of priceless monuments from antiquity (“ISIS.”). Though ISIS creates a wide variety of propaganda videos for recruitment purposes, perhaps no other videos were as successful at capturing the public eye as were the videos of the beheadings of foreign journalists and humanitarian aid workers. For instance, American journalist James Foley, who had a brave passion for combat videography, was held hostage for two years before being beheaded by an unidentified man (“Jim’s Story”). Similar fates occurred for upwards of 4000 people, though not all filmed, including citizens of Syria and the Levant (Dearden). The graphic, archaic nature of the murders created global headlines, generating a certain urgency from foreign nations.

ISIS began its global terrorism in northern Africa, but many in the West remained ignorant to the threat ISIS posed until it launched its attack on Paris in November 2013, when a series of bombs ignited across the city, killing 130 people (Lister). In July of 2016 in Nice, France, a French-Tunisian man drove through crowds, firing at onlookers, killing 84 people (Lister). Similar attacks blanketed the West, particularly in Europe. The numbers of attacks reached up to 143 attacks in 29 countries, killing 2043 people (Lister). It is significant to note that many of these attacks were merely inspired by ISIS--they were perpetrated by fans of ISIS--and the attackers may not have any direct links to the Islamic State. Nonetheless, its grip on the media has proven to be an effective mode for ISIS to garner support for the state.

Who joins ISIS?

“As of December 2015, approximately 30,000 fighters from at least 85 countries had joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)” (Picker). The majority of recruits come from other countries in the Middle East, sympathizing with ISIS’s anti-Western and Sunni fundamentalist agenda, and viewing joining ISIS’s jihad as a religious obligation. However, many Muslim recruits from Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Indonesia, and Tajikistan also uproot their lives to join the caliphate (Picker). Many of the Western recruits come from countries with high levels of prosperity and low levels of economic equality, such as Sweden and Finland. However, the countries with the highest levels of ISIS recruitment are largely culturally, ethnically, and racially homogenous: “the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS is driven not by economic or political conditions but rather by ideology and the difficulty of assimilation into homogeneous Western countries” (Picker) (Benmelech). These members of Muslim communities are socially isolated in their wealthy adopted Western countries, and so they are vulnerable to the lure of the caliphate.

However, not all ISIS recruits were raised in a Muslim home. With its savvy use of social media and violent propaganda, ISIS has inspired “a number of instant conversions to Islam among mainly marginalized non-Muslim youths in Western countries” (Hussain). Social media has allowed ISIS to convert non-Muslim youths, even those who come from complete families and enjoy cultural or racial acceptance in the communities where they live. However, many of these youths fit psychological and behavioral profiles generally associated with criminality. Studies of Jihadist terrorism in the United States confirmed that the majority of recruits in the period of 2014 to 2016 were Caucasian or African-American ethnic groups, which are ethnicities that typically lack any association with Middle Eastern communities (Hussain). In fact, ISIS sympathizers that are linked to terrorist plots in the United States are more likely to be completely unconnected to Muslim or Middle Eastern communities (Hussain). These domestic jihadist terrorists instead fit the profile of the psychological outcast: they are “younger, less educated, and seemingly driven as much by personal pathology as much as geopolitics … A significant number of those implicated in homegrown plots in recent years — again, mostly ISIS-related — have had long histories of petty crime, drug use, and mental illness, factors that were already strong predictors for incarceration in the U.S.” (Hussain). It seems as though, under different circumstances, these individuals might have become school shooters or petty criminals; ISIS just found them in the right place at the right time.

How does recruitment work?

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria primarily uses the internet and social media to encourage foreign recruits. The initial step that often motivates a potential ISIS recruit is the simple recognition that something is not right in the Middle East: recruits may question the widespread violence and strife in Middle Eastern countries, particularly those acts of violence caused by (directly or indirectly) Western influence. This feeling may be deepened by the Western media, which invariably celebrates victories over religious extremist groups, and also presents a desensitizing view of violence in Middle Eastern countries in general. The brutal drone strikes deployed by the US in its fight against extremist groups also kill innumerable civilians, drawing international attention and causing many to question the United States’s justification for its presence in the region. In fact, nine out of ten people killed in these drone strikes are not the intended targets (“Chapter 2: Recruitment.”). This is why potential recruits and ISIS members alike firmly believe that the West is waging a direct war on Islam, even as Western leaders, such as Presidents Bush and Obama, have denied that this is the case.

Many potential recruits are inspired by the lectures of Anwar al-Awlaki, the English-speaking icon of the ISIS caliphate. Al-Awlaki was born in the United States: he was educated at Colorado State University, and even voted for George W. Bush. However, after viewing what he believed to be an unjustified response to the 9/11 attacks, he soon joined al-Qaeda in its jihadist movements. He organized a series of lectures in which he expressed anti-American sentiment, describing his home country “that yesterday was a land of lynching and the Ku Klux Klan…. and tomorrow, a land of religious persecution” (“Chapter 2: Recruitment.”). He was well-spoken and had an American accent, which made him appealing to English-speaking Islamic extremists around the world. In 2010, Obama placed Anwar al-Awkali on the CIA kill list, leading to his death by a drone strike and making him the first American citizen to be searched killed by the American state since the Civil War (“Chapter 2: Recruitment.”). He was seen as a martyr by jihadists, making him the face of the ISIS movement.

Once indoctrinated by the rhetoric of speakers like al-Awkali, ISIS sympathizers turn to online chat rooms where ISIS recruiters are lurking. In these chat rooms, recruiters discuss the Quran, justifying each act of violence with fundamentalist interpretations of the word of Muhammad. The recruiters invitingly refer to new members of the group as “brothers,” allowing them to feel a part of their community. When the recruiters are able to convince the potential recruits of three radical interpretations of Islam, the recruits come fully under the recruiters’ control, and are ready to join the Islamic State. The three steps ISIS recruiters follow to gain the allegiance of new recruits are listed below:

1. Monotheism

Monotheism is a universal belief amongst the Muslim community, but ISIS brings a radical interpretation to this fundamental idea. ISIS claims that the belief in Allah as the only god entails the belief that Allah is the only lawgiver: therefore, the only accepted form of law is Shariah Law (the divine law as written by Muhammad). This law is archaic, and allows punishments commonly used in the medieval era. Furthermore, ISIS claims that its interpretation of monotheism requires the rejection of all secular or Western law, and that the failure to reject these secular laws means that one is not a true Muslim (“Chapter 2: Recruitment.”).

1. Rejection of False Idols

This belief is also rooted in the Quran, and refers to Muhammad’s destruction of non-Muslim idols in Mecca, an event that marked the start of Islam. ISIS enhances this notion of idols, and radicalizes it: the ballot box is an idol, the act of voting is an idol, the President is an idol, paying taxes to the secular state is an idol, etc. According to ISIS, failing to destroy these idols of the modern world also means one is not a true Muslim (“Chapter 2: Recruitment.”).

1. Loyalty and Rejection

In this third and final step, ISIS recruiters secure the allegiance of a new recruit. The potential recruit must make a proclamation, in which he declares allegiance to the ISIS community alone. This means rejecting Christian friends, Jewish family members, or even Muslim relatives if they do not align themselves with the radical ISIS views (“Chapter 2: Recruitment.”).

Once all of these steps are completed, ISIS recruiters know they have gained a new member. They then provide the new member with information on logistics, including things like obtaining plane tickets and finding safe houses. They make the daunting decision feel easy, and also obligatory. They present the Muslim community, as represented by ISIS, as one whole: “if one part of the body is sick, we are all sick” (“Chapter 2: Recruitment.”).

What is the state of ISIS today?

In March of 2019, President Trump announced the official defeat of ISIS, prompted by the liberation of the final Syrian/Iraqi territory held by the Islamic State (Sales). This was a symbolic win for the American fight against global terrorism. US forces “freed millions from slavery, ended organized rapes, halted the genocide of religious minorities, and stopped the slaughter of innocents in the about 40,000 square miles ISIS controlled at the peak of its power” (Sales). However hopeful this defeat seems, there remains a danger that ISIS will regain power. For instance, it may be able to continue fighting with its international organization, even without its territorial base in Syria and Iraq (Sales). This is exactly what happened on Easter Sunday in April 2019, when the Islamic State helped coordinate the suicide bombings of churches across Sri Lanka, claiming the lives of upwards of 350 people. ISIS issued a statement taking credit for the terrorist attack: in an online video, Mohammed Zaharan, the man suspected of issuing and organizing the attacks within Sri Lanka, declares allegiance to the Islamic state (Gettleman). In the video, Zaharan is seen leading “masked, black-clad disciples pledging fealty to the Islamic State” (Gettleman).

Though the public resists the claim that ISIS had any part in organizing the attacks, counterterrorism experts agree that the Sri Lanka attack would have required external assistance from ISIS operatives outside Sri Lanka, given the small presence of ISIS on Sri Lanka itself (Lister). ISIS’s news network released the video through its online chat rooms, suggesting that the Sri Lankan terrorists had direct communication with ISIS’s core operatives (Gettleman). Thus, these brutal attacks should worry Western security officials and those in the Middle East who do not align with the extremist group. It seems that the United States was wrong: ISIS is alive and well, and is simply evolving to achieve its goal--creating a global caliphate. ISIS’s publication site, al Nabaa, released a video about "raising the Caliphate banner in new arenas... The days are pregnant with more disappointments for the enemies of Allah" (Lister). The Islamic State is still in the fight for global domination.

Where are recruits now?

An estimated 500 experienced ISIS fighters are expected to remain committed to defending the remains of the Islamic State (McKernan). While most of the local recruits from Syria and Iraq are thought to have reentered the general populations undetected, over 2700 foreign fighters are being held in northern Syrian prisons and camps, under control of the Kurdish Democratic Forces (the SDF) (McKernan). These foreign fighters were blinded by the ideology and the initial success of the Islamic State--they joined the extremist movement at the peak of its territorial expansion, but were eventually captured by US-backed forces (Sly). The fate of these foreign recruits and their wives and children, a number totaling over 12,000, is now more uncertain in the face of the withdrawal of American troops from Syria and Iraq (Sly).

The foreign fighters piled up in this remote region of Syria are wanted by neither their homelands nor their captors, and they therefore pose a new threat to the already unstable country (Sly). Countries that supported the United States’s effort in dismantling ISIS are refusing to repatriate the foreign recruits, “citing the risk that they would spread radical ideology or perhaps carry out attacks back home” (Sly). Yet, Syria cannot be responsible for the recruits either; Abdulkarim Omar, who heads the SDF in northeastern Syria, says, “It’s a huge number. Some of them are very dangerous people, and we live in a very unstable area….[and this could create] a security vacuum that these criminals could exploit to escape and pose a danger to all of us” (Sly). The aftermath of the foreign aid from a Western power--in this case, the United States--could bring a new threat to the region. This is an unfortunately common theme in the history of the Middle East.

What is the future for ex-recruits?

The foreign recruits, however, generally want to go home, even accepting prison time, if necessary, as their fate: “I regret this, and I miss my family, and if I go home, I will do my best to help Germany,” said a 36-year-old German recruit (Sly). Though it is hopeful that many of the recruits seem to recognize their mistake, their original countries, including the US, believe these recruits no longer have a place within their home societies. For instance, Hoda Muthana, a 20-year-old student in Alabama, traveled to Turkey in 2014 on the premise that her trip was for a university event (Callimachi). Instead, she was brought to Syria, where she joined the Islamic State, married an ISIS fighter, had a child, and began organizing terrorist attacks in the West (Callimachi). But by 2019, Muthana realized she had made a terrible mistake, escaped the remains of the Islamic State, and begged for repatriation for herself and for her newborn son; she and her son were denied US citizenship (Callimachi). As a result, Muthana’s father sued the US government (naming Donald Trump in the suit, who had personally declared her denied citizenship). Muthana’s father stated that he does not expect his daughter to escape criminal prosecution and justice, but he hoped that his grandson would be able to grow up in what Hoda Muthana called “the greatest country in the world” (Schwartz). However, as of now, Hoda Muthana and her son have no legal basis to return to the country.

Currently, few foreign governments are agreeing to repatriate their citizens that joined ISIS. “While some countries had repatriated former members of ISIS on an ad hoc basis in the past, the fall of the caliphate has forced the U.S. and its allies to seek a more permanent fix” (Vinopal). Foreign governments do not only fear for the security of their nations, but they also fear the political repercussions associated with accepting ex-foreign fighters home again. However, it is important to recognize that not all of the women and children associated with the Islamic State are necessarily guilty of aiding terrorism, raising an important humanitarian issue (Vinopal). Human rights activist Letta Tayler claims: “there are ‘legitimate security concerns’ about taking back nationals….But that doesn’t excuse inaction….Governments should, in our view, repatriate their nationals—screen them, and prosecute them if necessary….And for those who have not committed a crime, governments should focus on rehabilitation and reintegration” (Vinopal). Reintegration has proven successful for former ISIS fighters, such as in the United States’s test on a group of Somali-Americans who had been recruited to join ISIS and wanted to come home; similarly, in Aarhus, Denmark and in Germany’s Hesse state, a de-radicalization program for ex-ISIS fighters was implemented and so far has seen successful results (Vinopal).

How do we use what we now know about ISIS?

Though the future for ISIS appears uncertain, it is vital that we do not underestimate the influence of the Sunni fundamentalist terrorist organization. The Islamic State’s ability to retaliate after its territorial defeat, by inflicting mass murder in the Sri Lankan bombings, is an important red flag, and may signal a shift in recruitment; perhaps, now that the territorial caliphate has fallen, recruitment will lead directly to committing terrorist acts in the recruits’ homelands. This is much easier--and more effective, in terms of propaganda value--than moving recruits to a physical caliphate. It is premature to expect ISIS to abandon its operations at this point.

Nonetheless, the fate of those ex-ISIS fighters--and their families--who surrendered or were captured, raises an important humanitarian question. Foreign governments must distinguish between those who have committed or organized terrorist acts and those who are only indirectly affiliated with the group. It is human nature for people and politicians in the original countries of ex-ISIS recruits to resort to otherism. However, now is the time to reject that inclination, and to view these ex-fighters and their families as people. At the very least, it is our responsibility to reintegrate the wives and children that have inflicted no harm on others.

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