How does the religious Right Dominate Israel?

Source 1, Source 2, Source 3

Politically, they are mostly opposed to the secularization of Israel as they see it, defined loosely as the effort to force the modernization of the Haredi community. Israel is unique in that it is a Jewish state, as it was created to be a home for Jews, but a secular democracy. This means that the spheres of religion and politics are not as separate as they are in some other countries, but also that Israel isn’t the Jewish theocracy Haredis would perhaps like it to be. They are strong supporters of settlers in the West Bank, believing that the land in and around Israel was given to the Jews by God. 30% of settlers in the West Bank are Haredi, and protecting these people is a high priority. This group holds a surprising amount of power in Israeli politics: the Haredi tend to vote in blocs for parties and policies they determine will benefit their deeply conservative and religious lifestyle. Haredi leaders have taken advantage of the community’s strong beliefs, encouraging monolithic voting patterns to game the system of the Israeli government.

What power does the ultra-Orthodox right hold?

The Israeli parliament is built off a system of proportional representation, a system which represents the electorate as precisely as possible in the parliament. This means that a simple majority could not dominate the Knesset by itself. Even parties with a single constituency can hold precious seats. Since the 1980s, ultra-Orthodox parties have taken advantage of this to work their way into nearly every coalition government. Shas has only been left out of two coalitions since its establishment, and United Torah Judaism has never been excluded, despite the fact that both parties command a relatively small number of seats on average. In the past, one reason that made these parties such viable candidates for coalition partners is their ambiguous stance on “the Palestinian question” as the notorious debate over a one-or-two-state solution is known. However, in recent years, some ultra-Orthodox parties have shifted to the right, endorsing a more hostile stance on the question of settlers in the West Bank. Some of the focal points of ultra-Orthodox policy include:

● Yeshiva students, or students studying in Orthodox schools, should be exempt from the Israeli military draft.

● Religion and state should not be separated.

● Large ultra-Orthodox families should be subsidized, and the ultra-Orthodox community should receive more financial aid in general.

● Settlements in the West Bank should be able to continue.

● Some ultra-Orthodox parties support the annexation of the West Bank.

Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the ultra-Orthodox platform is the hostility some leaders have for the Palestinian cause. Ovadia Yosef, the founder of the Shas, has made comments deriding Palestinians as “evil” and called for God to “strike them down with a plague”. Despite Yosef’s retroactive retraction of these comments, the anti-Arab sentiment within ultra-Orthodox parties is a cause for concern, especially when considering the political power they hold.

Why is the far right so powerful, and what happened to the leftist parties in Israel?

The greatest insult to a right-wing politician in Israel is to be called a ‘leftist.’ Today, only 12% of Jewish Israelis identify as left-wing, and left-wing parties are projected to take only 22 seats in the Knesset. The once-prominent Labor party received only around 6 seats, a recent entry in a series of blows to the left-wing. However, as recently as 1992, Labor received 44 seats in the Knesset, and was the dominant force in Israel’s government.

Why has this party fallen out of favor in recent years? Shmael Rosner, an Israeli journalist and researcher, conducted a study to examine Israel’s changing political attitudes:

The most significant finding in our study is that 55 percent of Israeli Jews belong to a group...we call “Jewish-Israeli.” This runs counter to the...wisdom...that Israel is divided between left and right, and secular and religious groups. These Jews’ identity is, in many ways, a new brand of Judaism born from mixing a strong affinity for Jewish traditions and a national sentiment in a way that makes the two almost indistinguishable….it is about culture — a culture whose pillars are ancient Judaism and modern Israelism. This group also shares some core beliefs about politics, including a realization that peace in the Middle East won’t happen any time soon.

The “Jewish-Israeli” demographic is the one at the forefront of most parties’ minds. Many parties have learned to attract this group with a cocktail of Israeli nationalism and Jewish pride. However, Labor and similar parties were founded to benefit non-traditional Jews, the part of Israel to whom cultural Judaism is less important. These less traditional Jews, now only 15% of the Israeli population, is much less significant in the elections than the Jewish-Israelis of Likud.

Another more concrete reason why leftist parties have lost relevance in the last 30 years is demonstrated by the leadership of ex-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin was one of the most prominent figures of the Israeli Labor Party and served as Prime Minister twice. His second term was a massively important turning point in Israeli public opinion and perhaps caused the dominance of the modern right-wing. Rabin won in 1992 by a narrow majority, forming his government on a platform of making peace with Palestine. He immediately began secret negotiations with Palestine, which led to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. In the Oslo Accords, Israel and Palestinian leaders acknowledged each other’s legitimacy and agreed to negotiate peace, and the fact that two bitter enemies had put it in writing gave hope for progress. However, there were many within Israel who were unsatisfied with the Accords. Critics pointed out the possible strategic danger, as Rabin considered giving up useful territory seized through Israeli military conquest in exchange for peace. In 1994-5, terrorism spiked in Israel, drawing even more criticism from citizens. Protests against the Oslo Accords were common. Notably, after one particularly devastating attack in which 22 Israelis died, then-opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu condemned Rabin, saying that the Prime Minister cared more about Palestinians than about Israelis. Rabin was portrayed as a Nazi and as causing “the death of Zionism.” Some extremist Rabbis referenced a Jewish law authorizing the killing of a Jew who imperils other Jews, implying that this law could protect Rabin’s killer. This vitriol came to a head in November 1995, when Rabin was assassinated by a radical right-winger after attending a rally. The next year, Netanyahu and Likud took power in the Knesset. The political sentiment had shifted, seemingly for good, as it became clear that Israeli voters neither wanted nor believed in the possibility of diplomatic achievement of peace in the region.

Today, Israelis are evenly split on the issue of a one or two state solution, but some three-quarters of the population do not believe an arrangement will be reached in the near future. There are vicious anti-left campaigns deployed by centrist and far-right parties, depicting the left as inviting in terrorism. And with a shrinking base and fracturing alliances, the relevancy of the Israeli left shrinks every election. Israel’s elections nowadays are competitions between the far-right and center-right, and the main question, increasingly, is which party head will lead the coalition.

What implication does the power of the ultra-Orthodox have for Israeli foreign policy?

The battle for seats is more contentious now than it has ever been, and fringe issues once barely acknowledged in the Knesset have come to the forefront of discussion. Both the United Right and the Shas, two parties which hold a combined 13 seats, are pro-annexation of the West Bank. The West Bank, a strip of land located between the Jordan River and Israel, is currently under Palestinian jurisdiction. 2.5 million Palestinians and 500,000 Israeli settlers live in the territory. There are many reasons for the movement to the West Bank, but most have to do with the belief that the Holy Land (including the West Bank) is a God-given territory of Israel. Because of the perceived religious right of the settlers to live where they choose, they are defended by the Israeli government with military protection within the West Bank. The Palestinian roads are segregated, some with walls down the middle, because of the Israeli government’s efforts to protect Israeli settlers from Palestinian aggression. Israeli settlement is a heavily contentious issue, and some argue that it is designed and encouraged by the Israeli government for the purpose of disrupting Palestinian life and unity.

Regardless of the true purpose of the settlements, the right to settle is critically important for parties like the Shas, United Right, and in the most recent election, Likud. As recently as 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu, the leader of Likud, made speeches promoting negotiations for a Palestinian state. However, in the years since, Likud has quickly pivoted, with Netanyahu now making comments against a Palestinian state. This shift in belief may be because Netanyahu felt this policy change was necessary to attract more right-wing and ultra-Orthodox voters. In 2015, Netanyahu was in danger of losing the race for re-election. Days before the election, he spoke to centrist publication Maariv about his distaste for the prospect of a Palestinian state, saying “Anyone who is going to establish a Palestinian state today and withdraw from territory is giving territory to radical Islam to attack the State of Israel”. Netanyahu gave in to the political pressure from the right-wing, and now proposes annexation of the entire West Bank, which would eliminate any possibility of a peaceful end to this dispute. Palestinian populations would likely rise up against the Israeli forces, creating a conflict equal to or worse than the Intifadas of 1987 and 2005, two devastating clashes between Palestine and Israel with death tolls in the thousands.

Conclusion: The Future

Due to the far-right and orthodox influence on Israeli politics, the future of Israeli-Palestine conflict does not seem bright for those hoping for peace in the region. Without total domination from one side, it is unlikely that either side will back down. The current Israeli leadership now relies on its polarization so heavily to stay in power that to compromise would be political suicide. The Palestinian leadership, especially in the Gaza strip, is under a huge amount of pressure from its people to show resistance to Israel, and would lose power if it displayed any weakness. So a grueling, drawn-out conflict in which neither side makes much meaningful progress benefits both sides, perversely. Both sides rely on each other to maintain a careful balance: enough damage done to pacify their own citizens, but not too much as to push the other side into an all-out war. Ghaith al-Omari, a former official of the Palestinian Authority, the governing body that controls part of the West Bank, called this “a negotiation by fire”. With each short, deadly bout of fighting between Israel and Palestine, people die and governments become more comfortable with the routine of violence in the region. However, if the annexation of the West Bank takes place, along with other anti-Palestine actions encouraged by the far right, this negotiation by fire could turn into an all-out war. The consequences of far-right influence are far-reaching and deeply dangerous, especially as Israel teeters on the brink of a potentially catastrophic conflict.