Crisis in the Gulf:

First off, let’s lay the groundwork. What and where is this Qatar place?

While much of United States foreign policy in recent years has focused on the Middle East, Qatar’s military has mainly been a nonparticipant in these matters. In the vast expanse of the Arabian Peninsula mostly dominated by Saudi Arabia, there is a smaller peninsula on the Eastern coast of Saudi Arabia. This small oasis is Qatar, one of the richest countries in the world per capita. In addition to sharing its only land border with Saudi Arabia, it is also very close to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, with less than twenty miles of water separating it from Bahrain and about two hundred miles separating Doha, its capital, and the two main emirates of the UAE, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (Anthony).

Qatar was formed in 1971 when nine Arab emirates were released from British protectionism, a status they had held since the European takeover of the Ottoman Empire in 1916. The British quickly took notice of, and harvested, the Qatari oil and natural gas for themselves, while propping up a pro-western emir, Ali bin Abdullah. It was between him and the British that a bureaucracy began forming, and public services began to be rendered. Though the British did find the oil, Qatar was and is the main beneficiary, with most of the oil money, in theory, going back into Qatari hands. In reality, Ali bin Abdullah’s son and successor, Ahmad bin Ali, and his heir apparent, Khalifa bin Hamad, changed the laws to allocate more of the oil revenues to Qatar’s ruling class. This shift of revenue united the country for the first time, against the greedy and corrupt ruling class. Ironically (in hindsight), the emir’s close relationship with the Saudi monarch is what set off much of the protests that took place in the 1960s (Toth).

Meanwhile, Great Britain’s influence over the region declined as the Qataris had been mostly controlling their own oil. This decline eventually led to the inevitable when, in 1968, it was announced that Great Britain would withdraw all of its military commitments east of the Suez Canal, near Cairo, Egypt. This order included the nine emirates over which the British had control. Seven of those Emirates became what, today, is the United Arab Emirates. The other two, disconnected from the rest, were Qatar and Bahrain. Essentially, this order encompassed the entirety of what is considered today to be the Middle East (Zahran).

Qatar was officially established an a fully independent country, free from British protection, in 1971. However, the British announced that they would be withdrawing in 1968. That timing left the Qatari ruling family in a unique, and favorable, position, as they essentially had time to prepare to be a functioning governmental bureaucracy, without the British guiding them or looking over their shoulder. Because of these circumstances, Qatar’s transition to an independent country actually went rather smoothly, as they had had a constitution in place a year before they became independent (Crystal).

Their system, like many others in the region, includes an Emir as the Head of State and, in theory, elected members of an advisory council to the Emir. In practice, Sheikh Khalifa, the Emir since 1972,, has insisted that Qataris are not ready for democracy, a view he still holds today, therefore preventing elections of that advisory council from ever happening (Nakhleh). Today, Sheikh Khalifa is basically a benevolent monarch presiding over a country made extremely prosperous by its vast oil and natural gas reserves (Jacobs).

The (supposedly) Big, Bad, Blockade

On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, “The Quartet,” in now-common parlance, announced that they were severing diplomatic relations with Qatar (Ulrichsen). This included Saudi Arabia shutting down its land border with Qatar, which is, as mentioned before, Qatar’s only land border. All of these countries imposed a land, sea, and air embargo on Qatar. This means that Qataris are not allowed into these countries, within two miles of their shores, and that Qatar’s world-renowned airline, Qatar Airways, is not allowed to fly to any destinations in those countries, nor are they allowed to use their airspace (Chughtai). As three of the countries in the quartet are Qatar’s closest neighbors, that has quite the effect on flights and maritime getting to Qatar.

The Quartet, through their demands, accuses Qatar of supporting terrorism, criticizes it for being too close to the governments and militaries of Iran and Turkey, of funding terrorist groups, and accuses Qatar’s well-respected state-run news agency, Al Jazeera, of spreading bias and fake news (Chughtai). While it is true that Qatar’s relations with terror groups such as Hamas, ISIS, and the Taliban are more benevolent than other countries around the world, countries such as the United States have actually used those relations to their advantage. For example, US used Qatar as an intermediary to get kidnapped soldier Bowe Bergdahl released from Taliban custody (Aleem). That instance showed that a country that is on speaking terms with the extremist groups could actually be good and stabilizing for the region, as diplomacy is now an option to resolve certain smaller conflicts which would otherwise be solved with force, therefore putting soldiers at risk, or not at all.

Among the Quartet’s list of thirteen demands are shutting down Al Jazeera, expelling Iranian military personnel, and to stop naturalizing citizens of the countries comprising the quartet, as well as financial compensation of the Quartet for the supposed harm Qatar’s actions had brought upon them. The last two demands were a deadline of ten days and insistence that officials from the Quartet would be able to constantly audit Qatar’s progress in meeting the demands (Chugtai). Qatar didn’t meet any of the demands and has blown the deadline seventy times over.

Three of the countries comprising the Quartet. Instead, Qatar has been remarkably resilient for almost two years, retooling its entire economy to be less focused on exports to those countries, strengthening its military, and even buying a brand new Boeing 747 cargo plane to import needed supplies (Fisher). The reason Qatar was and still is able to revamp is, once again, their money. They are the richest country in the world judging by per capita income . Their extreme wealth is a function of having the third largest natural gas reserves on Earth, behind Iran and Venezuela, and sizable oil reserves as well. In addition, Qatar has used its oil revenues to hold investments spanning a variety of sectors all over the world, including a stake in Uber, which recently had its initial public offering, making its early investors extremely wealthy, and complete ownership of the iconic Shard in London (Jacobs). Having those holdings on hand to, for example, buy a plane and rush its delivery is the main reason behind how Qatar is able to remain afloat during this blockade, as their natural gas and oil reserves are not running out at any point in the near future.

A Brief History of Qatar-Saudi Relations

As mentioned before, Qatar is a relatively young country. That, combined with its extremely small size in a Saudi-dominated region, facilitated Qatar’s status as essentially a puppet state of Saudi Arabia, at least for its first two decades in existence. However, slowly but surely, Qatar began to break from Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence.

The first real sign of their separation came in 1988, when Qatar established formal relations with the Soviet Union, a Saudi adversary because of its communist ideologies and because of Saudi Arabia’s ties to the United States, the Soviet Union’s primary adversary since World War II. Over the next half-decade, more little conflicts like that one arose between the countries. For instance, a 1992 border dispute between the countries caused the deaths of two Qatari soldiers, and, during the Yemeni Civil War in 1994, Saudi Arabia and Qatar backed opposing sides (Fisher). Marc Lynch, a political scientist at The George Washington University, poses the question, “Why be under the thumb of the Saudis if you don’t have to be?” (Lynch via Fisher) Qatar continued to thumb its nose at the Saudis’ supposed authority over it throughout the next two decades. No action was ever provocative enough towards Saudi Arabia to make them react the way they did here until 2017, but little things such as building a massive United States air base, partially to protect from any potential Saudi military action, and establishing trade and relations with Iran and Israel, both sworn enemies of Saudi Arabia, built up the Saudis’ rage over the years (Middle East Policy Council). The proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back was an al-Jazeera broadcast attributing an inflammatory quote to a prominent Saudi royal family member (Chughtai).

By now, you may have noticed that this section has talked solely of Qatari-Saudi relations. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are still essentially puppet states of Saudi Arabia, though are obviously a bit more progressive in their laws, or at least enforcement of said laws. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have recently re-established stronger relations, and this blockade, along with Egypt’s comparable, repressive policies on governmental power and human rights have only served to solidify this new partnership. Therefore, the rest of the Quartet’s involvement in this blockade is more based in relations with Saudi Arabia rather than antagonism towards Qatar (Ulrichsen).

How has the blockade affected Qatari citizens?

As mentioned before, Qatar’s ever-burgeoning economy kind of negated the impact that the blockade would have had on a country with more people or less resources. While there were reports initially of store shelves being empty as the supply across the Saudi land border was suddenly stopped. Qatari businesses and the government had to find new suppliers for everything, including Turkish and Iranian foodstuffs, as forty percent of the Qatari food supply came through the now-closed land border with Saudi Arabia. In fact, much of the supplies that Qatar had previously bought from those countries with which it now has hostile relations are now flown in by Turkey and Iran, using Iranian airspace. In addition, maritime imports to Qatar previously went through ports at either Abu Dhabi or Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. Much of those imports by boat have now shifted to originating in Oman, the only country on the Arabian Peninsula which has not cut relations with Qatar (Yemen joined the blockade in the middle of 2017) Even materials for new Qatari infrastructure, such as the World Cup Stadium the country is building for the 2022 event, have been re-sourced, though “shipping costs have gone up tenfold,” as the costs of shipping via truck as compared to a plane or a boat is so much cheaper (BBC).

Qatar has also shifted to start making many products domestically, ranging from laundry detergent to milk to cucumbers. Along with their primary trading partners in Iran and Turkey, Qatar has become one of their own primary producers. While it has been acknowledged that Qatar did make a significant dent into their hundreds of billions of dollars in reserves, their Foreign Minister, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, told the New York Times that Qatar was “over” the blockade, and, by all accounts, is looking toward a future without regional allyship (Hubbard).

Where does the United States figure into all of this?

The Saudi-Qatari feud actually presents a huge conundrum for the United States, as both Saudi Arabia and Qatar are among the United States’ strongest allies in the Middle East. United States policy in this part Middle East has been torn for the last two years, and quite literally directly contradicts itself at times, courtesy of President Trump and his twitter handle @realDonaldTrump (Milton-Edwards). To backtrack a bit, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has come out publicly with the United States officially supporting Qatar in the blockade, and for years, along with Kuwaiti authorities, tried to mediate negotiations between their two allies before they proverbially threw up their hands and gave up, with the main convener saying that neither country would ever be willing to bend. Militarily, the United States has supported Qatar, and refuses to partake in pan-Middle Eastern military exercises unless Qatar is included (Paul).

However, President Trump has indicated his support for Saudi Arabia on Twitter. Repeatedly. When the blockade started, Trump was very enthusiastic, and vowed his full support for the Saudis throughout the whole blockade, and has indicated his unwavering support for Saudi Arabia through all of United States foreign policy, which, in this case, has been in direct opposition to Pompeo’s stated goals (Milton-Edwards). However, Trump’s tweets do not constitute official US foreign policy, and the stated goals have prevailed overall, with the US supporting Qatar and advocating peace in the region, though the tweets have certainly sent mixed messages and prevented a clear, concise US message in the Middle East (Paul).

Looking Ahead…

Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been digging in for the long run. Simply put, in spite of their geographical proximity, these countries do not need each other to survive and thrive. As the foreign minister of Qatar said, “we’ve moved on” (Hubbard). Because of Qatar’s expensive retooling of its economy, they are now stable and thriving, with the shift to domestic production actually proving prosperous for the Qatari economy, providing it the jolt it needed by importing less food and supplies. Allies such as Turkey and Iran are prepared to keep Qatar afloat, and the massive American airbase, along with a fortification of the Qatari military, will keep Qatar safe and secure against any potential military action on the part of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or Bahrain. In addition, negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been stopped for months, as the United States basically threw its hands up in exasperation and their Qatar blockade czar retired. A replacement has not been appointed (Wong). Because of all of these factors, barring any radical changes, it seems as though this blockade will continue on for the foreseeable future.

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