Assessing The Effects of Transparency Laws on Different Political Actors
Transparency is a cornerstone of democratic governance because it allows the public to monitor governmental activity and see which private interests influence the state. Governments worldwide take strides in developing regulations to ensure transparency in governance, as have intergovernmental organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the World Bank, and the Council of Europe. Having more transparency policies developed means that citizens are more likely to have increased knowledge and trust in governments claiming to be ‘transparent'.
Transparency is a cornerstone of democratic governance because it allows the public to monitor governmental activity and see which private interests influence the state. Governments worldwide take strides in developing regulations to ensure transparency in governance, as have intergovernmental organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the World Bank, and the Council of Europe. Having more transparency policies developed means that citizens are more likely to have increased knowledge and trust in governments claiming to be ‘transparent'.
The aim that guides this project includes the development of a public policy-oriented approach to the study of transparency through the policy evaluation of the effects of different transparency laws on the behaviour and attitudes of different political actors.
The aim that guides this project includes the development of a public policy-oriented approach to the study of transparency through the policy evaluation of the effects of different transparency laws on the behaviour and attitudes of different political actors.
To this end, we first surveyed 300 politically active interest groups in Ireland to explore the effects of transparency on the lobbying profession.
To this end, we first surveyed 300 politically active interest groups in Ireland to explore the effects of transparency on the lobbying profession.
Secondly, we collected data on the way journalists use transparency portals thus acting as mediators of transparency.
Secondly, we collected data on the way journalists use transparency portals thus acting as mediators of transparency.
Finally, we conducted a survey experiment on a nationally-representative sample of 1,800 participants (Republic of Ireland) to explore the effects of transparency on political trust and perceived corruption.
Finally, we conducted a survey experiment on a nationally-representative sample of 1,800 participants (Republic of Ireland) to explore the effects of transparency on political trust and perceived corruption.
Peer Reviewed Articles
Peer Reviewed Articles
Crepaz, M. (2024) Lobbying transparency and attitudes towards interest groups: a survey experiment. Interest Groups & Advocacy. Open Access.
Crepaz, M. (2024) Lobbying transparency and attitudes towards interest groups: a survey experiment. Interest Groups & Advocacy. Open Access.
Crepaz, M. & Arikan, G. (2023). The Effects of Transparency Regulation on Political Trust and Perceived Corruption: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. Regulation & Governance. Open Access.
Crepaz, M. & Arikan, G. (2023). The Effects of Transparency Regulation on Political Trust and Perceived Corruption: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. Regulation & Governance. Open Access.
Crepaz, M. & Kneafsey L. (2021). Usability of transparency portals: examination of perceptions of journalists as information seekers. Public Administration, 100(4), 978-998.
Crepaz, M. & Kneafsey L. (2021). Usability of transparency portals: examination of perceptions of journalists as information seekers. Public Administration, 100(4), 978-998.
Crepaz, M. & Arikan, G. (2021). Information disclosure and political trust during the Covid-19 crisis: experimental evidence from Ireland. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 31(s1): 96-108.
Crepaz, M. & Arikan, G. (2021). Information disclosure and political trust during the Covid-19 crisis: experimental evidence from Ireland. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 31(s1): 96-108.
Crepaz, M. (2020). To inform, strategise, collaborate, or compete: what use do lobbyists make of lobby registers?. European Political Science Review, 12(3), 347-369.
Crepaz, M. (2020). To inform, strategise, collaborate, or compete: what use do lobbyists make of lobby registers?. European Political Science Review, 12(3), 347-369.
Other outputs:
Other outputs:
Crepaz, M. & Arikan, G. (2021). COVID-19 dashboards have a polarising effect on public trust. LSE Blogs.
Crepaz, M. & Arikan, G. (2021). COVID-19 dashboards have a polarising effect on public trust. LSE Blogs.
Crepaz, M. & Worthy, B (2023). As another lobbying scandal erupts in the Conservative party, are tougher rules finally on the horizon? The Conversation UK.
Crepaz, M. & Worthy, B (2023). As another lobbying scandal erupts in the Conservative party, are tougher rules finally on the horizon? The Conversation UK.
Impact of the project:
Impact of the project:
Second Statutory Review of the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015 (Ireland)
The project is supported by the Irish Research Council (GOIPD/2018/52)
The project is supported by the Irish Research Council (GOIPD/2018/52)
Project team:
Project team:
Michele Crepaz, VC's Illuminate Fellow, Queen's University Belfast
Michele Crepaz, VC's Illuminate Fellow, Queen's University Belfast
Other Collaborators:
Other Collaborators:
Raj Chari, Professor, Trinity College Dublin
Raj Chari, Professor, Trinity College Dublin
Liam Kneafsey, Assistant Professor, Trinity College Dublin
Liam Kneafsey, Assistant Professor, Trinity College Dublin