Monetary integration—such as adopting the euro—offers clear benefits: lower transaction costs, exchange rate stability, and closer integration with core economies. However, for catching-up countries with higher natural interest rates, it also poses a hidden macroeconomic risk: boom-bust cycles driven by overly loose monetary conditions. I belonged to first economists who wrote about this phenomenon (even before it happened, see Brzoza-Brzezina 2005) and conducted several research studies to investigate whether and how boom-bust cycles can be prevented.
The boom-bust cycle:
Interest Rate Mismatch: When a fast-growing country joins a currency union, the interest rate of the union may be too low relative to its own economic fundamentals. This mismatch fuels excessive borrowing and investment.
Boom Phase: Cheap credit leads to rapid increases in consumption, housing prices, and investment, often outpacing productivity gains. Financial institutions, facing few constraints, amplify these trends.
Bust Phase: Eventually, imbalances become unsustainable. Asset prices fall, credit contracts, output declines and unemployment increases — often severely, as the country lacks independent monetary tools to respond.
Historical developments: such boom-and-bust episodes occured in several member countries of the euro area, including Spain, Ireland, Lithuania, Latva and Estonia.
Poland and the euro area: Poland's (potential) accession to the euro area is a clear case of potentially severe boom-bust developments. Poland's natural rate of interest is 2-3 percentage points higher than that of the euro area. Convergence is expected not earlier than in the mid 2030s. (Bielecki et al. 2024)
Policy Implications: To avoid such cycles, countries should strengthen financial regulation and macroprudential tools before joining a monetary union. Coordination with fiscal policy is also critical (Brzoza-Brzezina, Jacquinot, Kolasa 2014, Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa, Makarski 2015, Bielecki et al 2019). The safest option is, however, to postpone accession until natural interest rates converge significantly.
Here's my youtube presentation (in Polish) on the costs and benefits of Poland's euro adoption with a large section on boom-bust episodes https://youtu.be/eA0zmWWllX4?si=wbC05eZkKiHeN1lS
Literature (my contribution to the topic):
Brzoza-Brzezina, Michał, 2005. "Lending booms in the new EU Member States: will euro adoption matter?," Working Paper Series 543, European Central Bank.
Brzoza-Brzezina, Michał & Kolasa, Marcin & Makarski, Krzysztof, 2015. "Macroprudential policy and imbalances in the euro area," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 137-154.
Michał Brzoza-Brzezina & Pascal Jacquinot & Marcin Kolasa, 2014. "Can We Prevent Boom-Bust Cycles During Euro Area Accession?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 35-69, February.
Marcin Bielecki & Michał Brzoza‐Brzezina & Marcin Kolasa & Krzysztof Makarski, 2019. "Could the Boom‐Bust in the Eurozone Periphery Have Been Prevented?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 336-352, March.
Marcin Bielecki & Michał Brzoza-Brzezina & Aneta Błażejowska & Kamila Kuziemska-Pawlak & Grzegorz Szafrański, 2024. "Estimates and Projections of the Natural Rate of Interest for Poland and the Euro Area," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 1-32.
Much of my recent research asks a simple question: when central banks or governments respond to economic shocks, who ultimately benefits and who bears the costs? While monetary and fiscal policies are usually evaluated in terms of inflation, growth, or employment, they also have important redistributive consequences across generations and households with different levels of wealth. Fiscal policy redistributes directly, but indirect effects related to macroeconomic developments can even invert the original redistribution. Business cycles redistribute as well and it matters a lot when one was born.
Monetary policy is not distributionally neutral. Monetary easing typically redistributes welfare from older generations toward younger ones. Lower interest rates support employment and borrowers, while reducing the returns earned by households holding large amounts of nominal assets.
What matters is not only what households own, but what they plan to buy or sell in the future. Young households often accumulate housing and financial assets, while older households decumulate them. As a result, the welfare effects of asset-price changes can differ sharply from what balance-sheet snapshots suggest.
Inflation and macroeconomic shocks can generate large redistribution. During the 2021-22 inflation surge, adverse shocks would have transferred welfare from younger and poorer households toward older and wealthier ones. Expansionary monetary policy largely mitigated these effects by supporting labor income and reducing real returns on wealth.
The COVID-era fiscal and monetary stimulus also had strong redistributive consequences. Although transfers were broadly distributed across society, most redistribution occurred indirectly through inflation, asset prices, and labor-market developments. Younger households were the main beneficiaries, while middle-aged and older households absorbed much of the cost through losses on nominal assets.
Different cohorts experience unequal welfare gains or losses from cyclical fluctuations, depending on their labor market status or asset positions. Some generations are systematically "luckier" than others, benefiting from favorable shocks during prime working or saving years. Crucially, monetary policy shocks, though small in output variance terms, play a disproportionately large role in intergenerational redistribution.
You can listen to my podcast on the topic (in Polish): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GeahZsFzyeA
Marcin Bielecki & Michał Brzoza-Brzezina & Marcin Kolasa, 2022. "Intergenerational Redistributive Effects of Monetary Policy" Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 549-580.
Brzoza-Brzezina, Michał & Kolasa, Marcin & Makarski, Krzysztof & Jabłońska, Julia, 2024. "For whom the bill tolls: redistributive consequences of a monetary-fiscal stimulus," Working Paper Series 2998, European Central Bank.
Marcin Bielecki & Michał Brzoza-Brzezina & Marcin Kolasa, 2026. "The redistributive power of business cycle fluctuations," Working Papers 2026-2, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
Brzoza-Brzezina, Michał & Rigato, Rodolfo Dinis, 2026. "The great redistribution that wasn’t: a HANK-OLG perspective on monetary policy," Working Paper Series 3197, European Central Bank.
I explore (with co-authors of course) how population aging, fertility trends, technology growth and migration affect the economy. Of particular interest is the impact on the equilibrium (natural) real interest rate (NRI) and the implications for monetary policy. We show that it is essential for central banks to take demographic trends into account, otherwise they risk conducting suboptimal policy.
Here's my podcast on the topic (in Polish): https://youtu.be/yN3ATC3IH4g?si=Rj_kZ0ukEmGCfXZo
We find that population aging has been the key factor behind a multi-decade decline in the natural real interest rate (in both Poland and the euro area)—accounting for about two‑thirds of the total drop since the mid-1980s (Bielecki, Brzoza-Brzezina & Kolasa 2020)
This demographic effect stems from longer life expectancy and lower fertility, which shift household saving and investment behavior.
Euro Area: Aging has already lowered NRI by approximately 2 pp between 1980 and 2025.
Poland: Aging alone is projected to reduce NRI by ~1.5 percentage points over a 40‑year span (2000–2040). While migration (notably from Ukraine) has some mitigating effect, its impact is relatively minor. This is because migrants typically arrive with little assets and have to accumulate them, which pushes the equilibrium interest down. (Bielecki, Brzoza-Brzezina & Kolasa 2022).
A falling natural rate raises the risk that nominal interest rates hit the zero lower bound (ZLB). (Bielecki, Brzoza-Brzezina & Kolasa 2023).
In the euro area, demographic trends increased the ZLB risk from less than 0.5% in 1980 to almost 6% by 2025
If central banks systematically overestimate the natural rate—due to delayed recognition of demographic changes—they risk setting too-tight policy, resulting in prolonged low inflation or deflation. This in turn, further raises the risk of deflationary episodes and hitting the ZLB.
We develop New Keynesian overlapping-generations (life-cycle) models calibrated to household-level data, then simulate how demographics influence saving behavior, capital accumulation, equilibrium interest rates and inflation.
Timely updates: Central banks should continually revise their estimates of NRI to account for demographic shifts, reducing policy mistakes and ZLB risk.
Structural policy reforms: Possible responses include raising the retirement age which can help offset downward pressure on the natural rate.
Immigration: While helpful, migration alone is insufficient to fully counter demographic headwinds.
Literature (my contributions to the topic):
Bielecki, Marcin & Brzoza-Brzezina, Michał & Kolasa, Marcin, 2020. "Demographics and the natural interest rate in the euro area," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
Marcin Bielecki & Michał Brzoza-Brzezina & Marcin Kolasa, 2022. "Aging, Migration and Monetary Policy in Poland," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1, pages 5-30.
Marcin Bielecki & Michał Brzoza‐Brzezina & Marcin Kolasa, 2023. "Demographics, Monetary Policy, and the Zero Lower Bound," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(7), pages 1857-1887, October.
A standard assumption in mainstream macroeconomics is that people form expectations in a rational way (see e.g. Muth (1961), Lucas (1972), Kydland and Prescott (1982)). This means that they use all available information, know the true model of the economy and solve it to generate a forecast of future macroeconomic variables like output or inflation.
However, a growing behavioral economics literature argues that people are prone to systematical cognitive biases that significantly affect their decision-making process. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) showed that while making judgments, people systematically deviate from the Bayesian probability distribution, a behavior they called heuristics. Heuristics are simplified processes of reasoning and decision-making based on ”rule of thumb” behavior used by all people on a daily basis. This phenomenon might generally be beneficial as it allows us to make quick decisions instead of conducting an in-depth analysis of each situation. However, as a consequence, forecasts need not be rational. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) have shown that indeed macroeconomic forecasts deviate from rationality.
In this line of research (of course together with co-authors) I ask how deviations from the rational expectations assumption affects the basic laws of monetary economics. In particular, we assume that expectations are formed behaviorally instead of rationally (Gabaix, 2020). In simpler words, we assume that households are somewhat myopic :
is the assumption of behavioral expectations more or less in line with the data than rational expectations?
how does deviation from rational expectations affect the transmission of monetary policy?
how does it affect the impact of fiscal policy on the economy?
how does it affect the consequences of joining a monetary union?
does it help explain important macroeconomic puzzles?
Is the degree of myopia constant or does it fluctuate over time?
Here are some answers, for more questions, answers and details you are welcome to read the papers
behavioral expectations find much more support in the data than rational expectations
if households form expectations behaviorally, monetary policy becomes less powerfull
if households form expectations behaviorally, fiscal policy becomes more powerfull
if households form expectations behaviorally, joining a monetary union is less costly (in terms of increased output volatility)
behavioral expectations can for instance help explain the so called UIP puzzle. In models with rational expectations foreign exchange returns are unforcasteable. This is not in line with empirical observations. Under behavioral expectations one can forecast returns on foreign currency investments
myopia fluctuates over time, for instance in periods of high inflation or uncertainty people become more forward-looking. This has important implications for the power of monetary and fiscal policies, as these vary over time as well.
My contribution to the literature:
Brzoza-Brzezina, Michał & Galiński, Paweł R. & Makarski, Krzysztof, 2025. "Monetary and fiscal policy in a two-country model with behavioral expectations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
Monetary Integration under Bounded Rationality, with Paweł Galiński & Krzysztof Makarski, NBP Working Paper forthcoming, Narodowy Bank Polski
Time-Varying Attention and its Consequences for Monetary and Fiscal Policy, with Stefan Girstmair, mimeo Narodowy Bank Polski