- Evaluating Strategic Forecasters (with Rahul Deb and Maher Said) (new)
- Mental Health Stigma (with Prashant Bharadwaj and Agne Suziedelyte)
- Robust Mediators in Large Games (with Michael Kearns, Ryan Rogers, Aaron Roth and Jon Ullman)
- Do Online Social Networks Increase Welfare? (with Manuel Mueller-Frank)
- The Design of Affirmative Action Policy: A Mechanism Design Approach (with Rakesh Vohra)
Papers in Refereed Journals
- An Anti-Folk Theorem for Large Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring (with Aaron Roth and Jon Ullman), ACM Transactions in Economics and Computation (TEAC), 5(2), October 2016.
- Discrimination via Symmetric Auctions (with Rahul Deb), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(1), February 2017, 275-314.
- Social Learning with Costly Search (with Manuel Mueller-Frank), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1), February 2016, 83-109.
- The Geometry of Revealed Preference (with Rahul Deb), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 50, January 2014, 203-207.
- Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders (with Rakesh Vohra), Journal of Economic Theory, 150, March 2014, 383-425.
- Coarse Decision Making and Overfitting (with Nabil Al-Najjar), Journal of Economic Theory, 150, March 2014, 467-486.
- Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules (with Rakesh Vohra), Mathematics of Operations Research, 38(4), November 2013, 682-697.
Papers in Refereed Conference Proceedings
- The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models (with Rachel Cummings, Katrina Ligett and Aaron Roth), Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2016.
- Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy (with Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth and Jon Ullman), Proceedings of Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), 2014.
- Ironing in Dynamic Revenue Management: Posted Prices and Biased Auctions (with Rahul Deb), Proceedings of the Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2013.
- Auctions with Intermediaries (with Jon Feldman, Vahab Mirrokni and S Muthukrishnan), Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 23-32, 2010.
- Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy (with Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth and Jon Ullman), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 104(5): 431-5.
- Mechanism Design and Privacy (with Aaron Roth), SIGecom Exchanges, 12(1), June 2013.
- Competition in Mechanisms, SIGecom Exchanges, 9(1), June 2010.
I've served on the organizing committee for- Fairness for Digital Infrastructure Workshop 2017, Texas Theory Conference 2016, New York Computer Science and Economics Day 2011 and Ad Auctions Workshop 2012.
I have served on the program committee for ACM Conference on Electronic commerce and other conferences and workshops in the sort of 'nexus area' between computer science and economics. Most recently, I served on the program committees for the ACM Foundations of Electronic Commerce 2016, and will be serving on the program committee for WINE 2016.
I've been a referee for, among others: American Economic Review, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, Econometrica, Economics Bulletin, European Journal of Operations Research, Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Management Science, Mathematics of Operations Research, Operations Research, Review of Economic Studies, Theoretical Economics and Transactions on Economics and Computation.