PERSPECTIVES 2020

Covid-19 pandemic has forced ASEAN states to rethink and re-manoeuvre the multilateralism that they have forged among themselves and with Japan, one of the important partners in the region. Japan has always been viewed as an entrenched security provider, both traditionally and non-traditionally by the ASEAN partners. However, the pandemic has heightened the pre-existing concerns in the relations, notably in human security and the notion of Japan as a leader in economic integration, human rights and liberal values. Japan’s aspiration to lead is being put under scrutiny as it reveals that Japan is in dire need of a fundamental shift in its policy-making towards ASEAN. The pandemic has reminded ASEAN of its lesser-partner status as Japan’s first response to the virus was to ban foreign national residents from re-entering the country, which is a stark comparison to how Japanese nationals are treated in ASEAN states and elsewhere. This shows that mostly ASEAN and other foreign nationals are regarded as disposable cheap labours in time of crisis. A true partnership between Japan and ASEAN would not only require ASEAN countries to step up to its role, but for Japan to change its policies and start treating ASEAN as equal and mutually reinforcing partner, not just as an attractive supplier of migrant labours in addressing Japan’s own economic insecurities. The recent official visits of the new prime minister Suga Yoshihide to Vietnam and Indonesia, and the inking of RCEP have been viewed as incremental changes in Japan’s views towards ASEAN and thus, a promising gesture in further mending the relationship. The role that Japan plays in concluding RCEP also demonstrates the extend of Japan’s leadership and strengthening solidarity in economic recovery post Covid-19 pandemic. Although Suga has never hold any portfolio in foreign ministry and minimal involvement in ASEAN-Japan relations, he and his cabinets are well-informed of ASEAN centrality. With the addition of a new Minister for Administrative Reform and Regulatory Reform, Kono Taro is an invaluable asset to ASEAN-Japan relations in Suga’s cabinet as he has vast experience engaging with ASEAN in his former posts as foreign as well as defence minister during Abe’s administration.

The Covid-19 pandemic has also accelerated the digitalization of economy and government-to-government relations with regards to healthcare and human resource management. Moving forward, Japan and ASEAN needs a deeper dialogue in shaping the liberal values with regards to digital divide and literacy in driving the region economic integration. The governments also have to work closely in addressing the regressing human rights issues along the global and regional supply chains. A comprehensive assessment of labour rights degradation and risks, and to mitigate these risks in Japanese firms based in ASEAN (and on the ground) are duly required as businesses are the most affected by the virus. In the context of business and human rights, ASEAN is definitely more advanced than Japan as European Union has been pressuring ASEAN to mitigate human rights risks and this leads to a rippling effect that influences the development of human rights in Japan due to the economic interconnectedness. In this regards, Japan could learn from the ASEAN partners especially Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia which are already working on national action plan in Business-Human Rights nexus and well-established human right institutions installed in most ASEAN states. The pandemic has also revealed a social divide between pro-government and against-government within the states in ASEAN where governments have the tendency to fall into the threat of authoritarian states. Civil societies and social medias could be the bridge in strengthening civil solidarity in fighting against the pandemic amidst the social unrest stemming from political crisis within the ASEAN states. Indeed, the pandemic has revealed the fragility of ASEAN-Japan relations, but the outlook for the relations remains positive although much still need to be done on both sides.

Dr. Mohd Ikbal Bin Mohd Huda & Siti Noor Adillah Binti Masrol,

Centre For History, Politics And International Affairs,

Faculty Of Social And Humanities,

The National University Of Malaysia

The SDG is a blueprint for global peace and prosperity, entrenching its thrust for worldwide effort in ending poverty and other life deprivations. The spirit of SDG gained a full support from all United Nations’ (UN) state members as a result of decades of work by the state members and UN itself. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development underlines 17 cores of SDG that aims to combat poverty conjoining with the strategies of improving health and education, reducing inequality, and propelling economic growth. Most importantly, these strategies shall be carried out in accordance with climate change awareness, conservation of forests and preservation of oceans. The SDG is an active continuation of the previous Millennium Development Goals (MDG), and its implementation is rooted on the 3 indivisible yet integrated dimensions of sustainable development namely the economic, social and environmental.

JSDF Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) fits perfectly within SDG endeavours as their main mission is to ensure the proper livelihood of displaced persons and infrastructure rebuilding within the conflict areas. Take for example of JSDF mission in 2004 to Iraq, which also marked one of JSDF historic moments when the service members were allowed to carry heavy weapons with them in an overseas mission. The level of readiness and commitment to help was displayed early while the JSDF service members were still at home base as they learnt Iraqis language, custom, religion and culture to better adapt with the locals. Male service members were also encouraged to grow more facial hairs to mingle better with the locals. JSDF arrived in the southeast city of Samawah in January 2004 with their mandate given by the Diet at that time is the peacetime reconstruction and the restoration of basic amenities. The efforts of restoring Samawah is a symbiotic relationship between JSDF and locals, as the complexity of Samawah’s infrastructure would require JSDF to contract out the construction works to the local civilian companies. This in turn generated the local economy and gave the locals a source of income in time of instability. The engineer and medical corps of JSDF also participated in the restoration of clean water supply, road building and medical supply. At this juncture, we could see that JSDF undertook the peacekeeping mission with the primary objective of providing basic human security of food, shelter, education and economy. It also suffices to say that the peacekeeping mission in Iraq also helped UN to build the trust of Iraqi citizen towards UN in helping them to rebuild their country.

Another monumental participation by JSDF in PKO was during the Haiti earthquake in 2010. As the 7.0 magnitude earthquake shaken and shattered the poor nation’s infrastructures and residences, over 3 million lives were at stake. JSDF sent a medical team first to galvanize the international humanitarian efforts, and later sent a 350 strong engineering unit under the flag of UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH). The JSDF working hand-in-hand with the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Medical Team, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) worked tirelessly to clear rubbles from the destroyed building, reopen crucial transportation and infrastructure points, providing crucial medical treatment, restoring water and food supply, transporting refugees, building a makeshift camp and housing thousands of orphans. In critical medical cases, JSDF flew the patients from Port-au-Prince to Miami to receive better treatments. This commitment of JSDF towards active support of human security has already fulfilled the spirit of global peace, years ahead before the pursuit of SDG. In that mission alone, JSDF again has invigorated the SDG elements of no poverty, zero hunger, good health and well-being, clean water and sanitation, decent work and economic growth, life on land and partnership for the goals. The boots-on-the-ground support coupled with financial aid laid a crucial foundation to an effective achievement of SDG, and at the same time it has boosted a positive Japanese image to the international community. For instance, during an interview with the JSDF service member, the engineering works of infrastructure and road restoration had swiftly reinstated the aid effort and economic activities. The humanitarian support by JSDF built a mutual trust with the Haitians and paved a way forward for effectively building a basic support for the Haitians to restart their daily life after the destruction. This in turn have simultaneously strengthen the SDG and MDG values of preserving human life as well as preserving the world’s peace.

In conclusion, Japan through JSDF has advocated the need for international cooperation long before the birth of SDG blueprints. Japan has braved the world’s negative perception for the fear of its active rearmament and sought the local political support in realizing the dream of better world for everyone. The Iraq’s mission opened the door for JSDF to re-evaluate their strategy within the unique national security environment, which was proven by the rapid restoration of water and food supply, and reparation of crucial infrastructures in Samawah. Therefore, JSDF shall not be seen as the military power to reckon with, but rather as a well-equipped and experienced humanitarians who would go extra miles in preserving international harmony, supporting human security and building a better world for future generations.

Dr. Mohd Ikbal Bin Mohd Huda,

Centre For History, Politics And International Affairs,

Faculty Of Social And Humanities,

The National University Of Malaysia

After nearly five decades since its inception in 1967, ASEAN launched the ASEAN Community 2015, comprising three community pillars: Political-Security Community, Economic Community, and Socio-Cultural Community. The conception of having a ‘community’ instead of a loose ‘association’ to promote and emphasize the ‘togetherness’ within ASEAN began as Singapore put forward an initiative to have an economic community in 2002. However, the economic development had to be accompanied by commensurate progress in the political field, leading to Indonesia’s motivation to initiate a political-security community, and followed by the Philippines’ initiative to establish a socio-economic community. Henceforth, the three pillars were born after intensive discussions at Bali Concord II in 2003, which stresses that these pillars are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region. Having collective identity on common interests, mutual trust and collective action mechanisms are an important foundation for ASEAN to develop a security community. Although ASEAN is different from traditional security organizations (being a non-military organization), military initiatives relatively do not seem to be taken seriously. This section attempts to focus on the ASEAN Political-Security

Community (APSC) and the political and security challenges to regional integration.

What does APSC mean for the people of ASEAN? APSC, established in 2015, is in line with the

human security concept which places people at the heart of its concerns, promotes the rights to a dignified as well as decent life, and freedom from fears. In order to transform ASEAN to be more ‘people-centered’ and ‘people-oriented’, a rule-based community grounded in shared values and norms needs to be in place to carve the pathway for a cohesive, peaceful and resilient ASEAN community, guided by the principles and purposes of the ASEAN Charter. Among the central codes of conduct of APSC are the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which governs the interstate relations as well as promotion of peace and stability and the 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ).

All ASEAN member States (AMS) are required to adhere to the guiding principles outlined in the TAC: 1) mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations, 2) the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion, 3) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, 4) settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means, 5) renunciation of the threat or use of force, and 6) effective cooperation among themselves. To ensure lasting peace within and beyond the region, ASEAN also takes upon itself to address the threat of nuclear proliferation. Three decades after the inception of SEANWFZ, this treaty remains an essential initiative which not only covers the territories of the signatory states, but their Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelves as well. Article 3 of SEANWFZ does not only prohibit nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destructions, but it also protects the region from environmental pollution and the hazards of radioactive and toxic waste materials. In addition, AMSs are encouraged to accede to and ratify international human rights as well as ensure effective implementation in order to promote and protect rights and social justice of its people. Therefore, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was established for the sole purpose of advancing human rights and fundamental freedoms in the discharge of its mandate, in accordance with its Terms of Reference (TOR).

However, increasing political and security challenges may hamper efforts to further consolidate peace and the process of regional integration. Unlike the ASEAN Economic Community, in

which integration can be measured through intra-ASEAN trade, APSC integration is much more difficult to achieve, and to measure by indicators alone. The challenges include the resolve of AMS to give substance to the declarations and exhortation they made in order to address the intra and inter-ASEAN power dynamics. AMS must stay true to the principle of neutrality and TAC, especially in the context of maritime disputes in the South China Sea. If ASEAN is seen to be impartial and doing the bidding of any of its geopolitical adversaries, its cohesion and unity will be jeopardized, and ASEAN itself will lose its standing to forge the political and security architecture of the region.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is central in enhancing political and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, as well as the pivot in building peace and stability in the region, is also facing increasing challenges posed by a myriad of issues such as climate change, pandemics, natural disasters, transnational crimes and violations of human rights, among others. APSC aims to enhance the role of the Chair of the ARF on political-security issues through the promotion of confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy activities, as well as conflict resolution initiatives reflected through enhanced dialogues and cooperation between ASEAN and 17 dialogue partners. However, the inability of ASEAN and ARF to address the genocide issue in Myanmar, and to engage China to be a responsible partner in the region has been attributed to both ASEAN and ARF’s lack of political will leading to inaction on these issues.

There is also the question of why ASEAN refuses to activate ASEAN Troika to address in a timely manner urgent and important regional political and security issues and situations of common concern likely to disturb regional peace and harmony. Despite having the mechanism to elevate ASEAN cooperation to a higher plane and further enhance ASEAN’s unity and solidarity, this ASEAN Troika has not been formally invoked to serve its purpose. AMSs themselves have divided views each time there is a call to activate this Troika by conveniently capitalizing on the principles of non-interference and sovereignty, and thus ASEAN’s stand remains rhetorical even though an issue has obvious spill-over effects to other member states. Moreover, the scope of Troika is also limited, as it does not have decision- making powers and it has to refrain from addressing issues concerning internal affairs of ASEAN member states. AMSs often show reluctance to multilateralize their issues and put their policies and actions under scrutiny by other member States. In a way, the principles within TAC, which aim to resolve conflicts through peaceful means, are also the stumbling block for political security building in the region, as the line between internal/domestic affairs and regional affairs is blurry. Issues that concern the peace and stability of the region must not be viewed as merely an internal affair of a particular State.

ASEAN observers and scholars have always attributed the ASEAN Way as the cause of ASEAN’s failure to address the emerging political and security challenges to regional integration. While it may be true that this ASEAN spirit may be the root cause of ASEAN inaction or failures, it is important to take into account that member States may not necessarily share the same aspiration, as each member has its own foreign policy priorities and national interests that may not be aligned with the interests of ASEAN. While aspiring to become a regional community with shared goals, values and norms, it does not mean that ASEAN member States will forgo their own interests for the sake of ASEAN as they have to leverage their own gains against the collective gains of ASEAN.

Dr. Mohd Ikbal Bin Mohd Huda,

Centre For History, Politics And International Affairs,

Faculty Of Social And Humanities,

The National University Of Malaysia

Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions is an edited book that provide readers with rich understanding on Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) through a comparative analysis. The book gathers views and observations of experts from all over the world. Although Japan is the main focus of the discussion, but the book lacks contribution from Japanese expert, neither academic nor field practitioner. The organization of the chapters that were divided into two different perspectives (donors and recipients) also indicate the dynamics of international aid in general which evolve from dependent to interdependent relationship. This book may present a confusing picture of Japan’s overall aid policy if one does not have a substantial understanding of development issues or Japan’s ODA policymaking institutions and implementation processes. It seems that the authors were not able to incorporate the significant ongoing changes. In order to capture its comprehensive picture, there has to be a systemic timeline of the expansion of Japan’s foreign aid. It also lacks explanation on the shift of Japan’s aid that initially served as part of a regional trade and reparations policy and later surpassed Western donors as the world’s largest donor country. However, in 2001 other donors have steadily increased their aid allocations, while Japan took a reversal action. The reduced ODA budget seen by many as weakening its major diplomatic tools.

The analysis was made based on a stereotypical understanding of Japan’s ODA. The common criteria that used to compare Japan with other donor countries are with respect to loan-focused versus grant-focused aid, project versus program orientation, the technical cooperation focused on operating equipment versus teaching primary skills at the grassroots level, and higher versus lower technology intensity. This kind of analysis triggers doubt about whether those simple dichotomies could be the only means to understand Japan’s aid effectiveness and quality. It leads one to presume that Japan has done nothing in order to comply with such international demands as those set by the United Nations like the issues of human rights, environment and poverty alleviation.

As depicted by the title, the content of the book also leads readers to a perspective that Japan is facing a dilemma whether to stick with its traditional aid philosophy or to comply with contemporary international norms. This book is one of many other literatures that include critiques on how Japan’s aid is administered. One of the critiques is about the Japan’s preference of tying its aid with Japanese companies. For some, such practice could be interpreted as protecting Japan’s own interest without giving flexibility to recipient countries. However, Japan has its own justification for that policy. Autonomy of recipient countries is very important to Japan especially in the case of democracy assistance. Untied aid is more favourable for the recipient countries than tied aid because the latter tend to be commercially motivated and promotes the donor’s interests by depriving local business of the chance to provide goods and services for aid programs. However, the ratio of untied aid does not always indicate the absence of commercial interest in donor’s aid program. For example, the French government provides foreign aid to teach the French language and though this aid is classified as tied aid, but it is not commercial. Besides that, the recipient countries, especially the least developed ones, lack local experts in carrying out the infrastructural project assisted by donor countries. It is understandable that Japan is very strict in ensuring the success of its aid through the principle of “self-help” and request-based.

Japan was depicted as less effective due to the country’s high preference on the loan aid as contrast to grant share. However, low grant share does not mean that contributions bring comparatively little benefit to recipient countries. For example, the absolute value of Japan’s grant in 1994 was US$8.98 billion, surpassing total ODA by France. Furthermore, recipients tend to waste bilateral grants which they consider “free gifts” while they spend bilateral loans more cautiously. This is consistent with Japan’s “self-help” policy. The loan aid is awarded based on the absolute choice of the recipient country and its plan on how to implement such project and the repayment. This practice is meant to ensure recipient’s autonomy and ownership of the project. A thorough screening process was done by Japanese government before such loan is awarded.

The new-directions part of the Japan’s ODA was very well illustrated by the author in the concluding chapter when he clarifies a better and clearer mandate of Japan’s main actor in foreign aid like Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). It is a response to critique that Japan’s aid is too bureaucratic and complicated in nature. The highlight on the appointment of Sadako Ogata as the new JICA chief was impressive as it depicts the reform of Japan’s foreign aid. Critiques on Japan’s ODA can also be found in many other literatures. Despite its negative element, it also indicates the importance of Japan’s aid which always fall under the spotlight of other donor countries. Ironically, despite of all those critiques, Japan is still ranked among the top donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list.

Dr. Mohd Ikbal Bin Mohd Huda,

Centre For History, Politics And International Affairs,

Faculty Of Social And Humanities,

The National University Of Malaysia

The concept of “Regionalism” appeared after the second world war, and rise during the Cold War period. The emerge and rise of the EU during the Cold War is seen as a successful example of regionalism. I agree with the opinion of Andrew Hurrel, which defined “regionalization is spontaneous regional formation”. However, this kind of formation is under the pressure of the international situation at the time. For example, the initial purpose of EU establishment is protecting common interests of European countries and improving their international influence under the pressure of bipolar system. During the recent decades, although the regionalization among Asian countries has stronger than before, the form of macro-regionalism like EU cannot apply and isn’t suit for Asian countries.

The size of a single European country is relatively small and cannot form a large-scale domestic market in terms of economy. Reigionalize are conducive to improving economic competitiveness. Meanwhile, although there is a gap in the level of economic development among European countries, but not significant. In Asia, there is a superpower: Japan, China, Korea (the existence of superpowers and the risk of regionalization). Secondly, territorial disputes still exist, such as Senkaku Island dispute, Dokdo Island dispute etc. and It could be a big obstacle of regionalization in Asia. Other than that, interference from outside countries such the US, remain highly vigilant about the risen of Asian country, especially China. In addition, the regionalization of European countries based on similar political systems, cultural identify and views of values. However, Asia is a multicultural continent with divers religions, and it leads to different customs and view of values. Simultaneously, there are different ideologies exist in Asia. Above all, in Asian countries, the stability of institution guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for a protection of minorities cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, I think form a macro-regionalism like EU is extreme difficult. In other word, regionalization and integration in Asia cannot be as deep as in the EU.

To answer the question of whether East Asian regionalism is emerging within the East Asian region is not an easy feat. The Northeast Asian countries (Japan, South Korea and China) have their own conflicts and rivalry that may slow down the regionalization. This is apparent in the competition between Japan and China economically in which both countries are main competitors in the regional market. Japan is increasing its emphasis on EPA whereas China is expanding its BRI. Japan as the central player in the region is being contested by China's booming economy. They are competing as well as working together. It has become a dynamic and delicate relationship between these two countries and the effects spill over to the rest ASEAN countries as well. How these two countries act in the regional level will determine the smoothness of regionalization as they are the top trading partners for ASEAN.

I don’t think East Asian Regionalism will emerge in the near future. Although China’s economic power and influence are increasing, Beijing cannot give East Asian countries full confidence. If we take Japan as an example, Tokyo has more welcome by Southeast Asian countries, because the strategic threat pose by Tokyo is significantly smaller. It is worth noting that the competitive relationship among Japan, South Korea and China. Expanding EPA rule by Japan and China’s BRI make the economic competition stronger. South Korea-Japan trade dispute in 2019 also hurt the regional economic development. Therefore, they dynamic relationship among these three countries play a decisive role in the regionalization in East Asia. Moreover, the involvement of outside region forces are major obstacles to regionalization. The distrust of China has rationalized the United States' entry into the region to provide regional security. As a result, Singapore provided maintenance service for the US Navy ships; Indonesia received military training form the US; Malaysia and Vietnam also join joint military exercise with the US force. Hence, it is difficult to form a regionalization without the consensus of maximizing common interest among East Asian region, and the existence of conflicts and external factors.

Dr. Mohd Ikbal Bin Mohd Huda,

Centre For History, Politics And International Affairs,

Faculty Of Social And Humanities,

The National University Of Malaysia

The good implications brought by trade war accompanied with negative implications at the same time. For the flow of trades, most of productions transfer from China to other trade partners of the US. According to the research from Nomura Securities in 2019, the increasing export wooed Vietnam’s GDP by 7.9%, Taiwan’s by 2.1% and Malaysia by 1.3%. At the same time, the GDP of South Korea, Singapore and Thailand increased by 0.8%, 0.7% and 0.5% respectively due to tariffs made products from China loose price advantage. These countries which have benefited from the growth in export to the US have seen their exports decline to China. To some extent, the benefits from trade transfer cannot offset the decline of demands from China. Therefore, the export numbers of these countries were decreased. This also causes losses to companies in the global supply chain.

Although the trade wars are hurting developing economies, they also bring about positive impacts to these economies as well. As previously mentioned, the negative impacts of trade wars on developing economies due to redirection of trade are minimal compared to the net gains in the short term. It is interesting to note that Asian economies will benefit from trade redirection towards suppliers by the tariffs. An ADB working paper series (2019) pointed out that these suppliers can be either domestic or in third countries that are already producing the targeted goods but are exempted from the tariffs.

In this context, the manufacturing will be shifted to these countries to cut on the production costs and in turn, this will increase the return on equity (ROE) as well as job creations in these countries. As Southeast Asia products will not be affected by the tariff, the prices will be less expensive and therefore, it may be an alternative to US products. An example of possible trade diversion in Southeast Asia’s favour is Malaysia’s export to the U.S. of electronic equipment ($9.4bn) and machinery ($2.4bn) 17 which may see increased market shares. The same can be observe in other Asian market leading by Vietnam, Philippines and Cambodia due to their export similarity to US with Chinese exports that are subjected to US tariff as pointed out by Calli (2018). However, this is only possible if these developing economies are able to optimize production with less demands for investments.

Another good implication of trade wars is that the supply chain for East Asia products will be concentrated in East Asia due to the fact that growth and consumption in East Asia will be higher than US in the long run. East Asia developing economies will become more self-sustaining as the supply chain shift from global to regional. To generate growth and employment in the region, it is more profitable for the developing economies to focus on supplying the components for a product than assembling the final product itself, for example superconductor, automotive parts. The developing economies will be able to move up the value chain as component supplier and control the supply chain, making more profits than the assemblers of the products. Besides that, the intra-regional trade will also increase as export and import will be focusing in the region in order to compensate the losses from reduced import and export from/to US and China.

Dr. Mohd Ikbal Bin Mohd Huda & Siti Noor Adillah Binti Masrol,

Centre For History, Politics And International Affairs,

Faculty Of Social And Humanities,

The National University Of Malaysia