Abstract: This paper identifies societal aging as a key driver of populism in Europe, emphasizing the non-linear relationship between the two. Using multilevel regression analysis on individuals from 29 European countries between 2002 and 2021, we analyze how societal aging ; measured by the age dependency ratio and its square shapes populist attitudes. Drawing on ten rounds of the European Social Survey, we examine voting, trust in political institutions, and immigration attitudes. Our findings reveal a U-shaped relationship between societal aging and political behaviour. We argue that demographic structure of society influences political attitudes beyond individual aging. The results highlight the importance of accounting for non linear demographic effects when analyzing political behavior in aging societies.
Abstract: This paper examines how exposure to a wide range of macroeconomic downturns shapes individual attitudes to politics and support for variety of populist attitudes in Europe. We try to capture the long-run and the contemporaneous exposure to crises. We first focus on economic downturns experienced during the impressionable years between ages 18 and 25. We use repeated cross-sectional data from the Eurobarometer surveys and exploit cross-country and cohort variation in exposure to recessions. Our baseline analysis relies on fixed-effects regressions controlling for individual characteristics and contemporaneous economic conditions. We then attempt to address identification concerns. To this end we implement a difference-in-differences design that compares cohorts differentially exposed to downturns within the same country. We find that individuals exposed to macroeconomic downturns in early adulthood are more likely to support populist parties and exhibit lower trust in national and European political institutions later in life.
Abstract: In an era marked by repeated crises and the growing traction of populist movements, understanding the deep-rooted factors shaping EU cohesion has become increasingly urgent. This paper investigates how lifetime exposure to economic recessions influences individual attitudes toward the European Union (EU). Resorting to rich micro-data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Eurobarometer, we construct a detailed measure of economic hardship experienced during lifetime, capturing not just isolated downturns but the accumu lated burden of multiple recessions over time. Importantly, we distinguish between various types of shocks-including output contractions, unemployment surges, consumption drops, participation in IMF adjustment programs, and the asymmetry or symmetry of crises across EU member states. We show that individuals with greater lifetime exposure to these eco nomic shocks are more likely to distrust EU institutions, oppose further integration, vote for Eurosceptic parties, and support exiting the EU. These patterns are especially pronounced for asymmetric shocks, which disproportionately affect specific regions or countries, in contrast to symmetric shocks, which appear to foster a sense of shared fate and solidarity. A series of robustness tests-including placebo checks, heterogeneity analyses, diverse shock types and designs exploiting EU institutional structure-confirms the persistent impact of economic trauma on EU attitudes, underscoring the need to address historical recessions to safeguard cohesion and democratic legitimacy in the context of the EU.