Open Finance Adoption and Financial Inclusion: experimental evidence from microentrepreneurs (with Giorgia Barboni, Bernardo Ricca and José Renato Ornelas)
- Funded by IPA Financial Inclusion and JPAL Jobs and Opportunity Initiative
Does improving knowledge about open finance increase adoption and financial inclusion? In a randomized experiment with Brazilian microentrepreneurs, targeted information increases adoption by more than 7 percentage points, a 40% relative increase. Effects are largest among firms with greater baseline digital payment (Pix) activity. Administrative data show increases of 4–5 percentage points in credit-card availability and 3–4 percentage points in credit-card use. Over six months, the intervention expands credit access more through business than personal accounts, increases working-capital borrowing by 5 percentage points, and raises business-account Pix transactions by 15%. Firm–bank evidence indicates that business-credit gains are concentrated among banks with less prior transaction information, while short-run gains in owners’ credit-card access occur at both less- and better-informed banks. These patterns are consistent with information sharing reducing lenders’ informational disadvantages and potentially strengthening competition. Our findings suggest that improving knowledge about open finance can increase adoption, expand credit access, and shift financial activity toward business accounts.
Sanctions, Financial Frictions, and the Organization of Conflict (with Nicola Limodio)
This paper studies whether financial sanctions increase the financial frictions faced by terrorist groups and how these affect their organization. We exploit staggered sanctions on Pakistani terrorist leaders, linked to unique administrative data matching leaders' identities to charity board composition. After sanctions, associates of sanctioned terrorist leaders create more charities, exposed charities raise more funds, and affected groups splinter into factions. This reallocates terror: attacks increase in Pakistan but decline in the US and Western Europe. A multi-agent LLM analyzes qualitative evidence and yields friction intervals with a midpoint near 20 percent, comparable to a wealth tax on terrorist organizations.
Unleashing International Trade through Financial Integration: Evidence from a Cross-Border Payment System (with Gustavo S. Cortes and Vinicios P. Sant'Anna)
Leveraging administrative data on the universe of South African exporters (2010–2019), we study how cross-border payment integration affects trade. Exploiting the staggered rollout of an RTGS system across 14 SADC countries, we find bilateral trade among participants rises by about 34%—an effect comparable to an 8.3–12.1 percentage point tariff reduction—with no evidence of diversion away from non-partners. The gains are concentrated in destinations with domestic RTGS systems, weaker pre-existing financial links to South Africa, and among more financially dependent firms, and are mirrored in aggregate country-partner trade volumes.
On the Financial Amplification of Regulatory Enforcement: Evidence from Deforestation in the Amazon (with Lucas Iten Teixeira)
[Draft available upon request]
We study how financial intermediaries amplify shocks to regulatory enforcement. In the Brazilian Amazon, anti-deforestation enforcement relies on optical satellite monitoring whose effectiveness varies predictably with seasonal cloud cover. After 2013, satellite alerts remained available but became less likely to trigger sanctions. Exploiting predetermined cloud patterns, we show that sanctions fall most where monitoring conditions are most favorable, while deforestation rises. Borrower risk subsequently declines: rural-credit defaults fall and agricultural lending expands. Using predetermined differences in banks’ enforcement-related risk taking and within-borrower comparisons across lenders, we show that high-exposure banks expand credit more strongly, isolating a credit-supply response. Within-municipality-year comparisons further show that borrowers more exposed to these banks accumulate more rural-credit operations and become 30 percentage points more likely to be detected engaging in illegal clearing after enforcement weakens. Together, these results reveal a financial multiplier: even without formal rules linking credit to compliance, lenders’ endogenous response materially magnifies the real effects of weaker enforcement.