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Welcome to the external seminar page of the LEM laboratory (Lille Economie Management - UMR 9221).
The seminar takes place on Tuesdays from 4:30pm to 5:30pm in the Salle du conseil - building SH2 - Cité Scientifique campus in Villeneuve d'Ascq (access: metro M1, stop "Cité Scientifique - Professeur Gabillard"; site map), and online on Zoom.
Organizers: Marie Pierre Dargnies, Ekaterina Borisova (ekaterina.borisova[at]univ-lille.fr) and Julien Benistant (julien.benistant[at]univ-lille.fr)
Program for the year 2025-2026
September 30
José De Sousa, University of Paris Panthéon-Assas (Webpage)
Title: Gender Homophily and Feedback in Teams (with P. Madies)
Abstract: We study how feedback affects gender homophily in teams. In a lab experiment, participants endogenously form teams for a real effort task. The salience of individual errors varies across treatments, and one treatment allows partners to send messages after errors occur. We find no gender differences in overall performance, but clear differences in homophily. While men show no homophily, women more often choose female partners, a pattern driven entirely by the highest-performing women. We investigate these results by examining gender differences in beliefs, satisfaction, and fear of negative evaluation.
October 14
Juan de Dios Tena Horrillo, University of Liverpool (Webpage)
Title: Balancing Today and Tomorrow: Determinants and Consequences of Task Allocation in European Football
Abstract: This paper examines how firms allocate tasks between young and senior workers, focusing on elite football as a setting where these decisions are directly observable. Using match-level data from the five largest European leagues between the 2011–12 and 2022–23 seasons, we implement a two-stage empirical strategy that exploits quasi-random variation from calendar-related events. In the first stage, we study the determinants of playing time for young players. We show that their inclusion is discouraged in high-stakes matches, particularly for those without prior experience, but is modestly encouraged by fixture congestion and player absences. In the second stage, we aggregate this exogenous variation to examine the consequences for team performance. The short-run effects are small: fielding inexperienced players slightly worsens results, while experienced players have negligible immediate impact. The long-run effects are more pronounced. Strategic use of experienced players improves subsequent performance, whereas inexperienced players contribute positively mainly when circumstances beyond the club’s control force their inclusion. These findings reveal a structural tension between managers’ short-term incentives and clubs’ long-term interests, and underscore the importance of policies that account for how experience shapes the value of investing in young talent in superstar industries.
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