I am a Project Assistant Professor at the University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD). My research interests lie in microeconomic theory, market design, and matching theory. I am also involved in projects with companies and local governments to put insights from market design into practice. I received my Ph.D. from Boston College in 2021.
[CV] [Google Scholar]
Email: imamurak[at]e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Stable and Fair Random Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market (with Yasushi Kawase)
Extended abstract at EC' 26
Stable Matching under Inconsistent Choice Functions (with Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai)
Presentation at MATCH-UP 2026
Path Independence for Choice Correspondences (with Keisuke Bando and Yasushi Kawase)
Extended abstract at EC' 25
Strategy-Proofness and Competitive Equilibrium with Transferable Utility: The Necessity of Gross Substitutes (with Keisuke Bando and Tomoya Kazumura)
Extended abstract at EC' 24
Measuring Manipulability of Matching Mechanisms (with Kentaro Tomoeda)
Equal Treatment and its Market Design Implications (with Kentaro Tomoeda)
Journal of Mathematical Economics (2026)
Previously circulated as "Tie-breaking or Not: A Choice Function Approach''
Efficient and Strategy-Proof Mechanism under General Constraints (with Yasushi Kawase)
Theoretical Economics (2025), extended abstract at EC' 24
Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Characterizations (with Battal Doğan and M. Bumin Yenmez)
Journal of Economic Theory (2025)
Meritocracy versus Diversity
Journal of Economic Theory (2025)
Efficient Matching under General Constraints (with Yasushi Kawase)
Games and Economic Behavior (2024), presentation at MATCH-UP 2022
Stability in Matching with Externalities: Pairs Competition and Oligopolistic Joint Ventures (with Hideo Konishi and Chen-Yu Pan)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2023)
Assortative Matching with Externalities and Farsighted Agents (with Hideo Konishi)
Dynamic Games and Applications (2023), special issue on Group Formation and Farsightedness
A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods (with Keisuke Bando)
Social Choice and Welfare (2016)
Assortativeness Measures for Multi-Type Markets: Theory and Application (with Suguru Otani, Tohya Sugano, and Koji Yokote)
Substantially expanded from "A Note on Assortativeness Measures"
Cores of 3-distant convex games (with Keisuke Bando, Toshiyuki Hirai, and Ryuhei Mizutani)
Welfare Loss and Robustness of Deferred Acceptance (with Tetsutaro Hatakeyama)
Why Women Choose Middle-Skill More? Marriage Market and Child Penalty (with Norihiro Komura and Takashi Unayama)
In most Japanese prefectures, students can apply to only one public high school. We published a policy report (in Japanese) proposing a DA-based admissions system and have provided technical expertise to national and local governments.
In April 2025, then-Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba instructed the government to explore reforms to the single-application system. The proposal is now discussed as the “Digital Multiple Applications System” (デジタル併願制) and its implementation is under consideration.
Theoretical and implementation support for matching algorithms. Bridgestone adopted DA for assigning new employees to departments, reflecting both sides' preferences while reducing administrative burden.
To address fragmented information and matching across public and private agencies, we recommend centralizing information, integrating markets, and introducing a recommender system.
Proposal · Interview video (in Japanese)
Automated the previously manual matching of students to partner universities, cutting administrative time and letting students rank up to six universities instead of three.
Based on surveys of students and volunteer tutors, we advise on matching algorithms for an application that matches junior high school students with volunteer tutors.
I teach market design at the Local Autonomy College, a training institution for local government officials, and speak at public events organized by the University of Tokyo Market Design Center and the Kojima ERATO Project.