Flock Cameras

Warrensburg Chief of Police Responds to Flock Questions

The following was sent in response to the questions sent and is being posted verbatim with minor edits for spelling and grammar. Highlighted text is for emphasis. Text after an asterisk (*) is additional commentary.

On October 26, 2025, the City Council received correspondence from Thomas Holbrook that included several questions regarding Flock Safety. Working in collaboration with Flock Safety, we have prepared the following answers.

Hello,

I am a resident of Warrensburg who has lived here for many years. I recently found out about the Flock Cameras being funded by the Blue Shield Grant. While I understand the attempt to make the city safer, I have some questions regarding the use of these license plate reading devices.

1.) Though the data is not sold to third parties, will third parties have access to the data at all? If so, which ones?

Flock Safety enables data sharing between government/law enforcement camera networks, and all data sharing is fully controlled by the respective customer. Law enforcement entities can access private camera networks (like HOAs, commercial businesses) if the private customer grants access; however, it is one-way sharing only. Private customers will never have access to government camera networks.

*They say law enforcement entities but do not specify if it is Warrensburg only, includes the county, other counties, the state, other states, or federal agencies.

2.) Where is the data physically stored? Here in Warrensburg? Remote storage outside of Warrensburg on a cloud server?

All data is stored in the AWS (Amazon Web Services) Government Cloud.

*AWS is not always secure. One example is Classified U.S. military data being found unprotected. System glitches as recently as this year can also lead to disaster.

3.) Though it was said that the data is typically deleted after 30 days, will any department within the city or public organization be keeping permanent copies?

Flock Safety’s default data retention is 30 days. At the 30-day mark, all images are permanently deleted and unrecoverable unless an agency has retained data as evidence in a criminal investigation. The data is then stored by the customer in their evidence repository system and in accordance with their evidence retention policy and applicable laws.  

*A default retention period implies that it can be changed to beyond 30 days.

4.) Where will these cameras be placed?

We have conducted an initial review and our anticipated locations are within the city limits at SE 201st Rd @ SE 150th Rd, North Holden Street @ West Culton Street, Mo-13 @ SE 125th Rd, Hwy DD @ M013, West Pine Street @ North Washington Street, Mo-13 @ Hawthorne Blvd, West Pine Street @ Hidden Pine, North Holden Street @ the Courthouse, Us 50 Hwy @ West Young Street, US 50 Hwy @ 121st Rd, US 50 Hwy @ Devasher Rd East Bound, US 50 Hwy @ Devasher Rd West Bound, Mo-13 @ US 50 North bound, Mo-13 @ US 50 South Bound, and Mo-13 @ SE 125th Rd South Bound.  It should be noted that locations can be changed for various reasons including effectiveness and/or in response to criminal activity or concerns.

5.) How will the city operate these cameras while complying with the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requiring a warrant upon establishing probable cause?

From my professional perspective, the Fourth Amendment serves to protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. When a vehicle is operated on a public roadway, its license plate—being state-issued and publicly displayed—carries no reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, I do not believe that the act of photographing a vehicle traveling on a public road constitutes an intrusion upon an individual’s constitutional privacy rights nor am I aware of any court determinations or legal guidance that is the case, at this time.  There is litigation on-going regarding this question. 

Flock Safety has reviewed this question and this is their response:

While there are stated concerns and litigation related to the Fourth Amendment, it has not been determined that license plate readers violate the Fourth Amendment or that a search warrant is required.   As recently as March 31, 2025, the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois added to the unanimous judicial response supporting LPR, stating, “It is not a search under the Fourth Amendment”.

Fourth Amendment case law indicates that LPRs do not constitute a warrantless search because they take point-in-time photos of cars in public and cannot continuously track the movements of any individual. Appellate and federal district courts in at least fourteen states, including the 9th and 11th Circuits, have upheld using evidence from license plate readers as constitutional without requiring a warrant.

Courts have consistently found that there is no subjective or objective expectation of privacy in the exterior of a vehicle or a license plate in public. License plates are issued by the government and are required to be visible for public safety purposes.

The cases below collectively reinforce the principle that, while privacy in broader movement patterns is constitutionally significant, the limited and targeted use of ALPR data by law enforcement may not violate that privacy interest.

United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2020)

The Ninth Circuit held that Yang had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle he failed to return to a rental company, thus rejecting his Fourth Amendment claim. Judge Bea, concurring, emphasized that LPR data use did not violate constitutional rights.

United States v. Wilcox, 415 F. App'x 990 (11th Cir. 2011)

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the use of LPR data, finding no Fourth Amendment violation when law enforcement used it to track a suspect's movements.

United States v. Toombs, 671 F. Supp. 3d 1329 (N.D. Ala. 2023)

The court concluded that the use of LPR technology to monitor a suspect's vehicle did not infringe upon constitutional rights, as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy on public roads.

United States v. Rubin, 556 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2021)

The court determined that the deployment of LPR systems to gather vehicle location data did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.

Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 319 Ga. App. 662, 738 S.E.2d 116 (2013)

The Georgia Court of Appeals found that the use of LPR data to identify a suspect's vehicle was permissible and did not violate constitutional protections.

United States v. Brown, No. 19 CR 949, 2021 WL 4963602 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2021)

The court held that utilizing LPR data to track a vehicle's movements over time did not amount to a constitutional violation, as the data pertained to public travel.

 Junction City Police Dep't v. $454,280 U.S. Currency, 531 P.3d 539 (Kan. Ct. App. 2023)

In this asset forfeiture case, the court ruled that LPR data used to establish probable cause for seizure did not infringe upon constitutional rights.

Traft v. Commonwealth, 539 S.W.3d 647 (Ky. 2018)

The Kentucky Supreme Court found that the use of LPR technology to monitor a suspect's vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as there was no expectation of privacy in public movements.

Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493, 142 N.E.3d 1090 (2020)

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that short-term use of LPR data did not constitute a search under the state constitution, thus no violation occurred.

United States v. Jiles, No. 8:23-CR-98, 2024 WL 891956 (D. Neb. Feb. 29, 2024)

The court determined that the use of LPR data to locate a suspect's vehicle was lawful and did not breach constitutional protections.

United States v. Yang, No. 2:16-cr-231-RFB, 2018 WL 576827 (D. Nev. Jan. 25, 2018)

This earlier district court decision found that the use of LPR data in tracking a rental vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy.

United States v. Graham, No. CR 21-645 (WJM), 2022 WL 4132488 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2022)

The court held that the collection of LPR data over a limited period did not constitute a search, and thus did not violate constitutional rights.

Chaney v. City of Albany, No. 6:16-CV-1185, 2019 WL 3857995 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2019)

In this habeas corpus case, the court found that the use of LPR data in the investigation did not infringe upon the petitioner's constitutional rights.

 People v. Bushey, 29 N.Y.3d 158, 75 N.E.3d 1165 (2017)

The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the use of LPR technology to identify a vehicle's location did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.

United States v. Bowers, 2021 WL 4775977 (W.D. Pa. 2021)

The court concluded that the deployment of LPR systems to monitor a suspect's vehicle movements did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.

 Uhunmwangho v. State, No. 09-19-00119-CR, 2020 WL 1442640 (Tex. App. Mar. 25, 2020)

The Texas Court of Appeals found that the use of LPR data to track a suspect's vehicle did not violate constitutional protections, as the information pertained to public travel.

United States v. Salcido-Gonzalez, No. 4:23-CR-00049-DN, 2024 WL 2305478 (D. Utah May 21, 2024)

The court held that the use of LPR technology to monitor a vehicle's movements did not infringe upon the defendant's constitutional rights, as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy on public roads.

*The problem with this argument is that a Washington judge ruled that data from Flock cameras recording public roads is considered part of the public record. While it is only one court case, it could open the door for other judges in other states to come to a similar conclusion, thus proving the point raised by fourth amendment advocates.

6.) Of the 14 cameras that the Warrensburg Investigative Bureau currently has access to, how many of them belong to public organizations, particularly ones that are funded by taxpayer money?

Five cameras currently within the city of Warrensburg, MO are private cameras, and the other nine cameras are funded by the University of Central Missouri.

*UCM is supported by Missouri taxpayer money as it is a state University. While safety is important, academics should take priority over being spied upon 24/7.

Questions Remain Over Flock Cameras

On October 14, Chief of Police Andrew Munsterman presented the Flock Safety Agreement to the Warrensburg City Council, which would allow Warrensburg to enter into an agreement to install and use the license plate cameras throughout the city, paid for by the Blue Shield Grant that was awarded to the Warrensburg Police Department.

Suzy Latare and Thomas Ruehle are right to be concerned about privacy implications. There are questions that still need to be answered.

• Though the data is not sold to third parties, will third parties have access to the data at all? If so, which ones?

• Where is the data physically stored? Here in Warrensburg? Remote storage outside of Warrensburg on a cloud server?

• Though it was said that the data is typically deleted after 30 days, will any department within the city or public organization be keeping permanent copies?

• Where will these cameras be placed?

• How will the city operate these cameras while complying with the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requiring a warrant upon establishing probable cause?

• Of the 14 cameras that the Warrensburg Investigative Bureau currently has access to, how many of them belong to public organizations, particularly ones that are funded by taxpayer money?

It is imperative to contact the city council and ask these questions. Taxpayers in Warrensburg have a right to know these things. Submitting a letter to the editor of the Star Journal would also be a good idea.