Territories within the northern region of the Arctic Circle belong to eight nation-states: Canada, the United States, Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. These states are collectively called the Arctic States. Nearly four million inhabitants live in the Arctic, and almost half a million self-identify as indigenous peoples. Though there are around forty-five distinct groups of indigenous Arctic people, more than half of the 500,000 Arctic indigenous people identify to belong to five larger ethnic groups - the Aleuts, the Athabaskan people, the Gwich’in people, the Inuits, and the Sami people. The 15,000 Aluets people are located on the Aleutian Islands, an archipelago of more than sixty islands in the Bering Sea. Most of these islands are controlled by the United States. However, Russia controls some as well. The 45,000 Athabasakan people live on the North American continent, with about 12,000 living in Alaska and 30,000 or so living in the Yukon and Northwest Territories of Canada. Derived from the larger Athabasakan group, the Gwich'in people are a smaller group with a distinct dialect who live in the northernmost portion of Alaska and the Yukon and Northwest Territories of Canada. There are currently only around 9,000 Gwich'in people who mostly continue to hunt caribou. The Inuits descend from the linguistic origins of the Aleut and have spread from northeastern Russia (Chukotka) and northern Alaska across Canada and to Greenland (Denmark). Today, there are 180,000 Inuits in the Arctic, most of whom are in Canada. More than 68,000 Sami live in Sami, stretching across northern Norway, Sweden, Finland, and western Russia. Estimates suggest that there are more than 40,000 Sami in Norway, about 20,000 in Sweden, 6,000 in Finland, and 2,000 in Russia. The other 250,000 indigenous peoples representing more than 40 smaller groups collectively formed an association as these groups all live within Russia's Arctic territories. The larger groups are the Khanty, Mansi, Ket, Sakha, Evenk, and Nenets. For an interactive map of peoples and locations, look here. Though these groups are distinct from one another, around 70% chose to remain nomadic or semi-nomadic until being forced to settle under Russian Communism.
The Ancient Greeks named the region Arktos, meaning "bear." Though many believe this name refers to the presence of polar bears in the region, more than likely, this was a reference to the Great Bear constellation that circles the northern sky. A Greek sailor, Pytheas, as early as 325 BCE, attempted to reach the northernmost point on the horizon. While the Sami people were settled in the northernmost Arctic regions of Scandinavia, the south was populated by Germanic tribes who had moved across the Baltic Sea from the European continent. Later, these tribes became known as the Vikings. From the 7th century onward, the Vikings would farm the southern Scandinavian plains and send ships abroad to explore and plunder (the latter is what earned them the name víking, or "pirate," from early Scandinavian languages. By the ninth century, the Vikings had chosen to sail westward in search of one of Europe's most precious luxuries - the walrus tusk.
Beginning in the 14th century, the separate kingdoms of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark created a union under one monarchy to unite Scandinavia under one government called the Kalmar Union. As such, the term Scandinavian describes the region's shared history and common linguistics within these three nation-states under this common rule for centuries. At the time of unification, Norway controlled both Iceland and Greenland (more on these later), and Sweden controlled the territory of present-day Finland. Iceland, Greenland, and Finland were technically all within the Scandinavian kingdoms, but their languages and cultures differed from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. As such, these entities prefer to be called Nordic states. By the 16th century, infighting led to the division of the Kalmar kingdom into two warring parties. Sweden Sweden broke off from Denmark and Norway in 1532 and maintained its control over Finland until 1809 when Russia took Finland from Sweden. In return, Sweden turned westward toward its Scandfinvaina neighbor and conquered Norway in 1815. As Sweden swallowed Norway, Denmark maintained its independence from Sweden and took control of Greenland and Iceland.
Though the Danish administered Iceland and Greenland after Sweden conquered Norway, they have always been distinct. Have you heard the adage that Greenland is covered with ice, and Iceland has green fields? This is both true and only a part of the distinction. First, geographically, Iceland is closer to Scandinavia and, thus, the initial destination for early Viking explorers. Second, topographically, Iceland is much greener (with only about ten percent of it permanently covered in ice), while Greenland is more than eighty percent covered by ice. As such, Iceland lent itself to more settlements and the eventual raising of sheep and cattle, while Greeland has remained largely undeveloped. Thirdly, Iceland's volcanic activity in the 19th century led to economic decline, starvation, and mass emigration, all factors that sowed the seeds of mass discontent among its nearly 300,000 settlers. As such, by the early 20th century, Icelanders called for increased independence and were finally successful after World War II. In contrast, Greenland has only around 50,000 inhabitants, with about 90% identifying as Inuits. Consequently, calls for Greenland's independence from Denmark have been mainly ignored.
In the 18th century, Tsar Peter the Great ordered the Great Northern Expedition to secure a trade route throughout the northeastern passage. Within this exploration, Russia built a tremendous naval fleet, discovered the Bering Strait and the west coast of Alaska, and formed a detailed map of Russia’s northern coasts, rivers, and islands. In 1916, one year before the Bolsheviks took power, Tsar Nicholas II’s foreign minister announced that Russia controlled “all land - undiscovered as well as discovered - between the Russian Arctic Coast and the North Pole.” However, with the fall of the Russian Empire, Russia's presence in the Arctic was severely weakened as Finland gained independence in 1917. However, its focus on the Arctic would be rekindled under Stalin, who believed the Arctic was key to the future of the Soviet Union. When the Soviets took power, the push for rapid industrialization led the government to push northward into the icy, less habitable regions of the territory. Under Stalin, the Soviets pushed northward into the Arctic to build enterprises for extracting fish and timber and mining coal and other fuels to transport these goods to market with strategic ports and icebreakers (ships used to navigate even the iciest of waters). Another area that the Soviets used for mining coal was the archipelago of Svalbard. Though these islands were formally established as Norwegian in the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, the Soviets could enjoy extraction rights under the treaty, so long as the islands would not be militarized and every state signatory allowed the equal commercial rights of others to the island. In practice, the Soviets were the only ones to remain on the islands following this treaty (and Svalbard is still a point of contention between Russia and Norway today).
In 1867, the U.S. purchased Alaska from Russia. Though the Russians were not keen on having America assume the territory, they needed to be stronger to defend it and badly needed an influx of cash (the sale was worth $7.2 million at the time). That same year, Canada gained independence from Britain. While the Canadians focused mainly on the fur trade, by 1880, gold mining in the Alaskan Yukon attracted more than 100,000 prospectors. By the 1900s, the rush had ended, though it is estimated nearly one billion U.S. dollars worth of gold had been extracted during this period.
This section will provide a brief overview of the tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Arctic throughout the Cold War. During World War II, after Hitler and Stalin signed the Nonaggression Pact, Hitler invaded Scandinavia, conquering Denmark and Norway (he chose not to conquer Sweden because it remained neutral and provided him with iron ore). As the Nazis controlled Denmark, the Danish government-in-exile formally signed a defense agreement with the U.S., allowing American presence in Greenland. As such, the U.S. would set up radar, weather, and naval stations in Greenland, which were primarily meant to be essential for delivering key goods to the Soviets during the war through the Lend-Lease Act. As Iceland was newly independent from Denmark, it tried to remain neutral during the war. However, because of its strategic location in the North Atlantic, Britain decided to invade and occupy Iceland in May of 1940, and the U.S. and British used the Icelandic coast to launch many successful naval attacks against the Germans throughout the war.
With the Nonaggression Pact signed, the Soviet Union invaded Finland, again, an attack known as the “Winter War.” Finnish territory offered (and still provides) a distinct geographic threat to the Russians as its northwestern strategic port of Marmunsk is no more than 200 miles away from the Finnish border, and the port of St. Petersburg (also known as Leningrad during the Soviet period) cannot be accessed unless ships run through the Gulf of Finland. Though the Soviets successfully took Finnish territory during World War II, by 1941, the pact between Germany and the Soviets was dismantled. Finland allowed German troops to move through Finnish territory to invade the Soviet Union with the aid of Finnish fighters. As such, Finland was considered an Axis Power at the end of World War II.
After World War II, the Allied powers quickly disaggregated into competing factions in a bipolar world. With the U.S. and U.S.S.R locked in an ideological battle, the Arctic became a region of increased importance simply because it was within the shortest path between the United States and the Soviet Union. As such, both sides would focus on stationing key defense bases and weapon systems within the region to deter a northern invasion by the other power. By the end of the Cold War, the Arctic had become the most heavily militarized region in the world. Before focusing on how the two superpowers came to militarize the Arctic North, this section will explore the role of the other, smaller states in the bipolar world.
In 1949, these states signed the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization based on the principle of collective defense. Article five of the treaty states, “An armed attack against one or more” member “in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Were such an attack to occur, Article Five encourages these states to exercise “the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations” to “assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
The decision for Denmark to join NATO can be summed up by the political slogan used after the war, “Never Again a Ninth of April,” referring to the occupation of Denmark by the Nazis in 1940. This sentiment was so widely felt that the Danish restricted its role in NATO to prevent even its allies from establishing NATO bases, installing nuclear weapons, or conducting any military activities on its territory. Most notable was an exception it made for Greenland. U.S. use of Greenland as a strategic launchpad during World War II meant the American government understood the benefits of Greenland for Arctic security. As such, it first offered to purchase Greenland from Denmark in 1946. Though the Danes refused, they did allow the use of Greenland for an early warning radar system and the establishment of Thule Air Base in 1951. Over time, Denmark has become increasingly more integrated into NATO operations.
As noted above, Iceland was under the rule of Denmark before being occupied by the Allies in World War II. During these periods, Iceland did not have a standing army. As such, even when it gained its independence from Denmark in 1944, it became the largest state in the world that did not have a standing army. That said, Iceland voted to join NATO to prevent any threat of Soviet expansion, allowed the organization access to its coastline to station troops, and occasionally even offered the assistance of its Coast Guard. In return, Iceland became the largest per capita recipient of Marshall Plan aid of any state.
Norway’s decision to join NATO is based on the state's geographic location. As the only original member of NATO to share a border with the Soviet Union, it was a straightforward calculation against Soviet invasion. The idea of a collective security organization that included Norway and its allies was initially conceived by the Norwegian government in exile in London during World War II. Once the war ended, Trygve Lie, the Foreign Minister of Norway, pushed for the establishment of NATO (he also became the first Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1946). During the discussion around NATO, these three Nordic states also met with Sweden to consider an alternative “Nordic pact.” However, they determined the organization would be too weak to counter potential Soviet aggression. Sweden chose to go it alone, remaining neutral throughout the Cold War. Though Canada was always willing to join NATO, its representatives pushed for the alliance to be more than just of military focus. Article Two of the founding treaty mirrors the principles Canada pushed for; known as the “Canadian Article,” Article Two encourages the “development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening [members’] free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.” While NATO offers a significant military presence in the Arctic, the Russians have more bases than all the NATO forces combined (see map below).
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Arctic states agreed in 1996 to provide a “high-level forum” to “promote cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and the other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic” (Article 1a). When an international organization is called a “forum” it is indicating that it is a place for cooperation among member-states but that it does not have an adjudicating body to interpret whether states are complying with or violating international law. Further, fora do not have a structured voting apparatus (e.g., majority rules or veto power). Instead, Article Seven of the Ottawa Declaration states that all “decisions of the Arctic Council are to be made by consensus of the Members.” It is worth noting that following the phrase “common Arctic issues” in Article 1a, a footnote reads, “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.”
The eight Arctic States - Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America - are full Members of the Council. In its preambulatory clauses, the Ottawa Declaration also affirms a commitment to the well-being of all Arctic inhabitants, including “the recognition of the special relationship and unique contributions to the Arctic of indigenous people and their communities.” It recognizes the contributions of “traditional knowledge of the indigenous people of the Arctic and their communities” to the “collective understanding of the circumpolar Arctic.” Out of a total of four million residents of the Arctic, approximately half a million (12.5%) are indigenous peoples. As such, Article Two of the Ottawa Declaration includes a status for “Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples” as “Permanent Participants” within the Council. The same article states that the purpose of these participants is to “provide for active participation and full consultation” with the member states and Arctic indigenous representatives and that these participants are chosen by the consensus of the member states of the Council and should never outnumber the number of member states on the Council.
To be considered a Permanent Participant on the Council, indigenous groups must comprise an Arctic indigenous constituency representing either “a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic State” or” more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state.” Six Indigenous Peoples’ organizations have been granted Permanent Participants status in the Arctic Council. The current six permanent participants in the Council are the: (1) Aleut International Association (representing approximately 15,000 Aleuts in the United States and 350 Aleuts in the Russian Federation), (2) the Arctic Athabaskan Council (representing around 45,000 Athabaskan in Alaska in the United States as well as the Yukon and Northwestern Territories of Canada), (3) the Gwich'in Council International (representing the 9,000 Gwich’in Alaska in the United States as well as the Yukon and Northwestern Territories of Canada), (4) the Inuit Circumpolar Council (representing 180,000 Inuit peoples living in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and a northeastern autonomous territory in Russia, named Chukotka), (5) the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (representing more than 250,000 people from 40 different indigenous groups that live within the Russian Federation), and (6) the Saami Council (representing over 100,000 Saami people living in Finland, the Russian Federation, Norway and Sweden).
Though consistent data on the warming temperatures in the Arctic began to be recorded as early as the 1840s, it was not until the late twentieth century that climate scientists could link human contributions to greenhouse gas emissions with an accelerated increase in global temperatures relative to those expected based on the expected naturally occurring warming trends. Whereas the entire globe is warming, the Arctic is warming faster due to a process known as “Arctic amplification.” In addition to average temperatures increasing in the Arctic (as elsewhere) each year, warmer temperatures also lead to the melting of sea ice (by about 13% less ice each year). As the ice melts, the warmer open ocean water absorbs direct heat from the sun (whereas in the past, the ice tended to refract sunlight instead of absorbing the heat from it). As such, the loss of sea ice due to rising temperatures results in temperatures in the region rising faster than other areas of the world, leading to more sea ice melting. Based on current sea ice rates of decline, climate scientists predict that the Arctic will be completely free of ice during the summer months before 2040.
Photo Courtesy of Foreign Policy Magazine (here)
The environmental impacts on the Arctic have monumental economic and security implications. Though the rapid increase in Arctic temperatures and melting of sea ice are detrimental to the region's fragile ecosystem, these factors increase economic opportunities for certain states.
More navigable Arctic waters will allow states and non-state actors to gain greater access to the increasing amount of fisheries available in this region. Global marine fisheries directly and directly provide around 820 million jobs worldwide (or about 10% of all employment for the world’s population) and are estimated to generate more than $400 billion in sales of nearly 180 million tons annually. Fisheries in the Arctic account for at least ten percent of the global seafood catch, including halibut, shrimp, scallops, squid, pollock, crab, cod, salmon, capelin, etc. According to climate scientists, nearly 80% of designated Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), or economic areas exclusively under the jurisdiction of states, are estimated to show a decrease in the maximum catch potential (MCP). This decline will pressure states to enter international waters to meet their maximum catch potentials. However, this trend is reversed for the Arctic region, where the maximum catch potential is projected to increase by more than seventy percent. With the drive of fisheries northward into Arctic waters, there is growing concern about unregulated and illegal fishing in international waters. In 2017, Russia, Canada, the U.S., Norway, Denmark, Iceland, China, Japan, and South Korea met in Iceland to negotiate an agreement that would prevent commercial fishing boats from casting their nets into the international waters of the Arctic for 16 years (beginning in 2021) to allow scientists to complete a full assessment of its fish stocks. Norway, Finland, and Greenland have significant fishing industries, accounting for around seven, four, and three percent of global frozen fish exports.
According to an assessment conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey, the Arctic currently accounts for nearly thirteen percent of the world’s oil reserves (90 billion barrels) and thirty percent of its natural gas. As noted in the map below, significant oil and natural gas reserves are found in the Arctic Alaska Basin, the Amerasia Basin, the East Canada-West Greenland Basin, the East Greenland Rift Basin, the East Barents Basin, the Yenisey-Khatanga Basin, and the West Siberian Basin. Of these fossil fuel reserves in the Arctic, Russia holds fifty-five potential reserves within its territory, the United States and Canada each hold around twenty percent, and Norway holds around five percent. Historically, access to these reserves in Arctic waters has been challenging and costly due to the need for icebreakers and special rigging equipment designed to withstand frigid temperatures, the challenges of building rigs on land on permafrost, long supply lines, limited access, higher wages for workers operating under extreme weather conditions, and potential environmental side effects (including the release of methane into the atmosphere as a byproduct of natural gas extraction). As such, some estimates place oil and natural gas extraction in the Arctic 50 to 100 percent more costly than in other parts of the world.
Though oil and natural gas are both fuels formed from the remains of dead animals and plants, their molecular makeup is distinct. Oil must be highly refined before being used, while natural gas requires minimal refining before it is ready. The ease of refinement and the vast amounts of natural gas reserves make it less expensive than oil for the consumer and a highly profitable business for producers (globally producing around $100 billion annually). In contrast, the global oil industry is valued at around $2.1 trillion annually. Oil is primarily used for transportation (and its byproducts are used to make plastics), while natural gas is used for heating and general electrical power generation. The central focus of Arctic natural gas and oil extraction is Russia. Seventy percent of the sixty-one fuel fields in the region are in Russia, and almost all of these are in the West Siberian Basin (see map below). The United States and Canada have Arctic oil and natural gas extractions. However, public opinion in both countries is divided on the issue due to the environmental impacts in the region. Greenland is believed to have the world's largest remaining untapped oil reserves, but it is currently not engaged in fossil fuel production.
Though we consider our communications network primarily based on wireless connectivity, thousands of miles of submarine cables on the ocean floor make this global connectivity possible. These wires are comprised of optical fibers or fibers made of elongated strands of glass or plastic that carry light along different wavelengths. When bundled, these fibers are covered in silicone gel, then plastic, steel wiring, copper, and nylon to protect the cables from damage on the ocean floor. Submarine cables account for around 95% of data transfers and voice communications worldwide. The first oceanic fiber optic cable was laid in the late 1980s by a consortium of telecommunication providers across the Atlantic, and today, more than 500 sub-sea cables travel upwards of 10,000 miles in length. They can carry upwards of 40,000 gigabytes per second. Historically, many communities in the Arctic had to rely on satellites and limited terrestrial fiber optic cables. Currently, several submarine optic cable projects are planned for the Arctic. Though some are intended to increase communication connectivity for Arctic inhabitants, other projects aim to connect Asia, Europe, and North America. Two Canadian projects (one led by a private company, Nuvitik, and the other by the Kativik Regional Government of Quebec) seek to link communities throughout the Canadian Arctic. Greenland Connect North is a third project connecting Greenland to North America (Canada) and Europe (Iceland), and the Quintillion Network currently links Alaskan communities. Still, its next phase will be to lay cables from Asia (Japan) to Europe (the United Kingdom) via the trans-Northwest Passage.
In August of 2021, Russia began laying its network of fiber optic cables along the Northern Sea Route. When finished, the project (dubbed the “Polar Express”) will stretch nearly 8,000 miles, connecting Europe to Asia. Though the plan was for the 1.2 billion project to be financed by Japanese and Finnish interests and run by a Russian-government-owned telecommunications company, the project was suspended in 2021 due to funding issues from the Japanese partner. China has shown an increased interest in submarine cables along the Northern Sea Route as part of its “Digital Silk Road,” which is slated to include nearly 100 submarine cables worldwide. In 2016, it offered to contribute to the Northern Sea Route through China’s state-affiliated telecommunications company, Huawei, in exchange for the route linking to China.
Fiber-optic communication infrastructure is not without its security risks. Throughout the Cold War, the National Security Agency deployed submarine recording pods on lines connecting Russian naval bases. There are further instances of government monitoring and analyzing “vast streams of sensitive personal information” of private citizens and submarine fiber optic signals to provide data that would lead to “significant breakthroughs in detecting and preventing serious crime.” As part of a larger “high-profile campaign to exclude China’s Huawei Technologies Co. from next-generation mobile networks over fears of espionage,” the United States warns that “ the company’s knowledge of and access to undersea cables could allow China to attach devices that divert or monitor data traffic—or, in a conflict, to sever links to entire nations” either remotely through network management or via coastal or submarine stations and vessels. The U.S. director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center within the Office of National Intelligence states, "Given that undersea cables carry the bulk of the world’s telecommunications data, safeguarding these cables remains a key priority for the U.S. government and its allies.”
Modeling of the Northwest and Northeast trans-Arctic shipping routes over four decades shows that the melting sea ice has allowed a thirty-five percent increase in shipping through the Arctic region from 1979 to 2018. During the last few years, ships have traversed more than five million miles annually. Advocates for using these routes note that trans-Arctic navigation works to reduce overall shipping distances, thus decreasing transaction costs and allowing for more goods to be shipped overall. Ships traveling from the west coast of the United States to Europe would have 4,500 miles less to travel if they were to navigate through the Northwest Passage rather than the more southerly route through the Panama Canal. Ships traveling from the South China Sea to Western Europe would see their journey reduced by 6,200 miles if they were to navigate through the Northeast Passage rather than across the Indian Ocean and through the Suez Canal. Estimates suggest that these routes can increase existing Asia-Europe-America trade by up to 66%. As the Trans-Polar shipping route is rarely used, projections of this route are based on something other than current traffic but on a future point when the Arctic is completely ice-free.
In addition to future extraction of oil and natural gas currently in hard-to-access reserves, the Arctic also contains rich mineral deposits (e.g., iron ore, zinc, silver, lead, nickel, copper, gold, gems (e.g., diamonds), and rare earth elements (REEs). There are seventeen rare earth elements (lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium, yttrium). These elements are used in consumer technology (including cell phones, computers with hard drives, hybrid and electric vehicles, flat-screen televisions, and defense applications like lasers, radar, and sonar systems). Chinese China accounts for more than ninety percent of REE production in the world, though both potential and proven deposits of REE are found in Greenland and in its Exclusive Economic Zone. Beginning in 2015, China began investing $2 billion in Greenland, which was more than 11% of the country’s GDP, most of which was by a Chinese state-owned enterprise, Shenghe Resources, in the Kvanefjeld project to extract uranium and other REEs.
The United States Air Force operates much of the U.S. defense presence in the Arctic. Its 2020 strategic plan deemed the region "immense geostrategic significance and a key location for global power projection.” When articulating potential threats to the U.S.' national security in the region, the Defense Department describes the region as "a part of the world where Russia and China are operating more freely" and recommends that the United States “must be able to quickly identify threats in the Arctic, respond promptly and effectively to those threats, and shape the security environment to mitigate the prospect of those threats in the future.” The U.S. Navy agrees with this overall assessment. Its vision document notes that states with either legal or de facto control over the maritime boundaries in the Arctic could launch military operations from the Arctic Ocean to other strategic points, potentially impacting nearly 75% of the world's population.
In a speech in February 2007, Putin angrily asked, "Against whom is this [NATO] expansion intended? And what happened to our Western partners' assurances after the Warsaw Pact's dissolution? … I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: ‘the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.' Where are these guarantees?" For Gorbachev's part, he said no agreement was made. However, the speech indicated that Putin's perception of NATO has expanded to counter Russian expansion. In August 2007, Artur Chilingarov, a Russian explorer who also is a member of the Russian Duma (parliament), used a Soviet-era manned submersible called Mir-1. Typically used for scientific research at depths of almost 20,000 feet, this submersible navigated under the ice on the surface of the Arctic Ocean. The submersible was carried on an icebreaker from Marmunsk and then launched from the icebreaker near the north pole to navigate the final distance before descending to the sea floor to plant a titanium Russian flag.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is an international treaty defining states' maritime rights and obligations. Specifically, it establishes designations for territorial waters, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones. Under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea, each state has twelve nautical miles of territorial waters extending off the coast. Once territorial waters can be determined for each state, Article 33 allows 12 more nautical miles beyond a state’s contiguous zone (in which a state may extend certain rights of the territorial waters in specific circumstances in which a breach of domestic laws of a state may be imminent, such as drug smugglers). In addition to territorial waters and contiguous zones, Articles 55 through 75 further designate a state's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles out to sea. Within an EEZ, a state has the exclusive right to exploit, develop, manage, and conserve all resources (e.g., fish or oil) in the water or seabed.
One of the notable exceptions (why does UNCLOS always make exceptions?) to these rules of designated maritime boundaries is that a state may be able to extend its waters beyond the usual 200 nautical miles for an EEZ if the land under the water serves as a "natural prolongation" of the state's territory. Whereas Article 76 first mentions the principle of natural prolongation, Article 77 through 81 requires that states gather geologic evidence to show the seabed has the same rocks and minerals as their territory. Article 76(8) explains that all claims to an extended continental shelf should be made to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The CLCS is a scientific body created by UNCLOS. These scientists will review the data and make a politically binding recommendation as to the validity of each claim.
Simply put, under UNCLOS, there is no legal significance for planting a flag on the seabed. Instead, any claims to waters beyond the designated zones (e.g., territorial, contiguous, and EEZs) must be reviewed and recommended by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Though the planting of the Russian flag on the top of the world was largely symbolic, the strategic importance of this move was evident. The Russians believe that the principle of natural prolongation offers an opportunity to claim the Lomonosov Ridge, a geological feature that stretches across the North Pole from Greenland to Russia. In 2001, Russia chose to submit the earliest claim to the Lomonosov Ridge before the CLCS. With whisperings that other Arctic states were interested in the ridge, the strategy was to be the first to gain a valid extension. The following year, the Commission returned the submission to Russia, requesting additional data supporting its claim. Such claims made include bathymetric data (measurements on the depth of the sea bed), seismic data (geological composition of seabed and subsoil), sediment continuity (between the shelf and the shore), rock formation, geophysical data, and the marine life and environmental data. Interestingly, Russia has been the only state to lay formal claims to the Lomonosov Ridge. Part of the discord is that Canada and Greenland have overlapping claims to the ridge. The issue is that both states wish to determine that the ridge extends their continental shelves.
Beginning around 2017, some Arctic states began pushing back against Chinese investments in the region. In 2018, Sweden’s Esrange Science Center chose not to renew contracts with Chinese scientific agencies that have used four satellite dish antennas since 2008. A similar contract between the Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) was also not renewed by the Finns in 2018. In 2017, a Chinese proposal to build a satellite dish antenna ground station in Greenland’s capital, Nuuk, went nowhere. The Greenland government did not accept China's proposal in 2017 to build a satellite dish antenna ground station for remote sensing in the Greenlandic capital of Nuuk. In 2020, the Canadian government ended an attempted Chinese takeover of the Hope Bay gold mine in the Nunavut, citing security concerns explicitly. In November of 2021, the Chinese firm General Nice was no longer able to operate its iron ore mine near Nuuk and Greenland requested that "all geological data is returned, remaining payments of 1.5 million Danish crowns are deposited, and the mining area is cleaned up." Since then, Chinese investments in nearly all the Arctic nations have fallen flat. After being quiet on the subject, the Biden Administration published the first Arctic strategy paper in the fall of 2022, which had been published since 2013. In this paper, the U.S. claimed that China has “used [its] scientific engagements [in the Arctic] to conduct dual-use research with intelligence or military applications in the Arctic.”
While other Arctic states are proving more hesitant to work with China, Russia is an energy-rich state happy to sell to China, heavily dependent on energy imports. Just twenty days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Putin visited China during the Beijing Winter Olympics. In a joint statement by both Putin and Xi, the two sides noted that the "friendship between the states has no limits" and that there are no "'forbidden' areas of cooperation." During this same visit, the two states signed a thirty-year agreement to continue the sales of Russian oil and natural gas to China and agreed to work on joint transportation ventures along the Northern Sea Route. Since this agreement, Russia has sent nearly one-third of its oil to China through a 1,500-mile Power of Siberia pipeline built with Chinese loans worth an estimated 50 billion. Though many report that Russia has the upper hand in the Arctic (due to its territorial claims and historical presence in the region), since the Ukraine war, Russia has needed to rely more heavily on China due to sanctions.
With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Arctic Council suspended all high-level meetings voted on by the other seven Arctic states. Soon after the invasion, NATO began coordinating exercises hosted by its Arctic members. In March 2022, just a month after the invasion, NATO allies participated in Norway's biannual military exercises, known as Cold Response. Within NATO press releases, the alliance emphasized that the exercises were "long-planned" and not linked to Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine." That said, around 30,000 troops participated in the exercises, including Swedish and Finnish troops. During the exercises, NATO members track the movement of the leading Russian cruiser (Peter the Great) in an area of the Norwegian Sea that is stuck between states' territorial waters but is technically the high seas. Known as the Banana Hole, due to the shape of the maritime zone, these waters allow other states to navigate close to each other's borders while technically complying with international law.
Throughout the rest of 2022, Russia increased its use of nuclear-capable submarines in the Arctic, particularly in the Barents Sea. In July, it flew two nuclear-capable bombers across the neutral waters of the Barents Sea. In September of 2022, the U.S. Coast Guard unexpectedly came across exercises conducted by seven Chinese and four Russian ships off the coast of the Aleutian Islands and within the United States' EEZ. In March of 2023, NATO hosts Joint Viking, the Norwegian-led joint exercises hosted every year. Between April and May, Russia hosted a variety of exercises in both the Barent and White Seas.
On May 11th, 2023, representatives from all eight Arctic states and the six indigenous peoples groups held an online meeting so that they could Russia’s two-year term as Chair being transferred to Norway. Members attending the meeting said there were no diplomatic incidents, and they issued a joint statement reiterating their commitment to work to safeguard and strengthen the Arctic Council. When the Norwegian Chair, Morten Hoglund, was asked about the goals of the next two years for the Arctic Council, he acknowledged that “The pause… though absolutely necessary… no doubt impacted the work of the Council.” He said that no political meetings will be held anytime soon. However, he hopes the working groups will continue to focus on four key priorities: the oceans, climate change, sustainable development, and the people in the North.
The same month that this peaceful transition of power was occurring virtually, Sweden and Finland each requested to join NATO. Two weeks later, NATO member states began conducting biannual joint military exercises cohosted by Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Known as the Arctic Challenge Exercise, the Finnish led the games as the newest NATO member led the 12-day exercise with nearly 3,000 troops and over 150 military aircraft. Following these exercises, Chinese news media warned that the “region has become a hot spot for major military powers to compete against each other in recent years.” They added that, with these exercises, “NATO has pressed the ‘accelerate button’ of the Arctic game.” During these NATO exercises, Russia flew bombers over neutral waters in the Barents and Norwegian seas escorted by fighter jets.
On August 11, Russia launched a two-month-long exercise by its Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea with more than 8,000 troops and 20 maritime vessels. During these exercises, Russia conducted several missile tests from submarines. That same month, eleven Chinese and four Russian naval vessels sailed near the Aleutian Islands in Alaska, leading the Navy to “dispatch four destroyers and a P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to monitor the formation.” In response, the U.S. Senator from Alaska, Dan Sullivan, remarked that his activity was “unprecedented…not just for Alaska, but for America to have 11 warships jointly being operated by the Chinese and Russians—who are increasingly working together—essentially doing freedom of navigation and navigation operations incursions into Alaska’s area.”
In September, Russia expanded its exercises, focusing on the Bering and Chukchi Seas. A Russian press release stated that the purpose of these exercises is to study areas for “combat operation and live fire, as well as conducting anti-terrorist operations by isolating areas, blocking and destroying them, a press release from the Headquarters in Severomorsk says.”
On the night of October 7th, two incidents occurred in the Baltic Sea that affected Arctic states. First, a telecommunication cable in the Baltic Sea connecting two NATO members - Estonia and Sweden - was severed. That same night, a gas pipeline linking Finland with Estonia was also damaged. By October 20th, both Sweden and Finland linked the two incidents together and to the same ship. During the time of the attacks, two ships - a Russian vessel and a Chinese one - were both in the Gulf of Finland. NewNew Polar Bear, a Chinese container ship, and Sevmorput, a nuclear-powered cargo vessel, were each noted to be in the vicinity when the damages occurred. By October 20th, Finland announced that their investigation suggested that it was the Chinese ship that was the prime suspect for the incidents.
On October 25th of this year, Russia launched two ballistic missiles and several cruise missiles from the Plesetsk launch site in the Arkhangelsk region. A day later, Russia demonstrated its ability to move weaponry from the Baltic to the Arctic by shipping a Kalibr missile up the Neva River before launching it into the White Sea. And the day after this, it launched eight new reconnaissance satellites into space from the Plesetsk launch site.