Publications

Singapore updated its BSL-4 Biosafety Standard in May 2026.  It covers design principles, management & operating policies,  performance testing & good practices handling highly dangerous  biological agents & the use of animals in primary containment cages .

16 October 2026

https://biosafety.moh.gov.sg/resources/information-and-guidelines/

A 2021-2023 chinese study of biosafety laboratories in Jiaxing, Zhejiang found issues on material & lab management, strain samples, security, facilities & equipment, wastes. Organisation management & housekeeping improved. 

15 October 2026

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12040964/

August 2025, Study financed by China National Health Commission, military & civil biosafety institutions produced a consensus on BSL‑3/4 incidents classifying risk as low (contained), medium (lab exposure), or high (infection or external release), with  emergency response guidance.

DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1673-713X.2025.04.001

Biorisk is defined as the probability and severity of harm caused by biological agents or toxins, including:

-Accidental exposure

-Leakage or release

-Misuse or unauthorized access

Incidents are grouped into three main categories:

-Human-related (e.g., exposure, injuries, infection)

-Environmental contamination (spills, aerosols, surfaces)

-Equipment/facility failures (ventilation, centrifuge, containment failures

Critical thresholds “red lines”:

-Lab-acquired infection 

-Release beyond containment

-Secondary transmission (community cases)

Personnel incidents and action:

-Needlestick / cuts: immediate disinfection, reporting, medical care

-Animal bites: similar protocol with added infection risk

-Suspected infection: isolation, transport to hospital, epidemiological investigation

-Collapse: first aid + evacuation

Contamination incidents

-Spill response (surface/environment)

-Biosafety cabinet contamination

-Aerosol risks: ventilation and containment

-Disinfection protocols (chlorine-based, timed exposure)

Equipment failures:

-Ventilation system failures

-Pressure loss or overpressure

-Wastewater treatment leaks

-Centrifuge accidents

-Biosafety cabinet malfunction

-Sterilizer breakdown

-Positive-pressure suit damage

-Life-support system failure

Biosafety BSL-3 labs in China, status published march 2026: 

By 2024 BSL-3 laboratories in CDC had achieved nationwide coverage in China. But deficiencies remain in construction and operations. Strengthened coordination between national and local authorities is needed to improve laboratory management & promote standardized and high-quality operation:

BSL-3 laboratories are conducting experimental activities in 32 provincial (autonomous region, municipality) and 5 cities with independent planning status across China.

According to the survey results, a total of 22 BSL-3 laboratories have been established in provincial (autonomous region, municipality) and centrally administered city disease control centers; among them, 20 are provincial (autonomous region, municipality) disease control centers and 2 are centrally administered city disease control centers. A questionnaire survey was conducted on 20 of these laboratories that have been established and put into use, and on-site surveys were conducted on 19 of them. 

Of the 20 BSL-3 laboratories that have been built and put into use, the laboratory personnel include management personnel, laboratory operators, and maintenance personnel. The total number of laboratory personnel is 801, of which laboratory operators account for 65.54% (525/801), management personnel account for 30.09% (241/801), and maintenance personnel account for 9.49% (76/801). There are cases where laboratory personnel hold multiple positions. 

The survey results show that 18 pathogenic microorganisms have been approved for experimental activities. Classified by hazard level, there are 5 pathogens in Category I: monkeypox virus, Ebola virus, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, tick-borne encephalitis virus, and yellow fever virus. There are 13 pathogens in Category II: highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, novel coronavirus, human immunodeficiency virus (types I and II), Brucella, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, poliovirus, rabies virus, Vibrio cholerae, Chikungunya virus, Burkholderia melioides, and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus. Of these, 20 laboratories are authorized to conduct experiments on highly pathogenic avian influenza virus and novel coronavirus. 

This study describes height accidental laboratory disease outbreaks and provides for each outbreak key themes and outbreak patterns.

"All events detailed here were shaped by systemic weaknesses. Fragmented legislation, inadequate oversight, and poor governance allowed breaches to go unreported". 

Out of these 8 accidental laboratory outbreaks, 6 are with "proximity to lab facility" and 7 are with "population near facility affected". 7 have "maintenance & engineering issues" or "other biosafety issues".

(Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2026, authors: Sandhya Dhawan, Wirichada Pan-ngum, Chandini Raina MacIntyre & Stuart D. Blacksell)

5 January 2026

An interesting case study by Dr Miranda Smith from sipri about expansion of biosafety max containment labs, technologies and BWC. 

Dr Smith explains that both the growth of number of labs and the new biotechnologies weaken the enforcement of BWC; also, labs are both a contributor to the implementation of BWC and a liability due to dual use.

She also says that BWC lacks verification, and new technologies such as synthetic DNA, gene synthesis, generate new risks such as manipulation of dangerous pathogens; these were not foreseen at the creation of BWC in 1972.

As a solution, she proposes AI and DLT (Distributed Ledger Technology) to reinforce oversight, strengthen data integrity and LIMS (Lab Information Management Systems), and enhance pathogen repositories and traceability.

The issue is complex & UN BWC is outdated; France, Togo, Senegal proposed a platform, but it is not effective; there are other proposals, but weak. IBCA believes it requires a complete overhaul, on the model of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) adapted to biology.

19 December 2025

"The exponential development of biotechnology is reshaping the shared future of humanity. Biosecurity has become a perilous "non-traditional battlefield":

"The frequency of new infectious disease outbreaks worldwide has increased threefold in the past 20 years compared to the 20th century. Highly pathogenic diseases such as Ebola have a mortality rate as high as 90%, and the COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed the fragility of public health systems."

"More than 100 laboratory pathogen escape incidents occur globally each year;"

"Cases of transnational organizations illegally collecting genetic data from developing countries continue to occur, eroding the sovereignty of biological resources."

10 december 2025

"Experiments with high-risk pathogens are routinely conducted under strict conditions of biosafety and biosecurity. In this Comment, we propose a Minimum Information about a High Containment Laboratory Experiment (MIHCLE) reporting standard." Note: It is missing HSE Health, Safety and Environmental culture.

8 november 2025

This study led by Tianjin university, center for Biosafety & Strategy, examines the rapid growth of dual-use biotechnologies—notably synthetic biology and genome editing—and their implications for biosafety. These technologies enable breakthroughs in medicine, agriculture, and industry but also pose severe risks due to potential misuse for creating harmful pathogens or biological weapons.

Key Points:

Global Trends: Synthetic biology and CRISPR have lowered technical and cost barriers, making artificial synthesis of viruses feasible.

Emerging Risks: Infectious diseases combined with dual-use technologies amplify biosecurity threats; examples include the artificial synthesis of horsepox virus.

Drivers of Risk: Easy access to genetic data, proliferation of biotech services, and integration of AI increase misuse potential.

International Response: Developed nations treat biosafety as a national security priority, investing in infrastructure, legal frameworks, and programs like DARPA’s “Safe Genes.”

China’s Challenges: Lack of comprehensive strategy, fragmented governance, and reliance on foreign resources create vulnerabilities.

Recommendations for China:

• Strengthen top-level biosafety strategy.

• Integrate defense and regulatory systems.

• Boost innovation and establish national bioinformatics centers.

• Update laws and policies to regulate dual-use research.

• Engage in global governance to gain influence.

• Develop interdisciplinary talent pipelines.

Main Takeaway: Dual-use biotechnologies are advancing rapidly, creating both opportunities and severe security risks. China must urgently implement strategic planning, innovation investment, legal frameworks, and talent development to safeguard national security.

March 2023

Pblished on 13/08/2021 at 10:00 , updated at 10:13,  R de Maistre 

This Covid-19 pandemic reveals the lack of international governance in the supervision of biological research, unlike nuclear power which has the IAEA.

In Yokohama in February 2020, from the port of Yamashita I could see the liner Diamond Princess, in quarantine because of a contamination of a new coronavirus. China had confirmed a few weeks earlier, on January 20, that the disease was transmissible from human to human, before imposing three days later a confinement to the city of Wuhan that lasted until April 8. This was before the WHO called it Covid-19. It called it a pandemic on March 11, 2020.

When I returned to France shortly afterwards, I started to look into the origin of this virus. Indeed, to avoid a new pandemic, it seems important to me to understand how this one appeared. I see this quest for the origin as a test of the responsibility of our societies and the credibility of science.

My research starts with the SARS epidemic of 2003 and quickly leads me to Wuhan. A large number of publications on SARS-like coronavirus research come from several institutions based in this city. The discovery of the reservoir of the virus in bats, the research on the mechanisms of passage of the viruses from animals to humans, the use of chimeric viruses, the sampling campaigns of bats in the cellars of Yunnan and other Chinese provinces, the studies and trials of SARS vaccines, were carried out by institutions in Wuhan. In China, regulations require that experiments on SARS-like viruses be conducted in a BSL-3 laboratory level. In Wuhan, no less than six sites have BSL-3 laboratories. One of these sites also includes a BSL-4 laboratory building. Was it a coincidence that so many studies were being done in the same city that was the first victim of the epidemic? Bayes' theorem tells me that a SARS-like outbreak that starts in Wuhan is as likely to be linked to one of its laboratories as to be purely natural. The question then arises: does the Sars-CoV-2 virus have a purely natural origin, or could it have leaked from laboratories? How to remove the doubt? This is where I see the need for a transparent investigation based on logic and facts. This is why I joined a group of specialists and academics from around the world and from different fields who are also interested in this issue. The members of this group have jointly written four open letters to the WHO requesting and proposing an independent and free inquiry into the origin of the coronavirus.

High levels of risk

BSL (Biological Safety Level) refers to the level of protection to isolate pathogens within a laboratory. Protection is provided by a set of containment measures. The containment levels range from the lowest biosafety level (BSL-1) to the highest (BSL-4, maximum biological containment laboratory). At BSL-3 and BSL-4, measures include maintaining a negative pressure in the laboratory, double filtration of air with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, inactivation of contaminated effluents, airlocks at the laboratory entrance and exit, etc...

The number of BSL-3 and 4 facilities in which research presents a high level of risk has increased rapidly in China over the past 17 years. I myself counted 64 sites that hold one or more BSL-3 labs in China in 2020, which adds up to between one hundred and two hundred BSL-3 labs, whereas in 2003 there were about ten. I also counted three sites with BSL-4 laboratories (in Kunming, Wuhan, and Harbin, respectively) in operation since 2018. Since the SARS epidemic in 2003, China has embarked on an ambitious program to develop these laboratories. One of the missions of this program was to prevent the emergence of a new SARS. Compared to the United States, which has several hundred laboratories, the number of BSL-3s is still low for a country as populous as China.However, their recent development has been rapid, which, as noted by Chinese biologists before the pandemic, brings risks such as lack of qualification and training of staff. As soon as the Covid-19 epidemic started, China declared that it wanted to build even more laboratories. In Wuhan alone, there are plans to build four additional sites, each containing several BSL-3s.

As much as we can welcome the measures taken to improve the prevention and treatment of epidemics, I wonder whether it is not necessary to clarify whether there was a laboratory leak or not before going any further. Following the accident that caused the core meltdowns at Fukushima nuclear power plant's reactors 1, 2 and 3, Japan shut down all of its nuclear power plants, and the world slowed down the execution of new projects. Of course, nuclear power is radically different from biology, but when in doubt about biological facilities, shouldn't we check? The severity of a risk is measured by the probability of an accident and the magnitude of its impact. A very low risk with a catastrophic impact can be classified as very severe. Even though biosafety laboratories are designed to make an accident very unlikely, risk levels remain high for studies of dangerous pathogens whose release could cause a global catastrophe. For even the most unlikely event scenarios, such as a faulty filter, a cracked weld, or a mouse bite, engineers must take special prevention and mitigation measures to reduce the severity of the risk posed by the pathogen and ensure laboratory containment. The risk reassessment following the Fukushima accident has resulted in a review of seismic levels and emergency power generator designs, among other things.  

Until a thorough investigation takes place, it is unlikely that the origin of the virus will be discovered. However, even if the virus turns out to be purely natural in origin, we know that a laboratory accident is plausible. The progress of biological research means has been considerable, and it is now possible, with techniques called gain of function, to make a virus more pathogenic and transmissible without leaving any trace. The number of research laboratories for dangerous pathogens has increased considerably, in China and in the world, without reducing the risks of natural emergence of new transmissible pathogens. Biological accidents can have catastrophic consequences. Under these conditions, it is undeniable that the risks of accidents are increasing. As biological accidents can affect all living beings on the planet, research on dangerous pathogens requires a global re-evaluation of risks.

The issue is of concern because since the beginning of the pandemic, China itself has issued reminders on the importance of biosafety and has put in place a national biosafety law, which has been in force since April 2021. The WHO has revised its biosafety manual (4th edition dated December 2020), and the "maximum containment" section has been expanded from three pages to six pages. In the United States, there are multiple Senate hearings on the origin of the virus and the national and global governance of health and biological research. What is France doing about regulations in the handling of dangerous pathogens, and transparency of information? Does France want to participate in the leadership of the global governance of biology, or will it have to be pulled by other countries?

The 21st century will be the century of biology

Because what this pandemic reveals to us is the lack of international governance in the supervision of biological research, in contrast to nuclear energy, which has the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). The IAEA provides an international governance, inspection, and regulatory mechanism to ensure that nuclear use is safe and not diverted to destructive purposes (dual use control). Nuclear power and biology are different fields, but each presents high risks. The risks in biology come from highly pathogenic agents. In many ways, biology can generate more serious accidents than nuclear, as a biological accident can affect the whole planet.

Thus, I plead for a rapid establishment of an "International Agency for Biosafety and Biological Research". This agency will be provided with regulatory and monitoring mechanisms. It should be independent of both States and researchers. It will offer services for the prevention of safety and environmental risks, and will supervise research on dangerous pathogens. The agency will also propose rules and means for sharing biological information, but also for the security of biological information by ensuring its integrity and traceability.

Moreover, until the origin of the coronavirus is elucidated, it would be advisable to suspend research on high-risk pathogens and reassess the risks before resuming it. If the 20th century was the century of physics, the 21st century will be the century of biology. Will our society be up to the task? Of the 3,711 passengers and crew on the cruise ship Diamond Princess, 712 were affected by Covid-19 and 14 died. A year and a half later, our planet has seen more than 4 million deaths and immeasurable disruption, and we still do not know the origin.