Papers

Peer-reviewed Articles

A Lost Variation Found: Negotiations and Research on International Economic Cooperation 

• Published at Review of International Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2024.2316834

• Abstract: International cooperation occurs after long periods of negotiation, but not every negotiation ends in cooperation outcomes. To date, International Political Economy (IPE) literature has not fully explored these negotiation variations. I suggest that researchers take a process-centered approach to better understand (non-)cooperation rather than look only at the cooperation outcomes. A process-centered approach enables researchers to examine the determinants of the negotiation process and alternative outcomes. This approach also helps uncover how the process may change domestic and international politics. I use trade negotiations to demonstrate negotiation variations and draw on relevant literature to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of process-centered and outcome-centered approaches. Relevant lessons from trade negotiations may shed light on other bargaining processes that bring about (non-)cooperation. While opening the black box of negotiations can be challenging, a process-centered approach advances our knowledge of international cooperation and bridges the gap between IPE research and the real world.

Delayed Cooperation: Political Systems, Elections, and the Outcomes of Trade Negotiations

• Published at Review of International Political Economy. DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2023.2171471 

• Replication Data

• Winner, 2021 ISA-South's Jim Winkates Graduate Student Best Paper Award  

• Abstract: Why do some trade negotiations conclude with preferential trade agreements, while others drag on indefinitely? Departing from prior focuses on established cooperation, this study emphasizes the trade negotiation process and accounts for the unconcluded talks. I argue that domestic uncertainties induced by political systems and elections will influence negotiation lengths and outcomes. On the one hand, political systems’ cohesion and efficiency in decision-making may affect the progress of trade negotiations. On the other hand, the unpredictability of electoral outcomes and calendars may prolong trade negotiations. To have a complete picture of trade negotiations, I collected an original Trade Bargaining Dataset, which contains information on both concluded and unconcluded talks. To test the hypotheses, I use a sample of 157 negotiations from 1980 to 2016, in which at least one negotiating country is from the Indo-Pacific region. The results from the Cox proportional hazard models show that parliamentary systems make negotiations smoother than presidential systems. Additionally, negotiating governments are not likely to sign agreements in election years, particularly in the elections of parliamentary and democratic countries. This study contributes to the trade cooperation literature by highlighting the variations in negotiation outcomes and offering a novel approach to investigating the negotiation process. 

The Realities Facing Graduate Students: Before, During, and After the 2020 Covid Pandemic

With Angela Pashayan, E. Stefan Kehlenbach, Grace Mueller, and Charmaine Willis

• Published at PS: Political Science & Politics, 1-7. DOI: 10.1017/S1049096523000252

• Abstract: Committees from the American Political Science Association (APSA) on the status of graduate students in political science conducted digital surveys in 2018, 2020, and 2022. Distributed using listservs from APSA, the surveys asked about a range of realities facing graduate students including employment opportunities, industry or academic support, and overall well-being. Analysis of the data pre-during-and post pandemic revealed high anxiety in 2018 as part of the student experience looking for jobs. By 2020 and 2022, anxiety worsened, to the point that the well-being of graduate students in political science should be addressed. Recommendations include a change in the structure of graduate academic programs to include stronger institutional support and emphasizing alternative paths for work that does not include teaching at an academic institution. 

It’s a Hard-Knock Life: Child Labor Practices and Compliance with IMF Agreements. 

With Brendan Skip Mark, Tiffani Crippin, and Andrew Foote

• Published at Social Sciences 10(5): 171. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10050171

• Abstract: How does IMF lending impact child labor? We argue as compliance with IMF reforms increases, child labor increases. IMF loans can help governments avoid bankruptcy, prevent debt defaults, and credibly signal a commitment to pro-market reforms which should generate trade and investment. However, IMF policies associated with revenue and social policies can have negative impacts on child labor. Education reforms undermine the quality of schooling, making child labor more likely. Healthcare reforms undermine the quality of healthcare; when parents are ill or injured, their children are more likely to enter the workforce to make up for lost income. Similarly, social safety net reforms reduce the ability of families to access a safety net during times of hardship and make it more likely that children are pushed into the labor market to keep families afloat. To test our argument, we use a probit model on a sample of 70 IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2016. Using new datasets on IMF compliance and child labor, we find that increased compliance with IMF reforms worsens child labor practices. Revenue and social policy compliance in particular are associated with an increase in child labor. 

Working Papers

Deals to be Determined: The Trade Bargaining Dataset, 1980-2020

• Abstract: The literature on trade cooperation has produced valuable findings and data collection works of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). However, one major issue has yet to be addressed in this field: Not every trade negotiation concludes with an agreement. To sign and enforce a PTA, countries must undergo a period of negotiation in which they discuss the scope and depth of the trade cooperation. There is a substantial variation in how negotiations end, but relevant research is insufficient in explaining the factors that drive the negotiation outcomes. One possible reason for the lack of discussion is the unavailability of data on the trade negotiation process. Therefore, I have built the Trade Bargaining Dataset (TBD). In this paper, I first indicate why a new dataset on trade negotiations is important and how such a dataset differs from the existing data on PTAs. Then I conceptualize the process of trade negotiations. The third section explains the steps of how I collected the data. The final section delineates the current progress of the data collection. 

Negotiating Big Deals: Leadership Turnover and International Trade Cooperation 

• Winner, Richard I. Hofferbert Best Paper Award in 2023

• Abstract: Leadership turnover is a critical moment for a country’s commitment to international cooperation. Prior studies find that leadership changes may lead to the collapse of existing alliances. However, leadership turnover may also interrupt the cooperation under negotiation, and we know relatively little about the negotiation process that precedes international cooperation. How does leadership turnover influence prospective cooperation? In the context of the negotiations for preferential trade agreements, I argue that prospective cooperation is less likely to take place after leadership turnover in negotiating countries. Leadership turnover and the following reshuffle of negotiation teams bring about modifications in negotiation objectives. To identify pre-cooperation deliberation, I collect original data on trade negotiations between 1980 and 2020. In the sample of 180 negotiations from 1980 to 2018, 64% have experienced leadership changes within the negotiating countries. This shows that the administration that opens a trade negotiation may not be the one that closes it. The findings from the Cox proportional hazard models suggest that leadership turnover reduces the prospect of cooperation. This study adds to the international cooperation literature by highlighting the negotiation process before cooperation. It also shows that the impacts of leadership changes extend beyond the cooperation underway. 

Domestic Mass Mobilizations and International Economic Negotiations 

• Abstract: How do domestic mass mobilizations affect international economic negotiations? I argue that domestic instability will create uncertainty in the negotiations for trade agreements and thus hinder the conclusion. On the one hand, domestic unrest may weaken the government’s incentives and capacity to continue its ongoing negotiations. On the other hand, negotiation partners may be concerned about potential changes in the negotiated deal. Uncertainties on both sides of the table will lead to negotiation delays. I use the originally collected Trade Bargaining Dataset to capture the process of trade negotiations. I also use the Cross-National Time-Series Data and the Mass Mobilization Project to measure the frequency of protests. The results of survival analyses show that trade negotiations take longer when negotiating governments encounter domestic instability, nonviolent protests, protests in democracies, and protests with economic demands. These findings contribute to international cooperation and political violence research by evaluating how civil societies may affect international negotiations. This study also entails implications for policymakers and social movement leaders. 

Punishing Democracies: the Coercive Power of Foreign Aid Democracy Sanctions. 

With Zachary D. Greene, Strathclyde University, and Amanda Licht, Binghamton University

• Abstract: Rich democracies support fledgling democracies through financial and diplomatic assistance. Yet, the connection between aid receipt and democratic stability is difficult to pin down; analyses uncover null, negative, and positive relationships. Under what conditions will aid sanctions call backsliding democratic leaders into line rather than embolden further authoritarian actions? The confluence of domestic political preferences and electoral threat create condition the incentives of incumbent leaders, creating four types of sanction cases:  donor prefers a strong opposition; donor prefers a weak opposition; donor prefers government with strong opposition; donor prefers government with weak opposition. Perversely, combining the strong democratic element of internal competition with economic coercion incentivizes democratic backsliding rather than progress when targeted governments perceive donors' preferences for that opposition may be driving the foreign aid threats. We evaluate our theoretical expectations using a diverse-case analysis of one of each type of sanction episode, finding substantial support for the posited causal processes. Punishing democracies produces good outcomes only under appropriate political conditions: Only if the donor prefers the economic ideology of an opposition which nonetheless poses little electoral threat to the incumbent. 

Carrot or/and Stick? Dictators’ Domestic Strategies Under Economic Sanctions 

With Ryan Yu-Lin Liou, University of Georgia

• Abstract: Research indicates that economic sanctions lead to rising dissent but rarely destabilize the target dictatorships. How do sanctioned dictators withstand the domestic disturbances triggered by foreign coercion? We contend that dictators will both co-opt and repress to prevent the public from threatening the regimes during sanctions. We further argue that party-based and nonparty-based autocrats will choose different co-optative strategies according to the availability of resources and the size of the winning coalition. Party-based dictators will increase public spending to co-opt the citizens, whereas nonparty-based dictators will selectively sponsor pro-government groups. In addition to the inducements, dictators will also restrict collective action rights to maintain political order. To test our hypotheses, we identify sanctioned dictatorships using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions dataset and the Autocratic Regime Data. The empirical results support our argument that dictators employ both carrots and sticks when confronted with sanctions. 

Works in Progress

You Are the Company You Keep: Labor Rights of China’s Trade Cooperation Partners  

• Abstract: Trade cooperation helps diffuse labor standards from advanced countries to their partners. While prior studies examine the spillover effect from countries with high labor standards, how does the trade cooperation relationship with China influence a country’s labor rights? Economic incentives, such as aid, foreign direct investment, and trade, have driven developing countries to improve their labor rights conditions either before or after forming cooperative relationships with developed countries. However, as China’s global engagement increases, developing countries have a less restrictive alternative when they seek international cooperation. I argue that developing countries that give priority to economic growth over labor rights may evade providing labor protection by cooperating with China. I use labor rights data to test the hypotheses and distinguish between the laws and practices of labor rights. 

Profits and Promises: The Economic Cooperation between Rebel Groups and Foreign Actors 

With Almira Sadykova, Binghamton University

• Abstract: Why and how do some states and private actors form economic partnerships with rebel groups? The literature has paid much attention to interstate cooperation but not the cooperation between state/private actors and rebel groups. In this study, we account for strategic thinking from the perspectives of both foreign actors and insurgents.  We argue that rebels who control non-renewable resources as well as govern the controlled areas are more likely to establish economic relationships with foreign actors. The two conditions ensure that prospective cooperation is profitable and sustainable. Valuable resources provide foreign partners with strong incentives to cooperate with the rebels, and the governance allows rebel groups to make a credible cooperative commitment to potential partners. We test the argument by using original data of rebel economic cooperation. By identifying the causes of rebel economic cooperation, we hope to improve the understanding of international cooperation between states and non-state actors.