We survey the central doctrine that perceptual experience involves representing the world, and suggest that many science‑based defences of representationalism overreach: properly understood, they support only a minimal representationalist thesis that is compatible even with non‑representationalist accounts of perceptual consciousness.


This paper lays the conceptual groundwork for a metaphysical investigation of psychological trauma. Rather than attempting to resolve the issue outright, the paper seeks to clarify key conceptual foundations, to map the logical space for theorizing about trauma’s metaphysical status, and to offer some initial challenges that any theory of trauma’s nature must confront.


In tackling the Master Argument from Hallucination, Naïve Realists have often dismissed what I call the Monist Strategy, which holds that the hallucinations invoked by the argument consist of a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of the mind-independent environment. In this paper, I consider whether this often-implicit dismissal is justified.


In this paper, we consider strategies for Naïve Realists to resist recent arguments from seeming against their view (Brogaard 2018). 


Despite its growing popularity, several aspects of naïve realism remain unclear.  Naïve Realists sometimes disagree on some of their central claims or have yet to fully articulate their commitments on key aspects of the view. In this paper, I aim to contribute to identifying the most representative version of Naïve Realism, which may serve as a point of reference for future discussions: Standard Naïve Realism

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