My research focuses on the metaphysics of perception and the philosophy of mental health.
I am particularly interested in the argument from hallucination against Naïve Realism, as well as in questions concerning the nature of perceptual experience, including the structure of perceptual spaces in multimodal perception. In addition, I work on topics in the philosophy of mental health, with a current focus on the nature of psychological trauma.
Published Material
G. Mazzullo (2025). The Monist Strategy. Naïve Realism and the Master Argument from Hallucination, Synthese, 205 (20): 1-23. (Open Access)
In tackling the Master Argument from Hallucination, Naïve Realists have often dismissed what I call the Monist Strategy, which holds that the hallucinations invoked by the argument consist of a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of the mind-independent environment. In this paper, I consider whether this often-implicit dismissal is justified.
G. Mazzullo, A.Raimondi (2025). Naïve Realism, Seemings, and the Nature of Visual Experiences. American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (3): 233–247. [PREPRINT]
In this paper, we consider strategies for Naïve Realists to resist recent arguments from seeming against their view (Brogaard 2018).
Despite its growing popularity, several aspects of naïve realism remain unclear. Naïve Realists sometimes disagree on some of their central claims or have yet to fully articulate their commitments on key aspects of the view. In this paper, I aim to contribute to identifying the most representative version of Naïve Realism, which may serve as a point of reference for future discussions: Standard Naïve Realism
Forthcoming
(Co-authored with Craig French). The Roles of Representation in Perception. To appear in Nikola Andonovski et al (Eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Palgrave.
On the Nature of Trauma. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology.
Special Issues/Edited Volumes
Focus on Fundamental Things. Special issue of Philosophical Inquiries, Forthcoming (2027), (co-edited with Giorgio Lando).
Doctoral Thesis
On Philosophers' Hallucinations. Naive Realism and the Master Argument from Hallucination. Ph.D. Thesis UoN, 2023. (Abstract here)
It is widely acknowledged that the Master Argument from Hallucination poses a significant challenge to Naïve Realism.I propose that Philosophers’ Hallucinations should be construed as naïve realist experiences. In undergoing such mental events, one would be perceptually aware of a region of space.
In Progress
Spatial Monism: A New Naive Realist Response to the Argument from Hallucination (Manuscript)
This paper develops my proposal about how Naive Realists should try to resist the Argument from Hallucination.
Impossibilism: Philosophers' Hallucinations are Impossible (Under Review)
Perceptual Spaces