Working papers

[1] Asset Purchases and Heterogeneous Beliefs (with C. Galli) [slides]

How central bank asset purchases affect market heterogeneous beliefs on defaultable nominal debt? In search for an optimal policy of asset purchases.  

[2] Information Technologies and Safe Assets (with G. Ordoñez)

Although safe assets - in the form of perfectly diversified portfolios - are insensitive to information, their quantity is not because more information discourages selling the risky assets that serve as a base for diversification.

[3] Faster Markets, Slower Growth (with J. Boccanfuso)

A model of consumers' rational inattention and inefficient R&D competition explains higher market concentration, increased markups, reduced turnover, and slower growth, even alongside more dynamic market shares and higher R&D spending.  

Publications

Spending Allocation under Nominal Uncertainty: A Model of Effective Price Rigidity
Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming; with Luigi Paciello.

Myopic Fiscal Objectives and Long-Run Monetary Efficiency.

Journal of Monetary Economics,  Vol. 136, May 2023, pages 1-17; with Eric Mengus. 

Learning from House Prices: Amplification and Business Fluctuations.

The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 88, July 2021, pages 1720–1759; with Ryan Chahrour.

Breaking the Spell with Credit-Easing. Self-Confirming Credit Crises in Competitive Search Economies.

Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 119, April 2021, pages 1-20; with Ramon Marimon. 

Can More Public Information Raise Uncertainty? The International Evidence on Forward Guidance.

Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 108, December 2019, pages 93-112; with Michael Ehrmann, Peter Hoffmann and Georg Strasser.

Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs.

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 2019, pages 1-29, with Philippe Andrade, Eric Mengus and Benoit Mojon. 

Price Dispersion, Private Uncertainty and Endogenous Nominal Rigidities.

The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 85, Issue 2, April 2018, pages 1070–1110.

Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Banks' Home Bias for Sovereign Debt.

Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 81, July 2016, pages 70-85, with Ariel Zetlin-Jones.

Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance.

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 8, Issue 1, January 2016, pages 42-97. [AEA research highlight]

Sequential Coordination, Higher-Order Belief Dynamics and the E-Stability Principle.

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 44, Issue 7, July 2014, pages 270-279.

Good Luck or Good Policy? An Expectational Theory of Macro-Volatility Switches.

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 37, Issue 12, December 2013, pages 2755–2770.

Eductive Learning and the Rationalizability of Oligopoly Games.

Economics Letters, Vol. 120, Issue 3, September 2013, pages 401–404.

Other

Making complexity easy: The ECB’s art of communication.

Banque de France Eco Notepad, January 2019.

More, and more forward-looking: Central bank communication after the crisis.

VOX e-Book, February 2018. with Günter Coenen, Michael Ehrmann, Peter Hoffmann, Anton Nakov, Stefano Nardelli, Eric Persson, Georg Strasser.

How to signal the future path of interest rates? The international evidence on forward guidance.

ECB Research Bulletin, vol.61, 2019.

Communication of Monetary Policy in Unconventional Times.

ECB Disussion paper. 2080/2017. with Günter Coenen, Michael Ehrmann, Peter Hoffmann, Anton Nakov, Stefano Nardelli, Eric Persson, Georg Strasser. 

The hazard of vague communication.

ECB Research Bulletin, no. 34 , 2017.