PhD Dissertation

Broadly, my dissertation work is on contemporary issues in the epistemology of consciousness while drawing on insights from G.W. Leibniz. Many anti-physicalist positions in the philosophy of mind take as a starting point that we stand in an epistemically special relation to our conscious states Historically, one could point to Rene Descartes, while today Philip Goff (2016) is explicit in making this a foundational assumption. In contrast, many physicalist positions deny that our epistemic access to our conscious states is privileged in the way it seems to be. Most notably are the illusionists such as Daniel Dennett (1991), Keith Frankish (2016), and Derk Pereboom (2011). Problems arise when we take our epistemic access to be as strong as Goff argues or as weak as Frankish and the illusionists argue. I attempt to sail a middle path between these two extremes utilizing Leibniz's theory of confused ideas.

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