My interests in philosophical topics are wide-ranging. One of my main research interests is in the philosophy of mind: i) What sorts of problems (if any) does consciousness pose to our physicalist picture of the world (and can they be overcome)? ii) What kind of causal contribution do our mental states make? To the first question, I think if we are realists about the nature of our conscious states, then there is some tension for our physicalist picture of the world. In response to this, I am interested in studying theories of consciousness, particularly the recent conversation in the literature surrounding panpsychist theories. I think the panpsychist research program allows us to be realists about our conscious experience while being (near enough) to physicalism. However, a posteriori physicalism also seems to be a promising way to avoid issues to our physicalist picture. My interest in the second question arose as a reaction to the first. The further a theory of consciousness gets from physicalism, the less clear it becomes how the mind can be causally efficacious. As such, I also pursue questions in mental causation, specifically in relation to the exclusion problem.

In value theory, I am most interested in consequentialism. Particularly, in which consequences are the “good” consequences we should promote and how the consequentialist can respond to common sense intuitions that some acts are intrinsically wrong. In moral epistemology, I’m curious about responses to Sharon Street’s evolutionary skepticism against realism. I have a few interests in applied ethical questions, such the ethical treatment of animals. In moral psychology, I’m curious about the nature of agency and whether akratic action can be rational. I’m attracted to views, like those of Nomy Arpaly and Karen Jones, which argue that our akratic actions can be responsive to moral reasons and, therefore, rational even if they go against our all-things-considered judgment.

In metaphysics generally, I’m interested in the nature of modality, possible worlds, and trans-world identity. Specifically, I’ve been attracted to the actualist position on possible worlds and counterpart theory of trans-world identity. I’m interested in pursuing what implications these positions have for theories of reference, philosophy of mind, and, particularly, necessitarianism—that things could not have been otherwise. Further, I have interests in the nature of grounding and questions in ontology (specifically, questions about composition).

A side interest of mine is the philosophers of the early modern period, specifically Leibniz.