Seminar Series

2023 - 2024

Speaker: Luis Corchon (Universidad Carlos III).

Title: “Folk Theorem under Bankruptcy”.

joint with C. Beviá (Universidad Alicante) and Y. Yasuda (U of Osaka).

Date: Thursday, March 07th at 12h30 (Paris Time).

Abstract: In this paper, we examine Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) within an infinite horizon oligopolistic market, accounting for the possibility of firm bankruptcy. Central to our dynamic analysis is the concept of Bankruptcy-Free (BF) allocations. The consideration of bankruptcy introduces several distinctive features not encompassed by standard models of infinitely repeated games. Notably, when firms are sufficiently patient towards future outcomes, achieving certain collusive outcomes as equilibria may not be possible. We discern qualitatively different results depending on the number of firms in the market; in a duopoly, only specific BF allocations can be sustained as SPNE, while in scenarios with more than two firms, allocations outside the BF set can also be established as SPNE. In both instances, it is crucial that the payoffs are above the minimax BF payoff, a condition more restrictive than the standard minimax payoff advocated in Folk Theorems. 

Here is, a link to the speaker’s and the FEELab website:

https://www.eco.uc3m.es/english/staff/cv/lcorchon.html

https://sites.google.com/view/feelabtbs/

You are cordially invited to participate in the seminar, which will take place in Room 321, Lascrosses building. 

For more information, please contact: Pierre Mella-Barral p.mella-barral@tbs-education.fr