Problem definition: Fashion retailers are increasingly implementing take-back programs to reduce textile waste and prevent used clothes from being landfilled. To increase participation, retailers must decide how much and what type of information about the program to provide to consumers, and how much of a financial reward to offer. However, the effectiveness of the different information and reward levels is unknown, and return rates remain low.

Methodology/results: We examine the effect of different information levels (i.e., none, generic, and different types of specific information) and reward levels on consumers' propensity to return their used clothes through three experiments involving over 3,500 subjects. We find that, overall, consumers express a higher likelihood to return when generic information is provided (i.e., the returned clothes will be kept out of the landfill), compared to when no information is provided. However, mentioning a specific circular economy strategy (i.e., recycling, resale, donation) does not lead to increased returns, compared to conditions where generic information is provided. Moreover, consumers are less willing to participate in the program when the retailer informs that the returned clothes will be resold, as consumers perceive the retailer to be profiting off their returns. Finally, we find that more consumers are willing to return their used clothes as the financial reward level increases, and that reward levels moderate consumers' reactions to different types of information: under a small reward, the differences between information conditions weaken, and they disappear completely when the reward is high.

Managerial implications: Our results offer several managerial insights: we find that information can be an effective lever to increase consumers' participation in take-back programs, but only if used judiciously. If a retailer intends to resell collected clothing, it may be better off simply providing generic information to the consumers. We also find that, due to lower participation rates under some forms of reuse, the overall environmental effectiveness of reuse may be lower than recycling. Finally, we show that while higher rewards lead to higher collection rates, a small reward can also foster high consumer participation if paired with the right information level.

Supply chains are clearly instrumental to firm-level environmental performance. Yet in research examining these effects, distinctions between arms-length relationships (largely transactional buyers and suppliers) and other influencers, such as strategic research partners (i.e., entities who jointly maintain legal commitments to shared knowledge and resources, with common service or product development interests) are often ambiguous. In our work, we aim to investigate this distinction. Combining arguments that reflect institutional theory, stakeholder theory, and expectancy disconfirmation theory, we anticipate positive associations between the environmental performance of strategic partners and the future performance of related focal firms. We posit these associations to be more easily observable than those between a firm and its arms-length relations. We further suggest that, due to the level of integration and co-dependency with strategic research partners, losses in environmental performance (backsliding) will be associated with dampened links between strategic partner performance and subsequent firm performance. By weaving together evidence from thousands of firm-year observations, merging representative fields from FactSet, CSRHub, and Compustat sources, we find support for these associations. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.

Much of the responsibility for advancing the circular economy has been directed towards firms, yet many reuse opportunities can only be achieved through environmentally compliant, household-level recycling behaviors. In response, policymakers and recycling organizations are using a range of feedback mechanisms to promote household recycling that meets local quality standards. However, the effectiveness of these tactics remains unclear, and stakeholders are divided on the appropriateness of their use. In this research, we examine the role of two popular feedback mechanisms – information-only and information plus penalty – in correcting households’ curbside recycling behaviors. With information-only feedback, households are provided with best practices for recycling and are not penalized for their errors. With information plus penalty feedback, households also receive information, but temporarily forfeit their recycling services. While previous studies have explored the use of information and penalties as feedback mechanisms to guide behavioral changes, there is mixed evidence on their effectiveness, particularly in the recycling context. We address this research gap by analyzing unique data collected from a 2019 curbside auditing effort that occurred in a large, Mid-Western city. Our analysis leverages econometric methods, and recycling feedback and performance data from 25,359 audits across 11,899 households and 15 recycling routes.We find that information-only feedback mechanisms, while preferred by some stakeholders, are not associated with improvements in recycling quality (measured using household contamination rates). By contrast, our results indicate that punitive mechanisms (i.e., information plus penalty) involving cart refusals are associated with significant reductions in contamination rates: i.e., households that receive punitive feedback reduce their contamination rate severity by 59%, and are 75% less likely to commit a violation in the future. More importantly, we do not find evidence that punitive feedback mechanisms generally discourage households’ participation in recycling programs (measured using future set out rates). Our study informs sustainable operations management literature by investigating how curbside feedback mechanisms, with differing levels of severity, influence critical dimensions of households’ recycling performance (i.e., recycling quality and participation). We also inform policymakers on how curbside feedback mechanisms can be more effectively leveraged to enhance opportunities for material reuse.

Much of the responsibility for advancing the circular economy has been directed towards firms, yet many reuse opportunities can only be achieved through environmentally compliant, household-level recycling behaviors. In response, policymakers and recycling organizations are using a range of feedback mechanisms to promote household recycling that meets local quality standards. However, the effectiveness of these tactics remains unclear, and stakeholders are divided on the appropriateness of their use. In this research, we examine the role of two popular feedback mechanisms – information-only and information plus penalty – in correcting households’ curbside recycling behaviors. With information-only feedback, households are provided with best practices for recycling and are not penalized for their errors. With information plus penalty feedback, households also receive information, but temporarily forfeit their recycling services. While previous studies have explored the use of information and penalties as feedback mechanisms to guide behavioral changes, there is mixed evidence on their effectiveness, particularly in the recycling context. We address this research gap by analyzing unique data collected from a 2019 curbside auditing effort that occurred in a large, Mid-Western city. Our analysis leverages econometric methods, and recycling feedback and performance data from 25,359 audits across 11,899 households and 15 recycling routes.We find that information-only feedback mechanisms, while preferred by some stakeholders, are not associated with improvements in recycling quality (measured using household contamination rates). By contrast, our results indicate that punitive mechanisms (i.e., information plus penalty) involving cart refusals are associated with significant reductions in contamination rates: i.e., households that receive punitive feedback reduce their contamination rate severity by 59%, and are 75% less likely to commit a violation in the future. More importantly, we do not find evidence that punitive feedback mechanisms generally discourage households’ participation in recycling programs (measured using future set out rates). Our study informs sustainable operations management literature by investigating how curbside feedback mechanisms, with differing levels of severity, influence critical dimensions of households’ recycling performance (i.e., recycling quality and participation). We also inform policymakers on how curbside feedback mechanisms can be more effectively leveraged to enhance opportunities for material reuse.

Socially missioned nonprofit (SMNP) organizations exist to connect at-risk populations to critical healthcare, food, and financial services. However, these organizations face several internal (resource infrastructure, management capability) and external (multiple stakeholders, client demographics and capabilities) constraints within which they must work to attain their goal of helping people in need. The extant academic literature offers a variety of solutions to such allocation problems for use in for-profit organizations. Yet noted differences in the operational systems of for-profit and nonprofit operations limit practitioners’ capabilities to readily leverage these tools. Thus, in this paper, we extend the applicability of classic resource allocation principles to the context of nonprofit operations’ outreach efforts. We describe a detailed case study analysis at one nonprofit organization (SC Thrive) wherein we implemented the theory of constraints– linear programming (TOC-LP) framework to help maximize the effectiveness of outreach initiatives carried out by the organization. Based on the results from our stepwise, nonlinear yield model, SC Thrive is now capable of doubling the annual number of applications submitted by potential beneficiaries for assistance services.

Many companies are reluctant to enter the remanufacturing market because of concern with cannibalization of new sales, competition from current remanufacturers, and the willingness of consumers to purchase remanufactured products. What is often missing, however, is an in-depth understanding of how consumers make complex purchase decisions involving remanufactured items among numerous other options. This paper examines how consumers evaluate remanufactured products when there are multiple conditions and generations of the item available, and evaluates the risk that remanufactured products pose to new product sales. We leverage transaction data of iPad sales from eBay and structural estimation techniques developed in the industrial organization literature to conduct our analysis. We find that product generation, condition, and seller attributes are all highly influential in shaping consumers' purchasing decisions and that the relationship between new and remanufactured products is much more nuanced and context-specific than previously shown. Counter to industry intuition, we find that remanufactured products pose the same amount of threat to new-condition goods as do used goods. Through these and other findings, we provide insights on how CLSC participants and those exploring entry into the remanufacturing business may achieve more profitable remanufacturing strategies.