Abstract: "In this paper I develop a novel account of the phenomenality of language by focusing on characteristics of perceived speech. I explore the extent to which the spoken word can be said to have a horizonal structure similar to that of spatiotemporal objects: our perception of each is informed by habitual associations and expectations formed through past experiences of the object or word and other associated objects and experiences. Specifically, the horizonal structure of speech in use can fruitfully be compared to that of a tool in use. The comparison suggests an account of our linguistic faculty as continuous with more foundational faculties of perception and action. I provide empirical corroboration of this account by drawing on recent neuroimaging studies of the multimodal, sensorimotor bases of speech comprehension. I then discuss how such an understanding of our linguistic ability helps advocates of embodied, non-representationalist accounts of cognition respond to a common objection. Critics grant that embodied approaches may be adequate to account for lower-level, online modes of cognition, such as perception and action, which directly engage their object. But they question whether such approaches can “scale up” to higher modes of cognition, such as imagination, memory, thought, and language, which can entertain absent, non-existent, or abstract objects. By providing a plausible account of the continuity of lower cognition and language-involving cognition, my approach responds to this objection, at least where language is concerned."
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11097-020-09655-5
Hayden Kee is an instructor at the University of Windsor. He is a Canadian philosopher researching issues in philosophy of mind and language, focusing on how the meaning we find and make in language extends more basic bodily modes of sensemaking in perception, action, and preverbal communication. His approach to these topics is pluralistic, drawing from phenomenology, analytic philosophy, cognitive science, and empirical research in psychology and neuroscience. His interests in phenomenology, embodied cognitive science, and Indian philosophy converge in his study and practice of yoga.
Julian Kiverstein is Assistant Professor of Neurophilosophy at the University of Amsterdam. He is currently writing a monograph for Palgrave Macmillan entitled The Significance of Phenomenology, and editing a comprehensive handbook for Routledge Taylor Francis on the philosophy of the social mind. In his research, he pursues the confluence of phenomenology and cognitive science developing phenomenologically informed answers to a number of questions in cognitive science, including time perception, conceptual thinking, empathy, free will, consciousness and the self.
Inês Hipólito is currently a post-doctoral researcher at the Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt University, having worked as teaching Assistant/co-lecturer at the University of Wollongong (Australia) and at the University of Sydney. She works on the intersection between philosophy of mind and computational cognitive neuroscience. She is interested in the architecture and organisation of the brain and cognition in theories under Dynamical Systems Theory and 4E Cognition.