Nature and Grace

Article One

Whether Another Doctrine is Necessary, besides the Philosophical Sciences

We proceed to the first article thus:

1. It seems that there is no need for any other doctrine besides the philosophical sciences. Man should not strive to know what is above reason, since it is said in Ecclesiasticus 3:22: “seek not to know what is higher than thyself.” Now what is within the reach of reason is adequately dealt with in the philosophical sciences. It seems superfluous, therefore, that there should be another doctrine besides the philosophical sciences.

2. Again, a doctrine can be concerned only with “what is,” since only what is true can be known, and whatever is true, is. Now all things which “are” are dealt with in the philosophical sciences, which treat even of God, wherefore one part of philosophy is called theology, or the science of divine things, as the philosopher says in 6 Metaph. (Commentary II). There was therefore no need for another doctrine, besides the philosophical sciences.

On the other hand: it is said in 2 Tim. 3:16: “All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness.” Now the divinely inspired Scriptures are quite distinct from the philosophical sciences, which are devised by human reason. It is therefore expedient that there should be another science which is divinely inspired, besides the philosophical sciences.

I answer: it was necessary for man’s salvation that there should be a doctrine founded on revelation, as well as the philosophical sciences discovered by human reason. It was necessary, in the first place, because man is ordained to God as his end, who surpasses the comprehension of reason, according to Isa. 64:4: “neither hath the eye seen, O God, besides thee, what he hath prepared for him that waiteth for him.” Men must have some foreknowledge of the end to which they ought to direct their intentions and actions. It was therefore necessary that some things which transcend human reason should be made known through divine revelation. It was necessary also that man should be instructed by divine revelation even in such things concerning God as human reason could discover. For such truth about God as could be discovered by reason would be known only by the few, and that after a long time, and mixed with many errors. Now the whole salvation of man, which lies in God, depends on the knowledge of this truth. It was therefore necessary that men should be instructed in divine things through divine revelation, in order that their salvation might come to pass the more fittingly and certainly. It was necessary, therefore, that there should be a sacred doctrine given through revelation, as well as the philosophical sciences discovered by reason.

On the first point: although things which are beyond human knowledge are not to be sought by man through reason, such things are revealed by God, and are to be accepted by faith. Hence Ecclesiasticus adds in the same passage: “many things beyond human understanding have been revealed unto thee” (3:25).

On the second point: sciences are distinguished by their different ways of knowing. The astronomer and the naturalist prove the same thing, for example, that the world is round. But the astronomer proves it by mathematics, without reference to matter, whereas the naturalist proves it by examining the physical. There is no reason, then, why the same things, which the philosophical sciences teach as they can be known by the light of natural reason, should not also be taught by another science as they are known through divine revelation. The theology which depends on sacred Scripture is thus generically different from the theology which is a part of philosophy.

Article Two

Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Science

We proceed to the second article thus:

It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science depends on principles which are self-evident, whereas sacred doctrine depends on articles of faith which are not self-evident, since they are not conceded by everybody. As is said in 2 Thess. 3:2: “all men have not faith.” Hence sacred doctrine is not a science.

Again, there is no science of particulars. But sacred doctrine is concerned with particulars, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and others. It is not therefore a science.

On the other hand: Augustine says (14 De Trin. 1): “by this science only is faith begun, nourished, defended, and strengthened.” Now this is true of no science except sacred doctrine. Sacred doctrine is therefore a science.

I answer: sacred doctrine is a science. But we must realize that there are two kinds of sciences. Some of them, such as arithmetic, geometry, and the like, depend on principles known by the natural light of reason. Others depend on principles known through a higher science. Thus the science of perspective depends on principles known through geometry, and music on principles known through arithmetic. Sacred doctrine is a science of the latter kind, depending on principles known through a higher science, namely the science of God and the blessed. Just as music accepts the principles given to it by arithmetic, so does sacred doctrine accept the principles revealed to it by God.

On the first point: the principles of any science are either self-evident, or derived from what is known through a higher science. The principles of sacred doctrine are so derived, as we have said.

On the second point: sacred doctrine does not narrate particular things because it is principally concerned with them. It introduces them as examples to follow, as do the moral sciences; and also as proofs of the authority of those through whom the divine revelation, on which sacred Scripture and sacred doctrine are founded, reaches us.

Article Three

Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Single Science

We proceed to the third article thus:

It seems that sacred doctrine is not a single science. As the philosopher says: “one science treats of one kind of subject only” (I Post. An., Text 43). Now sacred doctrine treats of the Creator and also of creatures, and these do not belong to one kind of subject. Hence it is not a single science.

Again, sacred doctrine treats of angels, of creatures with bodies, and of the customs of men. These belong to different philosophical sciences. Hence sacred doctrine is not a single science.

On the other hand: sacred Scripture speaks of these things as of a single science, for it is said in Wisdom 10:10: “She hath given him the science of holy things.”

I answer: sacred doctrine is a single science. The unity of a power or habit is indeed to be judged by its object, but by the formal nature of its object, not by the material nature of it. For example, man, ass, and stone agree in possessing the formal nature of “the coloured,” which is the object of sight. Now since sacred doctrine treats of things as divinely revealed, as we said in the previous article, all things which are divinely revealed agree in the one formal nature which is the object of this science. They are therefore comprehended under sacred doctrine as a single science.

On the first point: sacred doctrine is not concerned with God and with creatures equally. It is concerned with God fundamentally, and with creatures in so far as they relate to God as their beginning or end. Thus the unity of the science is not destroyed.

On the second point: there is nothing to prevent lower powers or habits being differentiated in their relation to matters which yet go together for a higher power or habit, because a higher power or habit comprehends its object under a more universal aspect. Thus the object of the common sense is “the sensible,” which includes both the “visible” and the “audible.” Common sense is a single power which comprehends all objects of the five senses. Similarly, sacred doctrine remains a single science while it treats under one aspect, in so far as they are all revealed by God, matters which are dealt with by separate philosophical sciences. Sacred doctrine is thus like an imprint of God’s knowledge, which is one and undivided, yet is knowledge of all things.

Article Four

Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Practical Science

We proceed to the fourth article thus:

It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science. For “the end of practical knowledge is action,” according to the philosopher (2 Metaph., Text 3), and sacred doctrine is concerned with action, according to James 1:22: “Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only.” Sacred doctrine is therefore a practical science.

Again, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the New Law, and the Law has to do with the science of morals, which is practical. Sacred doctrine is therefore a practical science.

On the other hand: every practical science is concerned with the works of men. Ethics is concerned with their actions, and architecture with their buildings. But sacred doctrine is concerned principally with God, whose works men are. Hence it is not a practical science. Rather is it speculative.

I answer: as was said in the preceding article, sacred doctrine embraces matters dealt with by separate philosophical sciences while it itself remains one, because the formal nature to which it attends in diverse things is their being made known by the divine light. Hence even though some matters in the philosophical sciences are speculative and some practical, sacred doctrine includes them all within itself, just as God knows both himself and his works by the same knowledge. But sacred doctrine is more speculative than practical, since it is concerned with divine things more fundamentally than with the actions of men, in which it is interested in so far as through them men are brought to the perfect knowledge of God in which their eternal happiness consists. The answer to the objections is then obvious.

Article Five

Whether Sacred Doctrine is Nobler than other Sciences

We proceed to the fifth article thus:

It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences. For the dignity of a science is indicated by its certainty, and other sciences whose principles cannot be doubted appear to be more certain than sacred doctrine, whose principles, i.e., the articles of faith, are the subject of debate. Thus it seems that other sciences are nobler.

Again, a lower science depends on a higher, as music depends on arithmetic. Now sacred doctrine derives something from the philosophical sciences. Hieronymus, indeed, says that “the ancient teachers filled their books with so many philosophical doctrines and opinions that one does not know which to admire the more, their secular learning or their knowledge of the scriptures” (Epist. 84 to Magnus the Roman orator). Sacred doctrine is therefore lower than other sciences.

On the other hand: other sciences are said to be subsidiary to this doctrine in Prov. 9:3: “She hath sent forth her maidens: she crieth upon the highest places of the city.”

I answer: since sacred doctrine is speculative in some things and practical in others, it transcends all other sciences, whether speculative or practical. One speculative science is said to be nobler than another either because it is more certain, or because it treats of a nobler subject. Sacred doctrine surpasses other speculative sciences in both respects. It is more certain, since the certainty of other sciences depends on the natural light of human reason, which is liable to err, whereas its own certainty is founded on the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be deceived. Its subject is also nobler, since it is concerned principally with things above reason, whereas other sciences deal with things within the reach of reason. Finally, one practical science is nobler than another if it serves a more ultimate end. Politics is nobler than military science, because the good of an army is subsidiary to the good of the state. Now in so far as sacred doctrine is practical, its end is eternal happiness, and all other ends of the practical sciences are subsidiary to this as their ultimate end. It is plain, then, that it is nobler than the others in every way.

On the first point: there is nothing to prevent what is in itself the more certain from appearing to us to be the less certain, owing to the weakness of the intellect, “which is to the things most manifest to nature like the eyes of a bat to the light of the sun,” as is said in Metaph. 2. The doubt felt by some in respect of the articles of faith is not due to any uncertainty in the thing itself. It is due to the weakness of human understanding. Nevertheless, the least knowledge which one can have of higher things is worth more than the most certain knowledge of lesser things, as is said in the De Partibus Animalium (bk. 1, ch. 5).

On the second point: this science can make use of the philosophical sciences in order to make what it teaches more obvious, not because it stands in need of them. It does not take its principles from other sciences, but receives them directly from God through revelation. It thus derives nothing from other sciences as from superiors, but uses them as ancillary inferiors, as the master sciences use subsidiary sciences, or as politics uses military science. Its use of them is not due to any defect or inadequacy in itself. It is due to the limitation of our understanding. We are more easily led from what is known by natural reason, on which other sciences depend, to the things above reason which this science teaches us.

Article Six

Whether Sacred Doctrine is Wisdom

We proceed to the sixth article thus:

It seems that sacred doctrine is not wisdom. No doctrine which derives its principles from elsewhere is worthy of the name of wisdom. As it is said in Metaph. 1, cap. 2: “the wise man must order, and not be ordered.” Now the preceding article makes it plain that sacred doctrine derives its principles from outside itself. It follows that it is not wisdom.

Again, wisdom proves the principles of other sciences, and is accordingly called the head of the sciences in 6 Ethics 7. But sacred doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences. It follows that it is not wisdom.

Again, sacred doctrine is acquired through study. But wisdom is infused, and is accordingly numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit in Isa. 11. It follows that sacred doctrine is not wisdom.

On the other hand: it is said at the beginning of the law, “this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations” (Deut. 4:6).

I answer: this doctrine is the wisdom of all wisdoms, absolutely so, and not only in respect of one kind of wisdom. The wise man orders and judges, and we may say that a man is wise in respect of a certain genus of things when he takes account of the highest cause of that genus, since we judge inferior things by means of a higher cause. An architect who plans the form of a house is said to be wise in regard to buildings, and is called a master-builder in distinction from the subsidiaries who hew the wood and prepare the stones. Thus it is said in 1 Cor. 3:10: “as a wise master-builder, I have laid the foundation.” Again, a prudent man is said to be wise in what matters for the whole of human life, since he directs his human actions to their proper end. Thus it is said in Prov. 10:23: “a man of understanding hath wisdom.” Hence he who attends to the absolute and highest cause of the whole universe, which is God, is called wise above all. That is the reason why wisdom is also defined as the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine explains (12 De Trin. c. 14). Now it is the quintessence of sacred doctrine that it treats of God as the highest principle, as he is known only to himself, and to others by revelation, not merely as he is known through creatures in the philosophical way spoken of in Rom. 1:19: “Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them.” Hence sacred doctrine is especially said to be wisdom.

On the first point: sacred doctrine does not derive its principles from another human science, but from divine knowledge, whereby all our knowledge is ruled as by the highest wisdom.

On the second point: the principles of other sciences are either self-evident and indemonstrable, or proved by natural reason in some other science. But the special principles of this science are founded on revelation, not on natural reason. It is not therefore for sacred doctrine to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge them. It repudiates anything in the other sciences which is inconsistent with its truth, as wholly false. Thus it is said in II Cor. 10:5: “Casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God.”

On the third point: since wisdom judges, and since there are two ways of judging, there are two kinds of wisdom. One may judge as the result of inclination, as does a man who has the habit of virtue, who judges rightly of the things which virtue requires him to do because he is inclined to do them. Thus it is said in 10 Ethics 5 and in 3 Ethics 4: “the virtuous man is the measure and rule of human actions.” One may also judge as the result of knowledge, as one who is versed in the science of morals can judge of virtuous actions even though he is not virtuous. The wisdom which is defined as a gift of the Holy Spirit judges of divine things in the first way, according to 1 Cor. 2:15: “he that is spiritual judges all things,” and as Dionysius relates (2 Div. Nom., lect. 4): “Hierotheus was taught not only by learning, but by the experience of divine things.” This doctrine, on the other hand, judges in the second way, since it is acquired through study, even though its principles are received through revelation.

From Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Nature and Grace.

Thomas Aquinas. A.M. Fairweather (Translation and Editor). (1978). Nature and Grace: Selections from Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas. The Westminster Press.