Dmitry Ryvkin
Dmitry Ryvkin
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Professor of Economics
School of Economics, Finance and Marketing
RMIT University
Melbourne, Australia
E-mail: d.ryvkin@gmail.com, dmitry.ryvkin@rmit.edu.au
ORCID: 0000-0001-9314-5441
Welcome to my professional website!
I am a micro theorist and experimental economist. Much of my work focuses on contests---incentive schemes based on relative performance comparisons. These are fascinating mechanisms with wide-ranging applications. More broadly, I am interested in organizations and incentive design, adverse behaviors such as corruption and cheating, as well as political economy, environmental social dilemmas, the interplay between cooperation and competition, and topics in economic psychology (aka behavioral economics).
I serve as Director of RMIT's Behavioural Business Lab, and as co-editor at the Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
Recent working papers
Recent working papers
Nought venture, nought have: Strategic risk taking and efficient investment in matching markets (with Kyungmin Kim and R. Vijay Krishna) [link]
Robust tournaments (with Mikhail Drugov) [link]
Choosing your own luck: Strategic risk taking and effort in contests (with Kyungmin Kim and R. Vijay Krishna) [link] R&R at Journal of Political Economy
Preventing search with defaults (with Andreas Ortmann, Tom Wilkening and Jingjing Zhang) [link] R&R at Economic Journal
Optimal prizes in tournaments under nonseparable preferences (with Mikhail Drugov; this paper supersedes "Optimal prizes in tournaments with risk-averse agents," which only considered the separable case) [link] R&R at Journal of Economic Theory
Tournaments with a standard (with Mikhail Drugov and Jun Zhang) [link] (see also an older extended version) R&R at RAND Journal of Economics
The psychology of prizes: Loss aversion and optimal tournament rewards (with Qin Wu) [link] R&R at Games and Economic Behavior
Entry and disclosure in group contests (with Luke Boosey and Philip Brookins) [link] R&R at Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Don't hate the player, hate the game: Uncovering the foundations of cheating in contests (with Glenn Dutcher and Daniela Glätzle-Rüzler) [link]
Robust prizes in all-pay contests with loss aversion (with Qin Wu) [link]
Selected publications by topic
Selected publications by topic
Contest theory and incentive design
Ryvkin, D. To fight or to give up? Dynamic contests with a deadline. Management Science, 2022 [link]
Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. Tournament rewards and heavy tails. Journal of Economic Theory, 2020 [link]
Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. How noise affects effort in tournaments. Journal of Economic Theory, 2020 [link]
Ryvkin, D., Drugov, M. The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments. Theoretical Economics, 2020 [link]
Boosey, L., Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Contests between groups of unknown size. Games and Economic Behavior, 2019 [link]
Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. Biased contests for symmetric players. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 [link]
Ryvkin, D. Heterogeneity of players and aggregate effort in contests. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2013 [link]
Ryvkin, D. The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups, Games and Economic Behavior, [link]
Ryvkin, D. Fatigue in dynamic tournaments. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2011 [link]
Ryvkin, D., Ortmann, A. The predictive power of three prominent tournament formats. Management Science, 2008 [link]
Experimental contests and organizational incentives
Brookins, P., Brown, J., Ryvkin, D. Evidence gathering under competitive and noncompetitive rewards. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, forthcoming [link]
Dutcher, G., Oexl, R., Ryvkin, D., Salmon, T. Do competitive bonuses ruin cooperation in heterogeneous teams? Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2025 [link]
Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D., Smyth, A. Indefinitely repeated contests: An experimental study. Experimental Economics, 2021 [link]
Boosey, L., Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Information disclosure in contests with endogenous entry: An experiment. Management Science, 2020 [link]
Boosey, L., Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 [link]
Dutcher, E.G., Balafoutas, L., Lindner, F., Ryvkin, D., Sutter, M. Strive to be first and avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives. Games and Economic Behavior, 2015 [link]
Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information. Experimental Economics, 2014 [link]
Market design, governance, and institutions
Ortmann, A., Ryvkin, D., Wilkening, T., Zhang, J. Defaults and cognitive effort. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2023 [link]
Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: An experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 2022 [link]
Abbink, K., Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. Corrupt police. Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 [link]
Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. Corruption and competition among bureaucrats: An experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2020 [link]
Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. Is more competition always better? An experimental study of extortionary corruption. Economic Inquiry, 2019 [link]
Ryvkin, D., Serra, D., Tremewan, J. I paid a bribe: Information sharing and extortionary corruption. European Economic Review, 2017 [link]
Ryvkin, D., Semykina, A. An experimental study of democracy breakdown, income, and inequality. Experimental Economics, 2017 [link]
Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. How corruptible are you? Bribery under uncertainty, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2012 [link]
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