Our roots are kept safely offline. We issue end-entity certificates to subscribers from the intermediates in the next section.For additional compatibility as we submit our new Root X2 to various root programs, we have also cross-signed it from Root X1.
Each of our intermediates represents a single public/privatekey pair. The private key of that pair generates the signature for all end-entitycertificates (also known as leaf certificates), i.e. the certificates we issuefor use on your server.
Download The Isrg Root X1 Certificate File
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Having cross-signatures means that each of our RSA intermediates has twocertificates representing the same signing key. One is signed by DST RootCA X3 and the other is signed by ISRG Root X1. The easiest way to distinguishthe two is by looking at their Issuer field.
Similar to intermediates, root certificates can be cross-signed, often to increase clientcompatibility. Our ECDSA root, ISRG Root X2 was generated in fall 2020 and is the rootcertificate for the ECDSA hierarchy. It is represented by two certificates: one that isself-signed and one that is signed by ISRG Root X1.
Let's Encrypt is a free, automated, and open certificate authority brought to you by the nonprofit Internet Security Research Group (ISRG). Read all about our nonprofit work this year in our 2023 Annual Report.
Browsers (Chrome, Safari, Edge, Opera) generally trust the same root certificates as the operating system they are running on. Firefox is the exception: it has its own root store. Soon, new versions of Chrome will also have their own root store.
and I found that one solution that people are using are going to: and going to the Active-->ISRG Root X1-->Self-signed--> and downloading the PEM File for ISRG Root X1 and placing it in the keychain app, and trusting the certificate which removes the error.
I am looking for a way to obtain a certificate chain through Let's Encrypt that does not append a cross-signed ISRG Root X1 certificate at the end. Right now, when requesting a certificate for a domain using the latest acme.sh client, I receive a certificate chain which includes a ISRG Root X1 that is cross-signed by the DST Root CA X3, for Android compatibility I presume.
Thank you, it works for me too, now. My mistake was trying to switch the preferred chain during a certificate update, I had to re-issue the certificate completely instead of updating it (in acme.sh terms) for the setting to become effective.
On 30th September 2021, the root certificate that Let's Encrypt are currently using, the IdentTrust DST Root CA X3 certificate, will expire. You may or may not need to do anything about this Root CA expiring, but I'm betting a few things will probably break on that day so here's what you need to know!
Ultimately, all certificates that power HTTPS on the Web are issued by a CA, a trusted organisation recognised by your device/OS. Here you can see the list of "Trusted Root Certificate Authorities" on my current Windows 10 device:
These certificates are built into your OS and are generally updated as part of the normal process of updating your OS. The certificate in here that is going to cause a problem is this one, the IdenTrust DST Root CA X3.
This will not be the first time a root CA certificate has expired and I imagine it will follow the same trend as previous expirations where things break. If the root certificate that your certificate chain anchors on is expired then there's a good chance it's going to cause things to fail. This happened last year, on May 30th at 10:48:38 2020 GMT to be exact, when the AddTrust External CA Root expired and took a bunch of things with it. Organisations like Roku, Stripe, Spreedly and many others had problems and they weren't the only ones, even RedHat had something to say about the event.
In normal circumstances this event, a root CA expiring, wouldn't even be worth talking about because the transition from an old root certificate to a new root certificate is completely transparent. The reason we're having a problem at all is because clients don't get updated regularly and if the client doesn't get updated, then the new root CA that replaces the old, expiring root CA is not downloaded onto the device.
In the last year alone, Let's Encrypt have grown their market share quite a lot and as a CA becomes larger, it's certificates enable more of the Web to operate and as a result, when something like this comes along they have the potential to cause more problems. This is nothing to do with what Let's Encrypt have done, or have not done, this still comes down to the same underlying problem that devices out in the ecosystem aren't being updated as they should be.
Given the relative size difference between Let's Encrypt and AddTrust, I have a feeling that the IdenTrust root expiry has the potential to cause more problems. Nobody really knows how much of a problem it could be, it could be of similar consequence to the AddTrust expiry, or there could be some unforeseen circumstances and it could be far worse, your guess is as good as mine.
As I said above, this issue isn't happening because of anything that Let's Encrypt have or have not done, it's happening because all certificates eventually expire and if devices aren't being updated then they won't receive the new, replacement certificates. That said, Let's Encrypt have not sat around and twiddled their thumbs as the expiration date has approached, they've been working hard trying to figure out a solution.
Back in April 2019 I wrote Let's Encrypt to transition to ISRG root, where Let's Encrypt had planned to move away from the IdenTrust root to their own root, ISRG Root X1, that expires on 4th June 2035, giving us quite a number of years. The problem was, not many devices had received the necessary updates that include this new ISRG Root X1, issued 4 years prior in 2015! If a large selection of devices had not received an update to include this new root certificate, they simply won't trust it. This is basically the same problem we're experiencing now with the IdenTrust root expiring, because client devices haven't been updated, they also haven't received the new ISRG Root X1. The transition was postponed.
This loosely translates to Android devices not having received an update for over 4 years, meaning those devices had still not received the ISRG Root X1, meaning they wouldn't trust it. Let's Encrypt can't move to issuing from the new root, but the IdenTrust root still has 1 year of life left and the clock is really ticking now.
In the end, something a little unexpected has happened which might just reduce the serious impact of this event and make it a little more palatable. Because old Android devices don't check the expiration date of a root certificate when they use it, Let's Encrypt may be able to continue to chain down to the expired root certificate without any problem on those older devices. This does introduce some complexity going forwards, but ultimately the goal is Extending Android Device Compatibility for Let's Encrypt Certificates.
For this to work, Let's Encrypt had to get a cross-sign for their own ISRG Root X1 certificate from the expiring IdenTrust DST Root CA X3, but that wouldn't help at all unless the cross-signed root was valid for longer than the signing root, which it is. The new ISRG Root X1 certificate is valid for longer than the IdenTrust DST Root CA X3 that signed it!
By extending the validity of the new cross-signed root beyond that of the signing root, Let's Encrypt have found a way to sneak past the rules and buy us another 3 years until this problem happens all over again. Some people are not happy with the sneaky play, but it does seem that it falls within the rules, though not perhaps what everyone would have expected or preferred. This new, cross-signed ISRG Root X1 is also not to be confused with the existing ISRG Root X1 that hasn't changed and further details can be found here.
Hopefully, this will help alleviate a lot of the problems that were pending, but it's not a solution to all problems as any client that enforces the expiration date of the root certificate that it anchors on, will still fail.
This Let's Encrypt docs page contains a list of clients that only trust the IdenTrust DST Root CA X3 certificate and after that is the list of platforms that trust ISRG Root X1. I've blended these two lists together to produce the following list of clients that will break after the IdenTrust DST Root CA X3 expires.
The answer to the question "what will happen when the IdenTrust root expires?" depends on how widespread the types of clients listed above are. I don't know what's floating around out there on the Web, and I don't know what depends on those things either. One thing that I do know, though, is that at least something, somewhere is going to break.
Let's Encrypt is a non-profit certificate authority run by Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) that provides X.509 certificates for Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption at no charge. It is the world's largest certificate authority,[2] used by more than 300 million websites,[3] with the goal of all websites being secure and using HTTPS. The Internet Security Research Group (ISRG), the provider of the service, is a public benefit organization.[4] Major sponsors include the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the Mozilla Foundation, OVH, Cisco Systems, Facebook, Google Chrome, Internet Society, AWS, NGINX, and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.[5] Other partners include the certificate authority IdenTrust,[6] the University of Michigan (U-M),[7] and the Linux Foundation.[8]
The mission for the organization is to create a more secure and privacy-respecting World-Wide Web by promoting the widespread adoption of HTTPS.[9] Let's Encrypt certificates are valid for 90 days, during which renewal can take place at any time.[10] This is handled by an automated process designed to overcome manual creation, validation, signing, installation, and renewal of certificates for secure websites.[11][12] The project claims its goal is to make encrypted connections to World Wide Web servers ubiquitous.[13] By eliminating payment, web server configuration, validation email management and certificate renewal tasks, it is meant to significantly lower the complexity of setting up and maintaining TLS encryption.[14] 17dc91bb1f
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