Research

Working Papers

I study how financial frictions affect product market decisions. As products have different production cycles and generate cash flow at different maturities, firms may adjust product mix to alleviate financing constraints. I use the wine sector as laboratory because product decisions can be identified and linked to cash flow maturity, and exploit a banking regulation which impacted on credit availability. I find that credit-constrained firms adjust product mix in response to the shock, shifting from long to shorter cash flow maturity products. My results suggest the impact of financing constraints on product markets are exacerbated with longer, less-flexible, production cycles.


Presentations (including scheduled):  EEA Congress 2020, Rotterdam | WFA 2020, San Francisco | FIRS 2020, Budapest (cancelled due to COVID-19) | SFS Cavalcade 2020, North Carolina | Portuguese Finance Network Conference 2021 | Stockholm School of Economics | Tilburg University | INSEAD | Warwick Business School | BI Norwegian Business School | NHH Norwegian School of Economics | University of Bristol | University of Amsterdam | Banco de España | Queen Mary University of London | KU Leuven | Imperial College, London | HEC Finance PhD Workshop, Paris | Bank of Portugal Internal Seminar, Lisbon | QED Jamboree 2019, Lisbon | Nova SBE Brownbag Seminar, Lisbon | Nova SBE PhD Research Group, Lisbon | Portuguese Finance Network Conference (cancelled due to COVID-19).
Awards: 2020 Cubist Systematic Strategies Ph.D. Candidate Award for Outstanding Research
Previously circulated under the title "Financial Constraints and Product Market Decisions: the Role of Production Cycles".
Media coverage: Portuguese Economy Research Report

This paper studies the impact of an MBA-style course in finance for executives of medium and large enterprises on firm policies and performance through a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in Mozambique. Using both survey and accounting data, we find that executives change firm financial policies in response to the treatment. A reduction in working capital generates an increase in cash that is used to finance long-term investments. Those changes improve the performance of the treated firms. Overall, our results suggest that relatively small and low-cost interventions help firms to mitigate financial constraints and potentially affect economic development.

Online materials: here.


Presentations (including scheduled, *co-author): AFA 2020, San Diego | EFA 2019, Lisbon | Portuguese Finance Network Conference 2021 | IGC Policy Workshop, Maputo | Empirical Management Conference, World Bank* | Fundação Getúlio Vargas* | Labor and Finance Group Conference, U. Chicago Booth* | Arizona State University* | University of Liverpool* | EEIF - Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance* | Toulouse School of Economics* | University of Cologne* | Erasmus University Rotterdam* | Swiss Finance Institute* | Bocconi University* | University of Illinois at Chicago* | Imperial College Internal Seminar* | LBS Summer Finance Symposium* | University of Glasgow* | Corporate Governance: Examining Key Challenges and Perspectives 2020, ISEG, Lisbon
Media coverage: Financial Times, Forbes, RDP Africa (radio interview), VoxDev

This paper estimates the effect of violent political conflicts on inventory investment. We analyze monthly inventory purchases of 431 clients of a multinational beverage supplier in Mozambique in response to conflicts occurring within a 10km radius. Firms respond to violent political conflicts by decreasing purchases by as much as 19%. Small firms experience a stronger decline of up to 33% compared to large firms. On the extensive margin, small firms are more likely than large firms not to make a purchase on a month that follows a conflict, and also more likely to terminate the relationship with the supplier. We find consistent evidence of heterogeneous effects across firm size using annual survey data on manufacturing firms. Small firms are disproportionately affected by political violence, which might exacerbate already existing differences to large firms in developing countries.


Previously circulated as: Firm Responses to Violent Conflict
Presentations (including scheduled, *co-author): Stockholm School of Economics, Global Finance Conference, Lubrafin Conference, WEFIDEV Webinar in Finance and Development, Imperial College*
Media coverage: Financial Times, FinReg Blog - Duke University

This paper studies whether informational frictions prevent firms from accessing government support measures using an encouragement based randomized controlled trial. We focus on two COVID-19 relief programs for firms in Portugal. These programs provide (i) wage support for workers who are kept on payroll and (ii) lines of credit backed by government guarantees. We randomly assign firms to a treatment providing either simplified information regarding the program or a combination of information and step-by-step application support. We find a significant treatment effect of simple information provision to firms on take up for the wage support program, but not for lines of credit. Our results constitute direct evidence that information frictions can act as a meaningful barrier to comprehensive distribution of firm-level support measures. 

Presentations (including scheduled, *co-author): Universidade Carlos III de Madrid*, Bayes Business School (Cass)*, Universidade do Minho*, TUM School of Management*, Mannheim*, 2022 China International Conference in Finance*

Media coverage: Portuguese Economy Research Report; Ricardo Reis (in Expresso)
We study the role of contract splitting in public procurement. Procurement contracts with price below a threshold can be awarded at discretion, while awards for contracts above it are required to be competitive. Exploiting a reform that reduced the threshold, we find that buyers manipulate projects’ price in order to award contracts at discretion. We show that contract splitting, the division of large contracts into multiple smaller parts, is the most important mechanism of manipulation in public procurement in this context. Our evidence suggests that splitting is driven by favouritism rather than efficiency-promoting motives of manipulation: we find i) no evidence that splitting is intended to foster non-contractible quality through discretion, ii) that split contracts are more likely to be awarded to sellers associated with favouritism, iii) less transparent buyers manipulate more, and iv) split contracts are associated with slightly worse post-award performance.Presentations (including scheduled, *co-author): Workshop on Lobbying and Political Influence, Utrecht U | UniTo-CCA PhD Workshop in Economics, U.C. Carlo Alberto | EUI | ISEG

Publications

Work in Progress

Reports

Report commissioned by EFFAS - The European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies. 


Books and Chapters

Undergraduate-level mathematics textbook (Portuguese). Currently in the fourth edition.


Other Research Experience


Project Field Coordinator in Mozambique, 2013. Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) and Novafrica.