Bureaucratic Promotion Incentives and Government VC Risk Preferences (with Yiran Xu)
We study a core mechanism underlying state entrepreneurship: how bureaucratic promotion incentives shape public officials’ willingness to bear risk. We exploit a sharp institutional feature of the cadre system in China — city mayors become effectively ineligible for further promotion once they reach age 58 — to identify the causal effect of promotion incentives in a regression discontinuity design. We proxy risk preferences using revealed behaviour in government VC investments, focusing on investments that are typically riskier: early-stage deals, deals without private co-investors, and investments in new local industries. We find officials with promotion incentives undertake substantially more government VC investments, with the increase concentrated in these high-risk categories. These effects are robust to balance tests, permutation placebos, and alternative specifications. We then examine longer-run consequences using patent outcomes of government VC-backed firms over the subsequent five years. On average, greater risk-taking does not yield robust improvements in innovation. We further document heterogeneity in treatment effects. Longer-tenured mayors respond less strongly to promotion incentives and generate higher-quality innovation, while less capable mayors respond by taking greater risks, which worsens the average innovation performance of government VC–backed firms.
Presentation(s): AOM (2026 scheduled, best papers award), Oxford Applied Micro Seminar (2026), Oxford Development Workshop (2026)
The Rise of Government Venture Capital in China’s Industrial Policy (with Ruilin Cheng and Yiran Xu)
We study the effects of a mechanical change in industrial policy instrument choice by exploiting China’s 2014 Budget Law, which compulsorily curtailed local subsidies and shifted support towards government venture capital (VC). Using an event-study design with a continuous treatment across prefecture-level cities that differed in pre-amendment subsidy intensity, we estimate the consequences of this substitution. We find the shock increased government VC investment, especially in late-stage deals. It also precipitated a decrease in firm entry—mainly in manufacturing—while entrant quality rose and innovation output was unaffected. The composition of post-shock government VC matters: a higher early-stage or stand-alone share increased entry and amplified innovation. We also find that government VC crowded in private VC, with the effect strongest in locations with a higher share of early-stage government VC investments and lower ex-ante private capital availability. Overall, replacing subsidy tool with equity tool tilted industrial policy towards selectivity and mobilisation of private finance.
Presentation(s): AEDC (2026, scheduled)*, CSAE (2025, scheduled), SALDRU-ERSA (2025), Oxford Development Therapy (2025)
Automation Technology and Labour Offshoring (with Marina M. Tavares and Max Marczinek)
Funding: CROSTAG (£2000)
Chapters / Policy
Post-Brexit imports, supply chains, and the impact on prices (with Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh De Lyon, Luisa Opitz)
Published in The economics of Brexit: what have we learned?, CEPR
Coverage (selected): Financial Times, The Economist, New York Times, BBC, Reuters, BBC Radio 4, Economics Observatory, The Guardian, The Independent
Industrial Policy and Economic Growth: Evidence from Saudi Arabia (with Muhammed Khudadad Chattha)
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series (2026)