Week 1, 13 October 2025.
Populism does not stop at simplifying issues, nor at opposing them, but most of the time it seeks a scapegoat. In this way, narratives are created that no one would have thought of before, and that later come to seem almost legitimate. The network agenda, sociologically speaking, is the third stage of that sociological phenomenon known as “Agenda setting.”
The network agenda operates by juxtaposing issues that are not necessarily interconnected, assigning them a specific frame and emotional tone, and ultimately defining the relationships among these issues. Thus creating a narrative of the facts.
One of the examples in Italy of the use of this strategy is the case in which two issues — the management of immigration and the rise in the unemployment rate — were linked together as cause and effect by Matteo Salvini, who built his political narrative around this connection for years.
Populism relies on various techniques to simplify complex realities and to polarize both situations and their actors. This dynamic undermines the foundations of democracy by promoting misleading explanations for societal problems and fostering hatred and distrust toward the democratic system, which comes to appear not only incapable of solving issues, but even of recognizing them.
This is just one case, but how many other strategies are quietly shaping public perception in the same way? and what consequences might they have for the health of contemporary democracies?
Week 2, 24 October 2025.
This illustrates how digital spaces that are typically limited to ideological discussion — often amplifying the most polarized and misinformed viewpoints — can, in times of strong opposition to government policies, drift into actions that border on illegality.
This case is far from marginal: it is a clear example of how digital radicalization can spill over into the real world. Key phenomena in these dynamics are: Echo Chambers — digital spaces where individuals tend to reinforce their own ideas without allowing information sources that could challenge them to penetrate the space; and Filter Bubbles — dynamics created by social media algorithms that present users only with content considered close to their worldview.
What this case highlights is: when information circulates in self-contained networks without external viewpoints, the ‘us versus them’ mentality creates fertile ground for extreme behaviors, often justified as acts of resistance or defense of individual freedoms. The question that should be asked at this point is: if digital spaces continue to isolate opposing viewpoints, how will this affect the health of democratic debate?
Week 3, 31 October 2025.
For decades, China has been hailed as a miracle of modern growth — a nation that became the world’s second-largest economy. Skyscrapers, bullet trains, and digital innovation tell a story of unstoppable progress. Yet, behind this façade of prosperity, very little is known about what everyday life looks like in this country.
How does a system with almost no political representation maintain order, unity, and obedience among 1.4 billion citizens?
In fact, while statistics and official speeches portray a confident, harmonious China, personal testimonies tell us another story.
For example, in “1000 Years of Joys and Sorrows,” artist Ai Weiwei reveals what it means to live under a system where creativity and dissent are crimes against the state. His family’s history — from his father’s persecution to his own imprisonment — mirrors the country’s long struggle between expression and control.
Similarly, in “How I survived a chinese reeducation camp” Gulbahar Haitiwaji exposes the hidden machinery of repression in China’s western frontier. Her account of indoctrination, constant surveillance, and fear inside a so-called “re-education camp” unveils the human cost of Beijing’s obsession with conformity.
Can we say that China’s rapid rise has come at the cost of its people’s freedom? And can we truly call it wealth when prosperity is measured alongside control and silence?
Week 4, 6 November 2025.
In today’s political landscape, polarization has become a defining feature of public life. People no longer listen to one another; instead, they identify strictly as being on the right or the left, leaving little room for genuine dialogue or understanding. The space for nuance and compromise seems to be shrinking.
The article published by "Facing history and ourselves" does not only explore the main aspects of the concept of polarization, but also focuses on the American context in particular, where this phenomenon has been gaining ground. In the United States, political extremism is increasingly leading to social division, where people are judged primarily by whether they belong to the right or the left wing.
Finally, when considering possible solutions to this situation, the article highlights several key ideas:<< Focus on issues rather than parties, Break out of your media bubble, Learn to listen, and Find shared projects>>. But, can these approaches really save us from this unproductive dichotomy? More importantly, is our society truly ready to acknowledge extreme polarization as a problem and start working to overcome it?
Week 5, 14 November 2025
Populism has become a defining force across contemporary politics, emerging on both the far right and the far left as societies grow increasingly polarized. Its appeal is rooted in the idea of restoring power to “the people,” especially in moments of institutional distrust. But this rise of anti-establishment rhetoric also raises tough questions about how democracies should respond. So when does populism become a problem and when does it not?
Populism, we could say, it becomes dangerous for democracies when it rejects the democratic system itself. For example, when it pushes for only direct representation, it ends up erasing the very representative structures on which democracy is built. If “everyone represents everyone,” then in practice no one is accountable. But the same anti-system impulse can be valuable in other contexts. In authoritarian regimes, where institutions serve only to reinforce the power of a ruler or an elite, challenging the system can be an essential tool for opening political space, demanding rights, and mobilizing collective action. An historical example is mid-20th-century Argentina: Peronism emerged as a populist movement that reshaped social and political structures, expanding rights and mobilizing groups that previously had little influence, illustrating how populism can act as a catalyst in rigid or exclusionary systems.
Week 6, 21 November 2025
Land grabbing has re-emerged in the 21st century as a powerful force reshaping rural landscapes, food systems, and the sovereignty of entire communities. While often framed as foreign investment or development opportunity, the large-scale acquisition of land by powerful states and corporations frequently reproduces the same dynamics of extraction, domination, and dependency that characterized classical colonialism. In this sense, land grabbing is more than an economic transaction, it is a contemporary expression of neocolonialism, where control is asserted not through direct political rule but through economic leverage, resource exploitation, and the displacement of local populations. Understanding this connection is essential for grasping how global inequalities are maintained and why resistance movements continue to emerge across the Global South.
The charts (2021 data) reveals a strong concentration of large-scale investments by countries such as China—by far the leading actor—followed by Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. Other notable investors include Singapore, Spain, Belgium, Japan, India, and Italy, highlighting how land grabbing remains driven largely by powerful global economies.
On the other hand, the targets of these investors are predominantly countries in the Global South, where vast stretches of arable land, weaker regulatory frameworks, and socio-economic vulnerability make large-scale acquisitions easier to negotiate. Finally, we can state that this phenomenon worsens the already fragile economic situation of these countries.
Week 7, 28 November 2025
Since the Lisbon Treaty, EU member states seemed committed to closer cooperation. The Parliament gained stronger legislative powers, and the Union appeared to move toward deeper integration. Yet today, many governments seem eager to reclaim what they once delegated. The rise of nationalist parties, focused primarily on domestic interests even at the expense of common European priorities, has accelerated this shift.
How did we get here? Many of the challenges Europe faces, such as migration or climate pressures, are undeniably global. In principle, they demand shared solutions rather than fragmented national strategies. However, growing perceptions of inefficiency at the EU level, alongside repeated crises, may have convinced some states that acting alone is faster or more effective, even if this assumption is questionable.
Where does this leave the Union? Can cooperation survive in an era of renewed national assertiveness? And can the EU remain effective if its members doubt the very value of acting together?
In my view, today’s challenges demand closer cooperation, not further separation. The issues we face are too complex and interconnected for any country to tackle alone. If member states remain stuck in the current stalemate, hesitant to move forward together, we risk worsening the very problems we are trying to solve. Only by strengthening collective action can the EU hope to respond effectively to a rapidly changing world.
Week 8, 5 December 2025
Euroscepticism is often imagined as a loud rejection of the European Union, embodied by Brexit. Yet the contemporary reality is more subtle. For many member states, the goal is not to leave the Union, but to criticise it, reshape it, and claim greater autonomy from within. Euroscepticism today is as much a communication strategy as it is a political conviction.
Take Italy as exemple. Once one of the most enthusiastic supporters of European integration, Italy became a fertile ground for sceptical narratives after the financial crisis of 2008. The euro and the austerity policies associated with Brussels were quickly framed as the origins of unemployment, economic stagnation and the decline of the welfare state. The crisis of migration strengthened this perception: as a frontline country, Italy felt abandoned by other members, and the sentence “Europe leaves us alone” entered the political vocabulary.
This does not translate into a real attempt to exit. Italian euroscepticism fluctuates. When crises deepen, criticism rises and sovereignty becomes a rallying cry. When European funds arrive the tone softens. The Union becomes not the problem, but the solution. In this oscillation, Italy shows the strategic character of contemporary euroscepticism: it is less about ideology, and more about negotiation.
Rather than imagining the EU as a stable project with loyal supporters and sworn enemies, it might be more accurate to see it as an ongoing bargaining arena. Euroscepticism, in this sense, is not a threat from the outside, but a pressure from within: a way for national governments to defend interests, protect identities and shift responsibilities. It is not only a rejection of Brussels, is it not? more a mirror that reflects the unresolved tensions of European societies themselves.
Week 9, 12 Dicembre 2025
The chart presents a global overview of political regimes, showing how countries are distributed across different levels of democracy and authoritarianism.
Only 12% of countries are classified as full democracies, suggesting that stable and consolidated democratic systems are limited. A larger portion, 28%, consists of flawed democracies, where elections exist but institutions and civil liberties are weakened.
Hybrid regimes account for 19%, reflecting systems that combine democratic procedures with authoritarian practices. At the same time, authoritarian regimes represent 28%, highlighting the continued strength of non-democratic governance worldwide. The remaining 14% lack sufficient data, underlining gaps in global political monitoring. Overall, the chart shows that fully functioning democracies are a minority, while hybrid and authoritarian regimes dominate. This situation reveals the fragility of democratic governance and the growing relevance of hybrid systems in contemporary global politics. Authoritarian and hybrid systems together account for nearly half of the global total, raising serious concerns about the future of democratic norms worldwide. The main worry is that, as hybrid regimes become more stable and consolidated, the trend of democratic backsliding may intensify, creating an increasingly troubling outlook for democracy.
This update cycle concludes here, at the end of the ninth week. Throughout this journey, it has become evident how complex today’s global situation is and how fragile the balance of the world ,and our trust in the stability of democracies, can be. We are emerging from a century in which the spread of democracy was widely seen as only a matter of time; instead, we now face established democracies experiencing democratic backsliding, while countries thought to be moving toward democracy increasingly use democratic mechanisms to consolidate authoritarian or hybrid systems that operate according to their own rules.
As shown, the factors involved are numerous and varied: economic, psychological, political, and sociological, making them difficult to fully grasp. The questions are many, while the answers and solutions remain uncertain. Are we entering a phase in which democracy itself will be rethought? Is this a moment of renewal toward something new? How do current global events shape political systems? And will populist movements and far-right forces continue to gain ground, or will this wave eventually be stopped?